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ABSTRACT 
 While recent scholarship has documented the long history of African American 
disenfranchisement leading up to mass incarceration, it has evaded a comprehensive 
investigation of Latino encounters with the U.S. criminal justice system by relying on a 
false dichotomy between black and Latino carceral experiences. The historical roots of 
Latino criminalization and punishment in the United States, dating back to the 1845 
annexation of Texas, merit a study that both particularizes Latino experiences and 
problematizes essentialized racial categories. Thus, this dissertation charts the trajectories 
of Latino racial constructions as shaped by incarceration, revealing how prisons have 
defined and destabilized the boundaries of Latinidad. Furthermore, this project finds that 
these racializations have served as decisive factors in determining the incarcerability of 
Latinos, with mass incarceration and deportation acting as intertwined, complementary 
systems of control. Utilizing a wide range of sources including prison records, personal 
memoirs, political discourses, local newspapers, survey data, and imagery from street and 
prison culture, this study also highlights the conflict between the concept of race as a 
social construct and efforts to quantify racial disparities in U.S. institutions. 
 
 The first chapter identifies the ways in which Latinos were perceived and 
recorded as racial others in registers from the nation’s flagship prisons between 1850 and 
1950. The personal histories of Latinos in this early era and later in the twentieth century 
also capture the normalization of interactions with law enforcement and the routine of 
jailtime. To address the systemic complexities that have dictated Latino racial 
developments, in the next chapters, I introduce an analytical framework based on three 
different racial paradigms. Chapter Two deconstructs understandings of Latinos as 
perpetual foreigners paired with the notion of immigrants as criminals. Chapter Three 
explores Latino experiences with criminalized blackness due to African ancestry and 
shared socioeconomic disadvantage. Chapter Four examines Latino disenfranchisement 
founded on Amerindian heritage and the reappropriation of Indianism as a tool of 
resistance in response. Finally, the last chapter analyzes longitudinal survey data, finding 
nuances within the racial disparities typically cited in criminal justice reports, while 
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Introduction – Criminal Justice Shapings of Latinidad 
 The most visceral experiences of being racially othered occur in the context of 
antagonistic, hostile relationships between an oppressed class and the authority figures 
that police and govern them. Thus, the relationship that Latinos have had with the U.S. 
criminal justice system informs the racial parameters that have historically excluded them 
from white privilege. In this dissertation, I argue that in the United States, being Latino or 
Hispanic means more than the national origins of one’s family, the etymology of a 
surname, or a language spoken by relatives and ancestors. Officially, “Hispanic” refers to 
people with ancestry from Spanish-speaking countries especially in Latin America but 
also including Spain, and “Latino” refers to people with ancestry from Latin America 
including non-Spanish-speaking countries such as Brazil. Both terms represent umbrella 
categories that many record systems, including the U.S. Census, have framed as an 
identity that should not only transcend national origins, but racial boundaries as well. In 
practice, however, many Latino communities in the United States have evolved into their 
own, mutually exclusive racial groups based on the social constructions of otherness that 
have occurred throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shaped by the forces of 
criminalization and punishment.  
Moreover, the U.S. perception of Latin Americans as racially distinct falls within 
a broader historical narrative. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when people 
used the word “race” in reference to Italians, Jews, or Poles, as Matthew Jacobson has 
argued in Whiteness of a Different Color, or Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, or the “Latin 
races,” as I assert in this study, they did not do so as a misnomer for ethnicity; they meant 
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race.1 Scholars like Jacobson, Mae Ngai, Michael Omi, and Howard Winant have tracked 
the fluidity of racial definitions that led white races to become a single white race 
through the immigration exclusion period in the early twentieth century.2 And as 
Jacobson suggested, the process of “becoming Caucasian… touches the histories of every 
other racially coded group on the American scene.”3 As a result, that formation of 
whiteness set the racial understandings of peoples with Latin American ancestry on a 
different trajectory.  
 To be sure, U. S. history is defined by its racial reimaginings that have often 
rendered the distinctions between race and ethnicity inevitably unstable—a phenomenon 
exemplified by the discrepancies between the formal recognition of Hispanic and Latino 
as ethnic labels despite the deployment of the terms as racial designations. Conceptions 
of both race and ethnicity rely on common descent—genealogy linked to a particular 
geographic region and some sense of a shared culture. However, when the application of 
discriminatory laws and policies has depended on racial boundaries, the complexity of 
where race ends and ethnicity begins has been a critical debate that resulted in either the 
institutionalization or deinstitutionalization of social constructions of difference and 
placement of those differences on a racial hierarchy.  
                                               
1 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy 
of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1-12. 
2 Jacobson, 7. Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern 
America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 7; Michael Omi and Howard Winant, 
Racial Formations in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s (New York: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1987), 65. 
3 Jacobson, 8.  
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 When “Spanish” existed as one of many white races in the nineteenth century, 
U.S. policymakers and researchers thought of the Spanish government, people, and 
culture as inferior and unsophisticated in comparison to the Anglo-dominated systems of 
the United States. And in U.S. immigration discourses in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Spaniards ranked toward the bottom of the white races. Though 
European, they were not part of the valued “old stock.” And that Spaniards had made the 
error of intermixing with uncivilized peoples—Indians and Negroes—proved that they 
were a people unfit for self-government. Furthermore, U.S. policymakers claimed that the 
mixed-race offspring of Spanish and other European, Amerindian, and black people 
resulted in a breed worse than those found within each single race.  
 Of course, the peopling of the Americas—indigenous populations met by 
European colonizers, enslaved Africans, and future waves of immigrants—has meant that 
the people born in the Americas over the past several centuries have had ancestry derived 
from different continents and physical features thought to correspond to that ancestry, 
including skin color. Latin American populations have long consisted of people with 
predominantly indigenous ancestry, European ancestry, or African ancestry, but also 
varied skin tones all along the color spectrum, as well as high levels of intermixing going 
back to first contact. As a result, the understanding of Latin America as a site of 
pervasive race-mixing has manifested in a connotation of racial impurity among Latinos. 
While the United States had fiercely tried to police sexual boundaries, the peoples of 
Latin America annexed and entering the country seemingly defied those efforts. 
Therefore, despite the racial hierarchies that have existed in Latin American countries, 
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not entirely unlike those of the United States, as well as the formal definitions of Latino 
and Hispanic, the race of people with Latin American ancestry has often transmuted into 
a homogenized, non-white category for immigrants and their descendants in the United 
States which in turn has signaled stereotypes of degeneracy and an uncivilized manner.  
 While race constitutes both a constructed identity and a manufactured 
observation, Americans have trusted that there could be authorities on race to confirm 
popular understandings of difference: science and the state. The racial definitions 
prescribed by these authorities have undermined one another from time to time given 
their specific biases and agendas. Even state records have used contradictory categorical 
systems to racially code people. And yet, those prescriptions have challenged common 
understandings of difference as often as they have created them. In this dissertation, I 
show how prison records, going as far back as the mid-nineteenth century, better aligned 
with common understandings of Latino racial difference than the U.S. Census, which 
largely erased these marginalized populations from its records. Indeed, criminalization 
and punishment produce the most vivid episodes of racial othering, experiences which 
often awaken identity formations. Ultimately, those of “pure” European blood were to be 
protected by the law, while those of “impure” blood threatened law and order.  
That being said, as perceptions and definitions of race have changed over time, 
criminal justice statistics have relied on unstable categorical schemes when it comes to 
the conflicted racial coding of Latinos. Latino/Hispanic is sometimes treated as ethnicity 
and not race, so that criminal justice statistics mask racial disparities by incorporating 
Latino populations within a black-white framework, largely counting Latinos as white on 
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paper, despite lived experiences as marginalized populations. This practice has concealed 
racial disparities not only between white and Latino populations, but between white and 
non-Latino black populations. Alternatively, Latino/Hispanic has been treated as a 
mutually exclusive racial category notwithstanding formal definitions for those terms. 
These inconsistent systems result in a Latino data gap, as well as a missing narrative 
about the deep-rooted discipline, criminalization, and punishment of Latinos that dates 
back over a century before the adoption of these terms in popular discourses. 
Even though imprisonment has exploded in the past several decades, incarceration 
has solved the dominant society’s anxiety to control undesirable populations for a long 
time. Leading philosophies at the end of the eighteenth century advocated for replacing 
capital and corporal punishment, as well as the public shaming popularly used in colonial 
America, with a new method of justice—the increased use of prisons. Once just a space 
to hold people awaiting punishment, prison became the punishment itself. But in addition 
to retribution, incarceration was also meant to accomplish incapacitation, deterrence, and 
most importantly, provide the opportunity for the rehabilitation of those perceived to be 
deviant members of society. From its inception in the early nineteenth century to 
Progressive Era reforms, states re-imagined the modern prison time and again. Over the 
course of that century, new trends called for subjecting inmates to solitary confinement, 
forced silence, intensely regimented schedules, hard labor, and psychoanalysis, all in the 
name of rehabilitation, with each new effort failing to reduce crime in any meaningful 
way.  
 6 
Instead, as Michel Foucault stated in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, the modern prison epitomized the eighteenth-century movement toward a more 
disciplinary society.4 Foucault defined the actions taken to subjugate human bodies to the 
will of the ruling class as disciplines, noting that this form of social control had been 
employed since the seventeenth century in education, hospitals, and the military. Yet he 
contended that prisons, the built structures that facilitate detention as punishment, most 
definitively exemplified disciplines being used to sustain power over society. The modern 
U.S. prison has controlled peoples by incapacitating prisoners with optimal designs for 
surveillance, while deterring free citizens from disobedience.5 Foucault suggested, 
however, that prisons fail to eradicate crime, because their focus is not to punish the 
crime, but to identify delinquent individuals who disrupt the social order.  
Accordingly, from 1925 until 1972, the United States prison population continued 
to grow in steady proportion to the increases in the general population. In 1973, the 
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended 
that no new prisons be built and that juvenile institutions be closed, as the commission 
found that these systems had failed to prevent crime, probably creating it instead. And yet 
in the three decades to follow, the number of people sent to prison skyrocketed, far 
outpacing the growth among all U.S. residents as a result of the turn toward “tough on 
crime” policies. This political move meant more convictions, along with longer 
                                               
4 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 
1979). 
5 Nineteenth-century architect John Haviland designed prisons to “strike fear into the hearts of 
those who thought of committing a crime,” as quoted in Francis X. Dolan, Eastern State 
Penitentiary (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2007), 11. 
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sentences, and long-term, post-incarceration punishments—essentially indefinite 
disenfranchisement for those coming into contact with the criminal justice system.  
The attention to this unprecedented and unmatched upsurge in U.S. incarceration 
rates has been accompanied by particular concern for the racial disparities in the criminal 
justice process. Most scholars and advocates have come to the consensus that the 
crackdown on street crime that focused on poor neighborhoods—specifically the War on 
Drugs as first initiated by the Nixon administration—has been the main culprit for the 
disproportionate rates of incarceration seen among people of color. However, when the 
prison boom took off in the 1970s, it was not the first time that black and Latino 
communities felt the weight of the criminal justice system. 
Thinking about the function of prisons historically and about the population most 
impacted by mass incarceration today, scholars such as Michelle Alexander and Loïc 
Wacquant have rightfully set prisons within the legacy of American slavery and Jim 
Crow.6 Because the institution has successfully kept the black community in bondage, 
Wacquant and Alexander have both made the case that mass incarceration constitutes a 
form of social control that facilitates the racial ideology of white dominance over a black 
undercaste.7 And like its predecessor institutions, mass incarceration was adopted and has 
been maintained by forming a hegemonic system in which white conservative elites 
exploit vulnerable, poor, working-class whites’ willingness to participate in a racial 
                                               
6 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 
(New York: The New Press, 2010). 
7 See Loïc Wacquant, “America’s New ‘Peculiar Institution’: On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto,” 
Theoretical Criminology 4, no. 3 (2000) and “Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet 
and Mesh,” Punishment & Society, vol. 3 no. 1 (2001): 95-133; Alexander, The New Jim Crow. 
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hierarchy and assert privilege, rather than standing in solidarity with black Americans at 
the bottom of a class hierarchy. Wacquant and Alexander accounted for white prisoners 
as collateral sacrificed to preserve the system; and as Wacquant suggested, each new 
system “is less total, less capable of encompassing and controlling the entire race.”8  
For that reason, different iterations of the penal system have resulted in response 
to various episodes of racial conflicts in the United States including, as Michelle 
Alexander has articulated in The New Jim Crow, the abolition of slavery, the brief social 
and political mobility of black Americans in the South during Reconstruction, the Great 
Migration, the rise and fall of Jim Crow, the successes of the Civil Rights Movement, and 
the visibility of the Black Power Movement.9 While this recent scholarship has explored 
the long history of African American disenfranchisement leading up to an age of mass 
incarceration, the historical roots of Latino criminalization and punishment merit an 
investigation that both particularizes Latino experiences and problematizes essentialized 
racial categories that isolate black and Latino encounters with U.S. law enforcement. It is 
especially important to note how Latino racial identity has evolved in response to 
experiences with police, in courtrooms, and behind bars, and how the criminal justice 
system has, in turn, been transformed as a result of ethno-racial developments.  
Therefore, this dissertation explores a different series of episodes that capture 
Latino experiences in the United States: the ambiguous citizenship status of Mexican 
residents in newly acquired U.S. land following the U.S.-Mexican War; associations with 
                                               
8 Wacquant, “America’s New ‘Peculiar Institution,’” 380. 
9 Alexander, The New Jim Crow. 
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runaway slaves and black neighbors; the rise and fall of practices akin to Jim Crow that 
targeted Latinos; waves of immigration; backlash toward migratory, farm, and union 
labor; the formation of ethnic-based youth gangs in urban centers; civil rights 
mobilization; and the consolidation of a pan-Hispanic identity. But these episodes in 
Latino history do not merely parallel or complement the history of black Americans that 
Alexander has presented by introducing a similar tale of a different color. Rather, these 
moments complicate racial understandings of Latinos by demonstrating that Latino 
groups have identified themselves or been identified as white, black, Amerindian, and/or 
foreign in the United States, depending on the politics of the decade, the region in the 
United States, or the group’s country of origin.10   
Although I have organized the chapters that follow thematically, the period of 
analysis herein begins with the U.S. annexation of Texas in 1845. The United States was 
forced to reconcile with new subjects within its borders. Mexicans became an annexed 
colonized population in the United States, and all the racial infrastructures that the nation 
had created to cope with black and Native American peoples came into play to properly 
place Mexicans and other Latin American immigrants within the established social order. 
In the decades to follow, U.S. imperialism led policymakers to assess the populations of 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic in consideration of potential annexation, 
while the proximity of those countries allowed for the migration of their peoples to the 
United States, especially in the wake of the Spanish-American War and subsequent U.S. 
                                               
10 While I plan to discuss other Latino groups, I mention Mexicans and Puerto Ricans specifically 
given their prominent presence in the United States over the course of this dissertation’s timeline.  
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intervention projects on the islands. Then, with the large waves of immigrants from Latin 
American countries following the change in legislation through the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965, the visibility of Latinos as a potential political and consumer 
collective resulted in the normalized use of a pan-ethnic “Hispanic” identifier on official 
forms and in popular discourses in the 1970s and 1980s. These watershed moments when 
the United States was forced to confront its racialized understandings of various Latino 
groups not only span many decades, but they also inform contemporary dialogues that 
continue to address the way Latinos are counted and categorized. 
Much of the evidence I look to is also organized by geography, given that Latino 
communities have had distinctive settlement patterns in different regions of the United 
States. In the Southwest, Mexicans have inhabited the land since before it became the 
United States, and have since immigrated to and concentrated in the region along with 
other Latinos, especially Central Americans in more recent decades. Meanwhile, Puerto 
Ricans have been the dominant Latino group in the Northeast since the turn of the 
century, but have increasingly been joined by other Latino groups, including Dominicans. 
While this research primarily turns to data from Texas and California as representations 
of the Southwest, contrasted with New York and Massachusetts as representations of the 
Northeast, it notes the important stories that take place elsewhere throughout the United 
States—namely the concentrations of Latinos in Illinois and Florida. Through this 
project, I demonstrate how race and space have intersected and intertwined to shape the 
racial identities of Latinos in conjunction with the social control program that is mass 
incarceration, making for a unique and pronounced impact on Latino lives. 
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Most importantly, by examining their experiences with the criminal justice 
system, this study reframes racial conceptions of Latinos by illuminating three racial 
paradigms that have dictated the identities and identifications of Latinos over the course 
of U.S. history. I refer to these paradigms as: the Latino-as-foreigner, associations-with-
blackness, and Indianism. While most scholars would not deny that Latinos have endured 
discrimination in the United States, many do, however, have the tendency to label this 
treatment as xenophobia. At best, xenophobia presents a limited understanding of the 
impetus for discrimination against Latinos. By and large, this dissertation finds 
xenophobia to be a gross mislabeling of Latino criminalization. Indeed, my contention 
with existing scholarship is its focus on the treatment of Latinos as foreigners. Prison 
studies dehistoricize the experiences of Latinos by conceptualizing their status as 
perpetual immigrants while also neglecting to frame their encounters with the U.S. 
criminal justice system as a form of racial othering characterized by both colorism and 
indigenous dispossession.11  
And while I recognize that deportation has long functioned as a form of 
punishment for Latino immigrants, acting as a complementary program to incarceration, 
this project looks to mass incarceration as America’s foremost program for controlling 
and punishing the racial other.12 The dissertation will track how, when, and why Latinos 
                                               
11  On colorism, see Margaret Hunter, Race, Gender, and the Politics of Skin Tone (New York: 
Routledge, 2005). On Latino Indianism, see Martha Menchaca, “Chicano Indianism: A Historical 
Account of Racial Repression in the United States,” American Ethnologist 20, no. 3 (August 
1993): 583-603. 
12 In turn, black immigrants, Latino and non-Latino alike, will also merit discussion in this project 
given the proportion of criminal removals sent back to countries with large black populations.  
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have been racially othered, by national, state, and local governments and law 
enforcement agencies. It will also consider Latino self- and collective identifications as 
racial others. Furthermore, I contend that the U.S. criminal justice system is such a 
powerful institution in the lives of Latinos that it acts as a principal force in their race-
making processes. 
Putting the role of mass incarceration in Latino lives into historical perspective, 
this study will not merely look at Latinos in jail cells over the years; rather, it will 
investigate several episodes since the mid-nineteenth century that have been defined by 
surveillance, criminalization, punishment, and control. Latino incarceration follows a 
legacy of formal law enforcement as well as extralegal justice, including race-based 
denial of full citizenship, courtroom discrimination, exclusion, expulsion, banishment, 
and deportation.13 And, just as it is necessary to acknowledge what distinguishes the 
Latino experience with the criminal justice system from non-Latino black and white 
experiences, it is important to note where similarities lie both before and after the rise of 
mass incarceration. The scholarship covering the impact of mass incarceration on people 
of color has garnered national attention, but it fails to recognize that citizenship status and 
region matter for incarcerable Latinos as much as the rise of conservatism, 
deindustrialization, and deinstitutionalization.    
                                               
13 Texts on the use of these individual practices include: Ken Gonzalez-Day, Lynching in the 
West: 1850-1935 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2006); Deirdre Moloney, National 
Insecurities: Immigrants and US Deportation Policy since 1882 (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2012); George A. Martinez, “The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican 
Americans and Whiteness,” Harvard Latino Law Review 2 (1997).   
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While “tough on crime” policies may have been invoked to address the disarray 
of ghetto communities in the 1970s, recognition that this period also served as a pivotal 
moment for Latino racial identity informs this analysis as well. One must consider that 
part of what accounted for rising Latino disproportionality in prisons was not necessarily 
new efforts to target street crime, or even growing numbers of Latinos in the general 
population being reflected in the population behind bars, but a mainstream push for 
Latinos to be identified under the pan-ethnic collective identity of “Hispanic.” In other 
words, despite the common explanation put forth about the War on Drugs leading to the 
mass arrests and imprisonment of Latinos, Latinos had been arrested systematically, 
facing unequal justice, many years before the onset of the prison boom in the 1970s. 
Thus, the racial constructions of Latinos through criminalization have been long in the 
making. 
The first chapter broadly addresses the question of what it has meant to be Latino 
and be incarcerated in the United States. Consequently, I begin by turning toward early 
prison records beginning in the mid-nineteenth century in California, Texas, and New 
York. These prison registers demonstrate how state authorities perceived people with 
Latin American ancestry compared to people of other backgrounds. They display the 
racial markers that prison officials observed and used to distinguish Latinos as a group 
separate from white and black inmates, as well as the ways that Latinos were 
homogenized, racially othered, and marked as permanent foreigners despite U.S. nativity. 
These records also document the normalization of prison interactions that Latinos had 
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with the criminal justice system over a century before the War on Drugs, the prison 
boom, and the post-1965 waves of immigration from Latin American countries.  
Then, given that much of the scholarship on the rise of mass incarceration, 
especially the studies that examine racial disparities in the criminal justice system, largely 
focus on the experiences of African Americans, or simply mention Latinos as a statistic, I 
review two memoirs that can provide a firsthand, Latino perspective on the impact of the 
criminal justice system in impoverished Latino communities in New York City and Los 
Angeles. These narratives enrich the understandings of Latino carceral experiences as 
part of a larger phenomenon with unique cultural perspectives. These powerful anecdotes 
also introduce the three racial paradigms discussed in further detail in the following three 
chapters. 
In the second chapter, I address the Latino-as-foreigner paradigm, in which 
Latinos have been presumed to be criminals by virtue of their assumed immigrant status. 
In popular and political discourse, the most common conflation of Latinos is the framing 
of the entire population as immigrants—a manifestation of the essentialized, racial 
othering of Latinos, despite a long history of nativity in the United States, and island-born 
Puerto Ricans having U.S. citizenship. In turn, Latinos have not been able to assimilate 
and merge into whiteness in the same way that earlier waves of European immigrants did. 
Instead, Latinos have existed in the United States as alien citizens and permanent foreign 
others.  
Meanwhile, xenophobic Americans have attributed crime to the foreign-born 
since the large waves of immigration in the nineteenth century raised nativist fears, in 
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spite of the consistent research to the contrary. To add to that misconception, with 
increased restrictions since the Immigration Act of 1924, Latino immigrants have faced 
the additional stereotype of being “illegal aliens.” For many Americans, “illegal” has 
been synonymous with “criminal.” However, while being in the country “illegally” 
qualifies as a civil infraction, it is not itself a criminal act. Furthermore, to think about 
and interrogate this paradigm in a contemporary context, I also use immigrant removal 
data to dispel the myths that deportation efforts target violent criminals and drug 
offenders. Rather, anti-immigrant policies effectively criminalize all Latinos, regardless 
of citizenship status or nativity, while non-citizens, regardless of whether they committed 
an immigration-related offense or violated a criminal law, face a harsh collateral 
consequence following incarceration in the United States—the additional punishment of 
deportation. 
In the third chapter, I argue that the incarceration of Latinos must also be 
understood within the context of black criminalization. With the history of African 
slavery in Latin American countries coupled with high levels of racial mixing, the 
presence of Afro-Latinos and people of partial African ancestry became a known reality 
taken into consideration in deciphering the race of peoples from Latin America. 
Therefore, the racial profiling of Latinos who have identified or been perceived to be 
black has resulted in disparities within the criminal justice system comparable with those 
of non-Latino black Americans. Furthermore, Mexicans and African Americans in the 
Southwest, like Puerto Ricans and African Americans in the Northeast, even if thought of 
as mutually exclusive groups, have been conceived of as components of the same 
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underclass, and therefore part of the same problem population prone to crime. In turn, 
this chapter complicates the fictitious racial division between black and Latino, as 
Latinos have also been subjected to racial profiling and colorism within the U.S. criminal 
justice system. 
For the fourth chapter, I look toward the wake of the U.S.-Mexican War as the 
northern frontier of Mexico became the newly acquired territory of the United States. 
U.S. policymakers contemplated the ineligibility of suffrage and citizenship for the 
annexed colonized population of Mexicans in the transferred territory given their Indian 
ancestry. Eventually this translated to the association of Mexicans with Indians through 
the first half of the twentieth century, accompanied by connotations of being degenerate, 
uncivilized, violent, and prone to crime. In the second half of the twentieth century, 
Latino activist groups—Mexican, Puerto Rican, and others—followed the anti-colonial 
thought of Latin American countries that reappropriated an Indian identity to assert 
autonomy and a claim to their lands. For Latinos in the United States, citing Indian 
heritage justified their place among unwelcoming neighbors and hostile authority figures. 
The significance of this identity as a form of resistance to criminalization manifested in a 
performance of identity that prominently featured Indian iconography in street culture 
and prison life. Criminalized Latinos’ antagonistic relationships with the law positioned 
them as racial others, but American indigeneity provided a sense of resilient opposition to 
oppression. 
While I use the first four chapters to establish that the U.S. criminal justice 
system’s treatment of people of Latin American ancestry has played a critical role in 
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defining them racially, other scholars have also made the argument that incarceration can 
change how an individual identifies racially over time. In the final chapter, by examining 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a dataset with responses from a nationally 
representative sample from 1979 to the present, I investigate the extent to which mass 
incarceration has played a role at the individual level in impacting the perceived race and 
racial identities of people who entered adulthood with the rise of mass incarceration. 
Furthermore, the longitudinal data allow for the tracking of Latinos’ lives as they cycled 
through jails and prison cells. This approach provides critical stories about the 
circumstances that have surrounded a generation’s experience with the criminal justice 
system in ways that Department of Justice and state prison statistics fail to capture, 
especially when many states have data gaps for people who have come to be known as 
Hispanic or Latino. 
The vast majority of the studies on race and incarceration have explored the 
disparities between black and white populations without critically considering whom 
those labels encompass and how their application varies based on the individual and 
across time. Those studies that frame their discussion within a traditional black-white 
racial dichotomy ignore the substantial numbers of Latinos that have also been entangled 
by the criminal justice system. Meanwhile, the existing research that has approached the 
subject of mass incarceration as a comparison of experiences between white communities 
and “people of color” or “black and Hispanic” individuals overlooks the criminalization 
and punishment of non-black racial groups that predate the era of mass incarceration. In 
response, my study investigates how prisons have defined and destabilized racial 
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categories as evident through the historical experiences of Latinos within the U.S. 
criminal justice system, experiences which have played a significant role in shaping the 


















Chapter One – Carceral Understandings of Latinos, Latino Carceral Experiences 
I’m the huevon Mexican, cell-taught,  
self-taught, the original writ-writer,  
chained up and locked down  
for a lifetime. I’m the Mexican  
who never gave up, who fought till  
every prisoner, guard, and lawyer, 
in America knows me, I taught myself  
to use your tools: I’m Ruiz,  
unbroken for all your torture. 
 
-David Ruíz, “Steel on Steel.”1 
 
In 2005, 63-year-old David Ruíz, a Mexican-American man who had been 
incarcerated all but eleven years of his life, reflected on his experiences as a Chicano 
activist within the Texas prison system. After years of violence and hardship endured 
under the highly exploitative system of building tenders—a convict guard system 
characterized by white dominance, extortion, and sexual abuse—Ruíz acted as the 
plaintiff in a civil action case, Ruíz v. Estelle, with the initial writ filed in 1972 and a 
decision granted in 1980 that addressed prisoner complaints regarding overcrowding, 
inadequate health care, unhygienic conditions, and lack of access to legal assistance. 
Most significantly, the court called for the termination of the convict guard system. The 
radical activism of the Chicano Movement transcended prison walls and guided Ruíz and 
his fellow inmates in their quest for justice, as they found inspiration through “embracing 
a cultural awareness of our ancestors… the wonders of the Maya, Inca, the Azteca,” 
relating the “unequal prison system” to “the subjugation of Mexico by the United States” 
and “things happening in Puerto Rico,” which they saw as part of the same “resistance 
                                               
1 David Ruíz, “Steel on Steel,” Texas Observer, December 2, 2005. 
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against imperialism.”2 Indeed, in New York in the 1970s, Puerto Rican inmates affiliated 
with the Young Lords, a radical Puerto Rican rights group, rebelled and rallied with 
demands “specifically pertinent to Latino prisoners,” including more interpreters in 
courts and prisons, free Spanish-language reading materials, Puerto Rican attorneys, and 
the end of injustices against “boricuas” on behalf of the “‘establecimiento.’”3 
While the growth and solidarity of Latinos in prisons entered an era of greater 
visibility in the 1970s as the prison boom took off and in the 1980s as more Dominicans, 
Cubans, and South and Central Americans joined Mexicans and Puerto Ricans behind 
bars, the dire carceral experiences and racial othering of peoples with Latin American 
ancestry within the U.S. criminal justice system has its roots in the Southwest’s first built 
prisons following the end of the U.S.-Mexican War. This chapter will focus on the ways 
jails and prisons racialized their Latino inmates through homogenizing categorical 
systems and essentializing labels. These labels, however, often lacked consistency in 
terms of correlation with nativity and other formal systems of categorizing race, such as 
the U.S. Census. In other words, these record-keeping systems demonstrate how the 
prison, and the criminal justice system as a whole, have acted as a race-making institution 
for Latinos, who have been treated as a group separate from white and black inmates, 
even before they were systematically counted in U.S. census records.  
                                               
2 Language excerpted from interview with one of Ruíz’s fellow Chicano activist prisoners, Alvaro 
Luna Hernandez, with Robert T. Chase, featured in “Cell Taught, Self Taught: The Chicano 
Movement Behind Bars – Urban Chicanos, Rural Prisons, and the Prisoners’ Rights Movement,” 
Journal of Urban History 4, no. 5 (2015): 836-861.  
3 Juanita Diaz-Cotto, Gender, Ethnicity, and the State: Latina and Latino Prison Politics (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1996), 36. “Boricua” is an indigenous-language term for 
Puerto Ricans. 
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Going into the twentieth century, I review Latino experiences with law 
enforcement and in jail and prison as told through two notable memoirs–—Piri Thomas’ 
Down These Mean Streets and Luis J. Rodriguez’s Always Running: La Vida Loca: Gang 
Days in L.A. To begin, Down These Mean Streets provides insight into race and 
incarceration in New York in the 1940s and 1950s based on the life of the Puerto Rican-
Cuban author. Rodriguez’s Always Running covers the Chicano author’s experience with 
gang life and revolving-door jail experiences in the Los Angeles area during the 1960s 
and 1970s.4 These narratives demonstrate how pervasive and prevalent the criminal 
justice system can be in the lives of impoverished Latino communities. While scholarship 
exists to corroborate the anecdotes of these texts, these stories are poignantly those of 
Latinos and reveal the nuances of their perspectives on the criminal justice system, while 
also portraying each author’s racial identity development as shaped by the processes of 
criminalization that they endured. Through these intimate personal histories of Latino 
prison life, this chapter will introduce the racial paradigms of focus in the following 
chapters. 
Labeling Latino Prisoners, 1850-1950 
 In 1851, California’s first state prison operated on a ship, the Waban. Its inmates 
soon contributed their labor to the construction of the state’s first prison built on land—
San Quentin State Prison. By 1854, the stone-cell prison was already overcrowded, with 
the inmates outnumbering the cells 300 to 48. Even as construction continued, the prison 
                                               
4 Piri Thomas, Down These Mean Streets (New York: Knopf, 1967); Luis J. Rodriguez, Always 
Running: La Vida Loca: Gang Days in L.A. (Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1992; reprint, 
Open Road Integrated Media, 2005).  
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would always cage more bodies than the cells it offered.5 As a result, San Quentin lacked 
ventilation, light, and sanitation facilities; four inmates had to share a single six-by-
eleven-foot cell, forcing fourteen-year-old boys to room with seasoned criminals, while 
the physicians treating the inmates complained of the stench and the vermin-infested 
bedding.6 And, in this early period of the state’s notorious prison history, California 
housed a disproportionate share of people born in Latin American countries compared to 
the general population in the state—between 1860 and 1880, Hispanics constituted 
around four percent of California’s general population, but 13 percent of the state’s 
prison population.7  
While the quantifying of Hispanic inmates could most easily be determined by 
relying on nativity, the notes written in each entry of the registers revealed more about 
racial understandings of the people who entered San Quentin, and later in 1880, Folsom 
State Prison. Beginning in 1851, the state’s prison registers recorded various information 
about each inmate, such as age, weight, height, complexion, eye color, hair color, marks 
on the body (such as scars or tattoos), and occupation, in addition to nativity.8 By the 
                                               
5 Clare V. McKanna, “The Origins of San Quentin, 1851-1880,” California History 66, no. 1 
(1987): 49-54. 
6 Ibid.; Clare V. McKanna, “Crime and Punishment: The Hispanic Experience in San Quentin, 
1851-1880,” Southern California Quarterly 72, no. 1 (1990): 1-18.  
7 McKanna, “Crime and Punishment,” 2-3. McKanna’s estimates seem to rely on his 
categorization of inmates based on nativity in which considered inmates born in Mexico (42 
percent), Chile (nine percent), and Brazil (first case) to be Hispanic. It is not clear whether he 
counted inmates whose physical features were labeled as “Mexican” and/or those who had 
Spanish surnames, but who were born in the United States, as Hispanic as well.  
8 The registers also recorded a grade classification; when the inmate was received at prison 
(month, day, year); crime; the county the inmate was sent from; length of the sentence (years, 
months); and notes (such as “Discharged”). Department of Corrections. San Quentin State Prison 
Records, 1850–1950. ID #R135, California State Archives, Office of the Secretary of State, 
Sacramento, California. 
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1860s, the entries contained indications of race. A parenthetical label of “negro,” or 
“Indian,” appeared by some names in the 1860s and 1870s. In a similar fashion, 
“woman” appeared in parenthesis by the names of female inmates, signifying that these 
types of labels both identified and othered unique populations in the prison. In the 1880s, 
“Chinese” and “Japanese” labels began appearing by names, which corresponded with 
the countries listed under nativity.  
Recorders also denoted race in the ways they filled out the spaces for complexion, 
eye color, and hair color, a system which evolved over the decades. For instance, inmates 
born in China had complexions listed as “fair,” “light,” or “dark,” in the 1850s; in the 
1860s, Chinese inmates’ complexion was consistently entered as “yellow” or “sallow;” 
and by 1872, Chinese inmates’ complexion, along with their eye and hair color was listed 
as “Chinese” or “China.” On the other hand, from the 1850s to the 1860s, inmates whose 
complexion was considered “fair” received distinct entries for eye and hair color—such 
as blue, brown, or gray for eyes, and black, brown, light, or dark for hair.9  
When Folsom State Prison opened in 1880, recorders took a different approach to 
listing racial markers. Throughout the 1880s, prison officials often merely wrote across 
the spaces for complexion, eye color, and hair color with the simplified “Black,” 
“Negro,” “Mulatto,” “Chinese,” “China,” or “Mexican.”10 Lorenzo Latora, an inmate 
                                               
9 Inmates who were born in European countries or who were presumably white, given the lack of 
a racial label, sometimes had their complexion as something other than fair, such as light, dark, 
medium, or sallow.  
10 Department of Corrections. Folsom State Prison Records, 1879-1949. ID #R136, California 
State Archives, Office of the Secretary of State, Sacramento, California. In some cases, the three 
spaces were filled in with the same label for each space. The strategy to write “Mexican” across 
all three spaces occurred consistently in 1885.  
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born in Chile and who arrived at San Quentin in February 1885, had his complexion 
recorded as “Dk Mexican.”11 In another case, a Mexican inmate had “Copper” written 
across the spaces for complexion, eye color, and hair color, which was a popular 
complexion color assigned to both Mexican and Chinese inmates in the late nineteenth 
century prison registers, as well as those with Spanish surnames born in California or 
other U.S. states. Mexicans’ complexion listings also included “dark,” “brown,” “ruddy,” 
“olive,” and “med.”12 
By the 1920s, the prison registers continued to denote race by following an 
inmate’s name with a label, such as “black” or “Filipino,” in parenthesis. At the time, the 
Philippines were under U.S. control, rendering Filipinos U.S. subjects.13 In other words, 
prison officials strategically used the labels in parenthesis to supplement nativity 
information, such as Mexico or China, that also served as racial indicators. However, by 
1936, “Mex” or “Mexican” also began appearing in parenthesis by names in the prison 
registers.  
Simultaneously, the prisons established an identification card system that 
seemingly eradicated the inconsistencies in recording race for inmates with Mexican 
backgrounds. As of 1919, San Quentin’s identification card system contained a 
designated category for color; and in 1923, Folsom State Prison adopted a similar system 
                                               
11 Latora’s nativity was listed as “Chili,” a common English spelling of the country’s name in the 
nineteenth century. 
12 Ibid. Sometimes, such as some listings in 1888, the registers started listing distinct color terms 
for inmates born in China, as opposed to writing in “Chinese” for complexion and eye and hair 
color.  
13 For more on the Filipino experience in the United States, see Mae M. Ngai, Impossible 
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004). 
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with a space for “Race.”14 The space for color/race often contained “Mex,” regardless of 
whether the inmate was born in Mexico or the United States. From 1919 to 1929, the 
identification cards contained the typical information that the state’s prison registers had 
recorded for inmates: name, registration number, county, date received, crime, sentence, 
occupation, term dates, criminal record, age, nativity, and distinguishing marks, such as 
scars or tattoos; the card included a mugshot as well. But the cards also had spaces for 
eugenicist-like interests—measurements of the head, nose, ear, eye, fingers, foot, teeth, 
and chin—most of which were left blank by prison officials.15  
It may be surmised that during this period, the eugenics movement, which was at 
its peak and held that criminality was hereditary, had an impact on California’s criminal 
justice system and the format that they used for these identification cards at both 
prisons.16 While the recorders diligently filled out the information on race, nativity, and 
the other traditional data pieces, their failure to collect the vast majority of physical 
measurements reflects the priorities of prison officials in their social organization of the 
inmate population—racial perceptions mattered; the calculus for hereditary criminality 
was superfluous.  
                                               
14 Department of Corrections. Folsom State Prison Records. 
15 See Charles Benedict Davenport, Heredity in Relation to Eugenics (New York: H. Holt, 1911). 
On an argument to sterilize “public wards” as a “social service,” see G. H. Parker, “The Eugenics 
Movement as a Public Service,” Science 41, no. 1053 (1915): 342-347.   
16 For more on the rise and fall of the eugenics movements as well as its applications, see Kenneth 
M. Ludmerer, “American Geneticists and the Eugenics Movement: 1905-1935,” Journal of the 
History of Biology 2, no. 2 (1969): 337-362; Melanie Fong, Larry O. Johnson, and Larry D. 
Johnson, “The Eugenics Movement: Some Insight into the Institutionalization of Racism,” Issues 
in Criminology 9, no. 2 (1974): 89-115. 
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In 1925, newspapers reported that a “race war” had taken over San Quentin State 
Prison, with racial conflicts resulting in several deaths between February and May. 
Tensions first exploded in February when Antonio Hernandez, a 38-year-old Mexican 
inmate, elbowed a white inmate, who responded by knocking Hernandez to the ground. 
When Hernandez threatened to kill the white inmate, the white inmate and his friends 
attacked Hernandez and crushed his skull. When the white inmates who killed Hernandez 
were punished and placed in the prison’s “dungeon,” other inmates formed a mob, 
perpetuating conflict between prison guards and inmates, as well as Mexican and white 
inmates, who continued to retaliate against members of each other’s population for the 
next few months.17  
The newspapers described the ongoing feud as a battle between “the Mexican 
American race” and “the Americans.” Evidently, as the San Quentin race riots show, the 
classification systems at San Quentin and Folsom accurately reflected the inmates’ own 
sense of collective racial identity. While people of Mexican ancestry made up just five 
percent of California’s population during the 1930 U.S. Census, they formed 17 percent 
of San Quentin’s population, a significant contingent.18  
                                               
17 “San Quentin Seethes in Race War,” Oakland Tribune, May 3, 1925; “Prison Race Feud 
Breaks Out Afresh,” Oakland Tribune, February 20, 1925; “Punishment of Quentin Slayers 
Pledged by U.S.,” Oakland Tribune, May 20, 1925.  
18 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics On Population Totals By Race, 
1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For Large Cities And Other Urban Places in 
The United States” (working paper no. 76, U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, February 
2005). While the percentage I provide for the general population is based on U.S. Census data, 
the figure may underestimate the number of people of Mexican ancestry as the designation as 
“Mexican” was shunned by some people of Mexican ancestry who claimed they were white as a 
mechanism to ensure full-class citizenship; see Jorge Chapa, “Hispanic\Latino Ethnicity and 
Identifiers,” in Encyclopedia of the U.S. Census,  Margo Andersen, editor-in-chief, Jorge Chapa, 
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While the Mexican government took note of the incidents at San Quentin, 
demanding justice for the murder of Mexican inmates, there was no immediate 
knowledge of whether the Mexican-identified inmates were U.S.- or Mexican-born, 
making clear that the perception of them as racial others usurped their actual nativity.19 
Nevertheless, the U.S. government had been working through diplomatic relations with 
Mexico at the time, and it was in a place to appease Mexico by making sure to punish 
Hernandez’s killers.20 The U.S. government did not, however, have to seek the same 
justice for Mike Gomez, a 20-year-old Mexican American from Texas who was beaten to 
death toward the end of San Quentin’s 1925 race war that May. The use of “Mexican” as 
a race/color category that did not correlate with nativity persisted into the 1930s. 
By 1929, however, San Quentin and Folsom both revised their forms to exclude 
the detailed measurement categories on the identification cards, but continued to record 
race and include spaces for general commentary on physical features such as complexion, 
hair, eyes, height, weight, build, fingerprints, teeth, and chin into the 1940s. While 
“Mexican” remained a major racial category among inmates, the identification cards 
added emphasis to racial others by listing categories such as “negro” or “Mexican” in 
parenthesis and a red font by the name of the inmate, demonstrating the importance of 
these racial distinctions.21 Once again, the label of “Mexican,” this time in red ink, did 
not necessarily correspond with nativity in Mexico.  
                                               
Connie Citro and Joe Salvo, editorial board. (Congressional Quarterly Press: Washington, D.C., 
2000). 
19 “Mexico Protests Prison Slaughter,” Bakersfield Californian, May 2, 1925. 
20 Oakland Tribune, May 20, 1925. 
21 Folsom State Prison Records. 
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Andrew Hernandez was born in Texas in 1917 to parents who had immigrated 
from Mexico. After relocating to California at age 15, Hernandez had several run-ins 
with the law—his criminal record listed a 30-day incarceration for assault when he was 
16; a six-month sentence for grand theft when he was 17 in Sacramento; another six-
month sentence for grand theft at age 19 in San Francisco; and a six-month sentence for 
petty theft when he was 20 in Bakersfield. At age 22, Hernandez served his first sentence 
in a state prison at San Quentin for grand theft, where his color was listed as “Mexican,” 
and he served 15 months of a one- to 10-year sentence.22 Hernandez then served time at 
Folsom State Prison for second-degree robbery. His Folsom identification card showed 
his name, followed by “(MEXICAN)” in red ink, his charge of second-degree robbery, 
and a one year to life sentence. He was discharged in time to be arrested and convicted in 
1944 for robbery and sent back to San Quentin once again. He was released in 1947, but 
then booked again at Folsom in 1948 for 0 to 10 years; his race was listed as “Mexican.” 
During the 1940 U.S. Census, Hernandez was serving time at San Quentin, and the 
census worker listed his race as white, suggesting that prisons took more liberty in using 
categories that distinguished Mexicans from the white population, a practice they had 
been using for several decades.23 
                                               
22 Entries for “Color” included: White, White (Jewish), Jewish, Negro, Mexican, Chinese, 
Chilean, Portuguese, Filipino, Indian, German, Italy, Pole, Canadian, Irish, Norwegian, etc. Many 
of the entries, other than “White” and “Negro,” corresponded to nativity; “Mexican” often did 
not. 
23 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940. 
Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1940. 
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In Texas, prisoners entered the first enclosed prison for convicted felons—Texas 
State Penitentiary at Huntsville—in 1849. From the onset, the aim of Texas law 
enforcement had been to protect Euro-American settlers from the dispossessed subjects 
of the state—that is, “to protect the fairest portion of Texas [from] unruly Negros, wild 
Indians, and marauding Mexicans,” as Governor Richard Coke later expressed in 1875.24 
When the plans for the Huntsville prison were proposed, the leaders of the effort intended 
for the prison to “reform the criminal by habits and industry.”25 In practice, that vision 
acted as a euphemism for the prison’s robust convict leasing system—slavery by another 
name, as historian Douglas A. Blackmon has labeled the model.26 In the 1850s, African 
American convicts did the work of slaves outside of the prison, while the ranks inside the 
prison consisted of a disproportionate number of men of Mexican ancestry, suggesting 
that “the ethnic group we now call Hispanic was already coalescing into an underclass.”27 
While healthy Mexican inmates were usually afforded the semiskilled labor of railroad 
work, black convicts worked plantations, decades beyond the end of slavery until 1912. 
With high demand, both Mexican and black prisoners worked on farms, given the alleged 
“limited capacity of these races to acquire technical knowledge.”28 These convicts 
                                               
24 Robert Perkinson, Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Empire (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2010), 52; Richard Coke, Address to the Legislature, January 12, 1875, reprinted in 
Governors’ Messages, Coke to Ross, 1874-1891 (Austin: Texas State Library, 1916). 
25 Perkinson, Texas Tough, 79; Paul Lucko, “Prison Farms, Walls, and Society: Punishment and 
Politics in Texas, 1848– 1910” (PhD diss., University of Texas, 1999), 74. 
26 Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans 
from the Civil War to World War II (New York: Anchor Books, 2008). 
27 Perkinson, 76. 
28 Ibid., 127; Texas State Legislature, Penitentiary Investigating Committee, Report and Findings 
(1913), 27, 22– 23, 27; Frederick H. Wines, Remarks, Proceedings of the Annual Congress of the 
National Prison Association, Austin, Texas, 1897, 193. 
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literally worked themselves to death; a physician from the Huntsville prison claimed that 
“50 percent of those who die within the walls are worn out and broken down on the farms 
and then sent back to the prison to die.”29 
With the end of the convict leasing system, the prison reckoned with how to 
reform and organize the inmates. Segregation received an easy endorsement; it was 
entrenched in Texas society and the Texas prison system—white inmates needed to be 
separated from black and Mexican inmates, both in residence and in work, with the more 
comfortable conditions being afforded to whites.30 And like Folsom State Prison in the 
late 1800s, the Texas prison system also documented perceptions of racial others through 
the labels written across the lines of the designated spaces for complexion, hair color, and 
eye color in the prison registers—black, mulatto, and Mexican.  
“Mexican” complexion-eye-hair entries did not necessarily reflect nativity in 
Texas either—some were listed as having been born in Texas or another U.S. state. As in 
San Quentin and Folsom, those with “fair” complexions in Texas prisons received 
differentiated eye and hair colors—blue, brown, light, etc. This system of homogenizing 
the racial others of the Texas prison system—black, Mexican, and Indian convicts—
continued until 1915. From 1915 to 1950, the Texas prison registers adopted a new 
system for marking each inmate’s race, including that of fair-complexion inmates. Above 
                                               
29 Perkinson 127; Charles S. Potts, “The Convict Labor System in Texas,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 21 (1903): 88; Joe L. Wilkinson, The Trans-
Cedar Lynching and the Texas Penitentiary: Being a Plain Account of the Lynching and the 
Circumstances Leading Up to It, Also a Presentation of Conditions as They Exist in Our State 
Penitentiaries (Dallas, TX: Johnston Printing & Advertising Co., 1912), 132; Texas State 
Penitentiaries, Biennial Report (1904), 36. 
30 Perkinson, 171.  
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the space for complexion—where “fair,” “drk,” “lgt,” or “rud,” may have been written—
were letter codes for race: “B” for black, “W” for white, and “M/Mex” for Mexican, 
regardless of the inmates’ place of birth.31 
In 1952, a journal article, “The Paroling of Capital Offenders,” discussed Texas’ 
statistics for capital punishment. Between 1924 and 1952, 350 inmates received the death 
penalty as their sentence—269 for murder, 73 for rape, and 8 for robbery—only 19 
percent of which were commuted to life sentences. The authors of the article also 
disaggregated the data by race, commenting, “For the sake of brevity we will use the term 
‘race’ loosely,” as the categories included White, Negro, Mexican, and Indian.32 By 1930, 
Mexicans constituted nearly 25 percent of the Texas population.33 While their share of 
capital punishment cases did not align with their proportion of the general population, as 
Mexicans made up just 13 percent of those sentenced to the death penalty, they 
represented a significant contingent of the prison and general population by the time of 
the article’s publication in the 1950s to be included in the analysis, even as the Census 
Bureau had abandoned the “Mexican” race category following the 1930 U.S. Census in 
light of protests from Mexican-American groups and criticism from the Mexican 
government.34 Census categories posed problems in the New York prison system as well. 
                                               
31 Conduct Registers. Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Archives and Information Services 
Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission, Austin, Texas.  
32 G. I. Giardini and R. G. Farrow, “The Paroling of Capital Offenders,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 284 (1952): 85-94. 
33 Brian Gratton and Emily Klancher Merchant, “La Raza: Mexicans in the United States 
Census,” The Journal of Policy History 28, no. 4 (2016): 1-31. 
34 Ibid.; Giardini and Farrow, 92; United States Census Bureau. 
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Before Folsom, San Quentin, and Huntsville, Sing Sing Correctional Facility in 
New York operated as the fifth prison built by the state of New York, opening in 1826. 
Sing Sing represented the New York model of prison discipline that called for congregate 
labor, while the Pennsylvania system called for solitary confinement.35 By the turn of the 
century, Sing Sing was known in New York for stern discipline, to the point of admitted 
cruelty by guards, practiced at the institution, in order to “break the men down physically 
and mentally.” The inmates wore striped suits and the old prison block consisted of cells 
that measured just a little over three feet wide, seven feet deep, and just under seven feet 
tall. By the 1920s, the conditions were thought to have much improved—with the 
adoption of gray prison uniforms and cells measuring four feet wide, seven-and-a-half 
feet deep, and a full seven feet high.36  
The first Puerto Rican inmates, however, first appeared in Sing Sing’s registers in 
1899—a fitting time given the tense connection that had been established between the 
United States and the island through the Spanish-American War. The first two Puerto 
Rican inmates, Charles Barnes and Cicero Forster, were both born in Carolina, Puerto 
Rico. The register listed both men’s complexions as “BK.” In the notes for Forster, the 
entry described him as “a colored man.”37 Several years passed before the next three 
                                               
35 Jennifer Graber, “The Furnace at Sing Sing, 1828–1839,” in The Furnace of Affliction: Prisons 
and Religion in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 
103-34. 
36 Alfred Conyers described his experiences as a guard both at Sing Sing from 1879 to 1929 and 
before then at Clinton Prison. Although he talks in more detail about the stern discipline at 
Clinton, he later reports that disciplinary measures at Sing Sing were “even more” stern. Alfred 
Conyers, Fifty Years at Sing Sing: A Personal Account, 1879-1929 (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2015).  
37 Sing Sing Prison. Inmate admission registers, 1865-1971. New York State. Dept. of 
Correctional Services, Series B0143. New York State Archives, Albany, New York. 
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Puerto Rican inmates entered Sing Sing; all three had their color listed as “Black.” In 
1909, Louis Quinone arrived at the prison, and his color was listed as black, but the 
registers listed his complexion as “mulatto.” In 1912, Albert DePasso and George 
Edwards were admitted to Sing Sing, and their complexions were listed as “black.” This 
assignment of “black” to Puerto Rican inmates reflected the discourse in the wake of the 
Spanish-American War concerned with the level of blackness on the island that had 
recently been subsumed by U.S. colonialism, with reports that, “black people… 
encountered in Porto Rico are treated by their lighter-colored brethren as if their skins 
were of the same color… without any evidence of knowledge on the part of either that 
there is a difference in color between them.”38  
These potential misalignments in racial understandings between the island and the 
mainland United States manifested in records for Puerto Rican inmates perceived to be 
white as well. In 1913, Sing Sing’s registers listed Puerto Rican inmate Louis Sulsona as 
white with a dark complexion. In 1914, Juan Arroyo was listed as “Spaniard” for his 
color, despite he and his parents being born in Puerto Rico; also that year, Raymond 
Vasquez had his color listed as “white,” his father having been born in Barcelona and his 
mother on the Island.39 These early examples from 1899 to 1914 demonstrate that Puerto 
Ricans entered a stricter black-white racial schema at Sing Sing than the prisons in Texas 
                                               
38 Herbert M. Wilson, “Porto Rico: Its Topography and Aspects,” Journal of the American 
Geographical Society of New York 32, no. 3 (1900): 220-238. For another perspective, see 
Charles M. Pepper, “The Spanish Population of Cuba and Porto Rico,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 18 (1901): 163-178. For more on U.S. 
policymakers interpretations of Puerto Rican race in the nineteenth century, see Eric T. L. Love, 
Race Over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2004). 
39 Ibid. 
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and in California, even as the registers hinted at certain racial ambiguities such as 
Sulsona being listed as both “white” and “dark,” and Quinone being listed as black, with 
a mulatto complexion.  
While the Sing Sing registers failed to record color or complexion from 1915 
through 1925, the format of the registers took a similar turn to those of California in the 
1920s, with the form calling for highly detailed information. However, instead of 
physical measurements, the Sing Sing form collected background information on family, 
education, employment, and habits—a more progressive, sociology-oriented approach to 
understanding criminality.40 The new form also had an entry for “color.” The categories 
                                               
40 The information collected before 1926 tended to include: Number (prison identification); 
Sentenced (Date); Received (Date); Grade (letter); Name; Alias; Received from (city, state); 
County; Court; Judge; Plea; Term (start date to end date); Jail Time (number of days); Crime; 
Term out by Commutation, Expiration or Parole (date); Where born; Age; Occupation; Single, 
Married, or Widower; Height; Weight; Education; Religion; Moderate, Temperate, or 
Intemperate Habits; Drug or Tobacco Use; Idle or Employed; Living or Dead Father; Living or 
Dead Mother; Number of Children; Residence when arrested; Name of relative or friend. From 
1926 to 1939, the information collected grew to include: Classification Group; Color; Lost Time; 
Criminal Act; Date of Commission; City or Town Where Crime Was Committed; Value of Goods 
or Money Involved in Crime; Recovered?; Accomplices; Where Are They Now?; Is Prisoner on 
Friendly Terms With Accomplices?; Date of Birth; Mental Age; Mental Diagnosis; Date of Entry 
to U.S.; Port of Entry to U.S. (port, city, state); Nativity of Father, Mother; Age of Prisoner When 
Father Died, When Mother Died; Number of Brothers, Sisters; Sequence in Family; marital status 
(Single, Married, Widowed, Divorced, Separated, Common Law Marriage) and length of status; 
Health; Education (ability to read, write, and communicate in English); Other Language; Speaks 
English (Good, Partial, None); Age Left School; Number of Years of Schooling; Grade Reached; 
College (Years); Other or Technical Education; Religion; Church Attendance (Regular, 
Occasional, None), length since regular attendance; Employed When Arrested, length of 
employment; If Unemployed How Long Since Last Regular Employment; Employment Record 
for Last Three Employers (employer, address, start and end date, nature of work done, weekly 
wage); Occupation; Skill Level (Skilled, Semi Skilled, Unskilled, College Trained); Last Weekly 
Wage; Self Supporting; Supports Others and How Many (Under 16, More Than 16); Length of 
Residence at Present Locality, State; Legal Residence (City, State, Country); Name and Address 
of Nearest Relative; Criminal Acts Attributed to Military Service; Military Service (Army, Navy, 
None). 
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entered for color included white, black, and yellow. Inmates born in Puerto Rico or Cuba 
were often categorized as “white,” with occasional entries of “black.”  
In at least two instances, Alfred Nazario in 1931 and Gattitano Luca in 1934, a 
Puerto Rican inmate’s color was recorded as white, then crossed out and corrected as 
“black.”41 Nazario had only recently come to New York before his sentence at Sing Sing. 
Nazario would later be released from Sing Sing and return to Puerto Rico in 1939, sailing 
from New York City to San Juan on the S.S. Borinquen, a reference to the Taino name 
for the Island.42 By the 1940 U.S. Census, Nazario was living in New York City again, 
surrounded by other Puerto Ricans on East 117th Street in East Harlem—part of the 
outgrowth of Spanish Harlem at the time. Nazario, like the vast majority of his Puerto 
Rican neighbors, had their “Color or race” listed as white.43  
Luca, on the other hand, was awaiting trial at the Brooklyn City Prison at the time 
of the 1930 U.S. Census.44 His race was recorded as “Negro,” while a fellow Mexican 
inmate’s race was recorded as “Mexican.” While there was a unique designation in the 
1930 U.S. Census for “Mexican”—as well as “Indian,” “Chinese,” “Japanese,” 
“Filipino,” “Hindu,” and “Korean”—and even though they were instructed, “Other races, 
                                               
41 In 1939, Puerto Rican inmate, Sebastian Cruz, had his race recorded as black, then crossed out 
and corrected as white, which still signified the difficulty for prison administrators to identify 
race for Puerto Ricans within the black-white categorical system. Sing Sing Prison. Inmate 
admission registers, 1865-1971. New York State. Dept. of Correctional Services, Series B0143. 
New York State Archives, Albany, New York. 
42 Selected Crew List and Manifests. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
43 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940. 
Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1940. 
44 The name listed in 1930 is “Gaetano Luca,” but the information corresponds to the 1934 record 
for “Gattitano Luca.” 
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spell out in full,” census recorders still forced Puerto Ricans and Cubans into the black 
and white categories.45  
While his charge was not listed for his sentence at the Brooklyn City Prison, the 
1934 record at Sing Sing indicated that Luca had multiple run-ins with the law—he was 
charged with second-degree assault for holding up and assaulting another man; he also 
had received a suspended sentence for illegal possession of narcotics, a charge which 
validated the stereotype of people of Latin American ancestry at the time. In 1929, a U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics report claimed that marijuana use “is noted particularly 
among the Latin Americans or Spanish-speaking population. The sale of cannabis 
cigarettes occurs to a considerable degree in states along the Mexican border and in cities 
of the southwest and west, as well as in New York City and in fact wherever there are 
settlements of Latin Americans.”46 In effect, this broad-stroke charge of criminality 
against Latin American peoples across the United States meant shared carceral 
experiences in the decades to follow.  
Additionally, it seemed that nativity was also subject to interpretation when it 
came to Puerto Ricans. The 1917 Jones-Shafroth Act had granted U.S. citizenship to 
Puerto Ricans born on or after April 25, 1898.47 Yet, Nazario, born in Guanica, Puerto 
Rico, in 1910, and who migrated to Brooklyn, New York, in 1922 was labeled as “alien” 
                                               
45 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930. 
Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1930. 
46 Eduardo Sáenz Rovner and Russ Davidson, “Drug Trafficking and Political Anarchy during the 
1930s,” in The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking, Smuggling, and Gambling in Cuba from the 
1920s to the Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 31-44. 
47 Joel Morales Cruz, “Puerto Rico,” in The Histories of the Latin American Church: A Handbook 
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, Publishers, 2014), 513-34. 
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in the Sing Sing prison register in 1931.48 Similarly, Nazario de Kony, also born in 1910 
and a fellow black Puerto Rican inmate at Sing Sing in 1931, was later identified as an 
“alien” during the 1940 U.S. Census, when he was incarcerated at Attica State Prison. An 
Italian immigrant inmate, on the other hand, was labeled as “Naturalized.”  
 These discrepancies in the records for incarcerated Puerto Ricans demonstrate the 
conflicts they faced in fitting into the black-white racial dichotomy that governed New 
York and much of the United States in the early twentieth century. As seen through the 
narratives analyzed in the following section, this misunderstanding of Puerto Rican 
identity in New York persisted through the 1950s, but by the end of the twentieth 
century, Puerto Ricans in the Northeast, like Mexicans in the Southwest, existed as an 
ethno-racial contingent, distinct from their black and white counterparts even, and 
sometimes especially, within the context of urban poverty, interactions with law 
enforcement, and incarceration.  
Latino Carceral Experiences: Down These Mean Streets 
 Piri Thomas’s Down These Mean Streets is a memoir that exemplifies the 
experience of black Latinos especially with regard to how colorism operates within their 
own communities as well as the racial profiling they endure at the hand of law 
enforcement. Born in 1928, Thomas described his upbringing in Harlem and his back-
and-forth between the city neighborhood and the suburbia of Long Island, where his 
family eventually moved when his father made enough money to afford a small house 
there. In both places, his dark skin often overshadowed his Puerto Rican heritage; others 
                                               
48 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930.  
 38 
mistook him for African American or demeaned him as a “nigger spic.” Thomas 
struggled to own his identity, feeling as an outsider among his six light-skinned siblings, 
light-skinned Puerto Rican mother, and a dark-skinned Cuban father who seemed to favor 
his other children.  
Although Thomas travelled and worked in different parts of the country once he 
turned eighteen, he eventually returned to New York when he was still in his early 
twenties.49 It was back home in Harlem where he joined a group of old friends in 
planning an armed robbery of a gay nightclub that resulted in Thomas and a police officer 
shooting each other. In the immediate aftermath of the failed robbery, Thomas tried to 
run away from the scene as he bled through the gunshot wound in his chest. As he went 
in and out of consciousness, police officers eventually apprehended him and took him 
back to the scene of the crime. As Thomas sat in a chair, amused at being guarded by one 
of the club’s patrons, an officer confronted him, “Do you think it’s funny, you black 
bastard?” Thomas responded, “I thought I was Puerto Rican… If you don’t mind, I’m a 
Puerto Rican black bastard.” The cop reiterated his perceptions of Thomas, saying, “You 
lousy dirty black bastard, you lousy black spic, why I oughta kill you.”50  
                                               
49 In his late teens and early twenties, Thomas dabbled in various activities: traveling to the Deep 
South as a Merchant Marine; returning to Harlem where he developed and overcame a heroin 
addiction; various restaurant jobs, including one in Washington, D.C., where he half-heartedly 
considered pursuing an education at Howard University. 
50 Thomas, 234-235; Thomas expressed various anti-gay or homophobic sentiments, an 
unsurprising manifestation of hypermasculinity in both Latino communities and street culture. 
See Megan Durell, Catherine Chiong, and Juan Battle, “Race, Gender Expectations, and 
Homophobia: A Quantitative Exploration,” Race, Gender & Class 14, no. 1/2 (2007): 299-317. 
Sharon Dolovich, “Two Models Of The Prison: Accidental Humanity And Hypermasculinity In 
The L.A. County Jail,” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-) 102, no. 4 (2012): 
965-1117. 
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The cop, however, abided by the orders to treat Thomas like a patient since he had 
been wounded. An ambulance took Thomas to St. Vincent Hospital, where he had 
surgery and started his recovery while police officers stood guard. Thomas completed his 
recovery after being transferred to Bellevue Hospital Prison Ward. He then spent months 
awaiting trial on murderer’s row at The Tombs, New York City’s infamous city jail, even 
though the police officer he shot had not died.51 The judge sentenced Thomas to five to 
fifteen years for attempted armed robbery in the first degree and five to ten years for 
felonious assault—sentences to be served concurrently. Thomas, whose friend had just 
received a death sentence for his part in a robbery in which his partner accidentally killed 
the store clerk, was thankful for the concurrent sentence, thinking “at least I could do two 
days for one.”52 
From The Tombs, Thomas left to serve out his sentence at Sing Sing, in a 
“shipment” with other inmates—Gonzalez, Rivera, Washington, O’Leary, Puluskie, 
Goldberg, and Walters—the Spanish surnames hinting at the significant contingent of 
Latinos that Thomas would be a part of during his time behind bars.53 Not long into his 
sentence, he decided to fortify his reputation as fearless by antagonizing a black inmate, 
Rocky, drawing him as a “funny-book black cannibal, complete with a big bone through 
his nose.” The racial divisions that prisoners adhered to at Sing Sing emerged as Rocky 
responded to Thomas’ insult with, “You yellow-faced motherfucker,” while Thomas 
                                               
51 For more on the circumstances at the Tombs, see Timothy J. Gilfoyle, A Pickpocket's Tale: The 
Underworld of Nineteenth-Century New York (New York: Norton, 2006). 
52 Thomas, 246. 
53 Ibid. 248-249. 
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identified Rocky as a moreno, even as Thomas had been assigned the dark-skinned label 
in other contexts.54   
Thomas, however, soon transferred to Comstock State Prison.55 He described the 
social hierarchy that existed there: con men at the top, followed by attorneys and 
abortionists, heist men in the middle, then thieves and burglars, with rapists, 
homosexuals, crooked cops, and drug addicts at the bottom. While he was drawn to those 
with status—a conman named Sam and the well-educated Kent—Thomas recalled that 
his best friend at Comstock was, like him, “a big black Puerto Rican” named Young 
Turk. Thomas had varied interactions with other inmates—a fist fight with another 
inmate which turned into mutual respect, rejecting the solicitations of an effeminate 
inmate looking for a partner, only to act as a witness at a “marriage ceremony” between 
that inmate and his new romantic interest—none of which are necessarily defined by 
ethno-racial affiliations.  
But ethno-racial affiliations did come into play when Tico, the 18-year-old little 
brother of Thomas’ friend from the old neighborhood, claimed Thomas as a cousin when 
he arrived at Comstock. Both Thomas and Tico were Puerto Rican, but Thomas was older 
and bigger, and had earned a reputable status at the prison, whereas Tico was new, small, 
and baby-faced. Thomas empathized with Tico, reassuring him that given their 
circumstances, “we’re more than cousins, kid, we’re brothers.”56 But Thomas was not the 
                                               
54 Ibid., 252-253.  
55 Thomas refers to Great Meadow Correctional Facility which is located in Comstock, New 
York, as Comstock State Prison.  
56 Ibid., 265.  
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first one Tico turned to for care behind bars; he had also trusted Rube, who he described 
as “a spic like me.” Instead, Rube had used the trust based on ethnic solidarity to 
manipulate Tico for romantic pursuits.  
For his part, Thomas had his own expectations of ethno-racial solidarity. With the 
sorrow of being denied parole after serving four years behind bars in miserable, mind-
numbing conditions, Thomas commiserated with Young Turk, “I bet if there had been 
one moyeto or one spic on that board I’d’a made it. Do only blancos work on parole 
boards?”57 Although parole boards were established to tailor sentences and rehabilitative 
interventions to each inmate, with the additional benefit of easing overcrowding in 
prisons, the parole system has also had the reverse effect of acting as an additional aspect 
of retribution “through the threat of parole denial as punishment for misbehavior.”58 And, 
to Thomas’ point, critics of the autonomy and subjectivity of parole boards have claimed 
that boards function as “a hidden system of discretionary decision making and [lead] to 
race and class bias in release decisions.”59 
After this incident of perceived discrimination and as Thomas pined for the 
outside, counting down the time until his next meeting with the parole board, a riot broke 
out in the prison yard. Thomas felt torn about which side to take. The code of the street 
told him to join with the men rebelling, who yearned for freedom, but demanded better 
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treatment in the meantime.60 Thomas, however, had his long-term goals of early release 
from prison in mind telling him not to defy the guards. Before Thomas could make a 
definitive choice between the two sides, the guards apprehended him, eliminating his 
ability to take a stance either way. In that moment, Thomas reflected on what the conflict 
signified, “They, we, all of us, in one way or another, were rebelling against time, against 
the locked up feeling of being a part of a building instead of a part of life.”61 Thomas 
expressed the somber sense of dispossession upon which prisons capitalized.  
The riot that Thomas described in his memoir took place on August 18, 1955. 
During the incident, 174 inmates “spontaneously” started a ten-hour strike. In the end, 
eight guards, three state troopers, and 14 inmates were injured in the conflict when the 
officers used nightsticks and guns as clubs to quell the uprising in less than thirty 
minutes. Reflecting Thomas’ account, the State Correction Commissioner, Thomas J. 
McHugh, reported that many of the inmates involved made no formal complaints—they 
were subsumed by the moment in which other inmates acted out their dissatisfaction with 
the conditions at the prison.62 And yet, the uprising at Comstock was just one in a series 
that had taken place that year, with other riots emerging at the Massachusetts State Prison 
in Boston, Nebraska State Penitentiary in Lincoln (three times), Texas State Prison in 
Huntsville, Rusk State Hospital in Texas, Nassau County Jail in Long Island, the 
                                               
60 For a more recent argument on the social pressures and context of the “code of the street,” see 
Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City 
(New York: W.W. N, 1999). 
61 Thomas, 282-283.   
62 “3 Hurt as Cops Smash Prison Sitdown Strike,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 18, 1955; 
“Clubs Quell Riot in Upstate Prison,” New York Times, August 19, 1955; “Prison Chief Calls 
Riot ‘Spontaneous,’” New York Times, August 28, 1955.  
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Greenville State Prison Camp in North Carolina, Ionia State Reformatory in Michigan, 
Walla Walla State Penitentiary in Washington (twice), Rhode Island State Prison, 
Wyoming State Prison, Nevada State Prison in Carson City, and Bexar County Jail in 
Texas.63  
The cause of the riots and the complaints lodged by inmates ranged from low 
quality food to overcrowding, the use of long solitary confinement periods, guards’ 
behavior as careless or unjust, poor building conditions, program deficiencies, and the 
“lack of hope of ever reaching time off for good behavior.” At Rusk State Hospital, black 
inmates protested the inferior recreational facilities made available to them as opposed to 
those accessible to white inmates; they had been inspired by the riot that had just taken 
place at the Texas State Prison in Huntsville, suggesting that these incidents across the 
country were not isolated. The day that the Comstock incident occurred, Thomas sensed, 
“riot is in the air,” normalizing the eruption of dissent that was inevitable in the 
environment that U.S. prisons were developing in the 1950s, a generation before the 
onset of the prison boom.64  
Thomas’ recollection of the riot indicated the perceived racial disparities that had 
already taken root in the prison system as well. He described how, once the riot had come 
to an end, the guards stood in two rows as the inmates who had rebelled and been beaten, 
literally and figuratively, walked between them back to their cells. Thomas commented, 
“Damned if it didn’t remind me of the moving pictures where the Indians stood in a long 
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row and let the white captive run through. Only the colors were reversed.”65 In the 
newspaper stories, the return of the protesting inmates to their cells was the end of the 
riot, but Thomas described how the protest only made the relationship between the 
inmates and guards increasingly antagonistic and hostile, with the guards exerting 
violence on all of the inmates. Thomas noted that “the prison held on to its tight air of 
tension for a long time after the riot,” which made him fear what effect the riot would 
have on the outcome of his next parole board meeting.66  
In his anticipation of that meeting, Thomas gained an interest in Islam, as fellow 
inmates of color were turning to the religion, having come to the conclusion that 
Christianity was the “white devil’s religion.”67 The Islam preached in prison emphasized 
black cultural pride. This type of intellectual thought, along with topics in philosophy and 
psychology, kept Thomas’ mind engaged at a point when his anxiety was on the rise as 
he contemplated his inability to remain sane if the parole board decided he needed to 
serve more time. But in 1956, when Thomas finally saw the parole board for the second 
time, they granted him a release. Thomas recalled, “I felt like I was leaving home… In 
like a kid, out like a man.”68  
Still, Thomas had been released for the time to which he had been sentenced 
through a Manhattan court; he still had to face a judge for warrants in Bronx County for 
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armed robbery. Thomas considered how the discretion among judges had severe 
consequences for the people being sentenced. The six years that Thomas had to serve for 
the sentence he received through Manhattan nearly broke him, but “the Bronx was 
handing out wild bits of time, like seventeen and a half to thirty-five years,” a thought 
that made him think of fleeing the lax cops that were escorting him.69 He convinced 
himself to trust the process, spending the night at the Bronx County Jail before seeing the 
judge about his pending warrants. When he arrived at his holding cell, he had an 
existential moment as he encountered his bunkmate. The bunkmate was about 20 years 
old, and they quickly identified each other as “Spanish,” a connection that acted as an 
opening for solidarity and sympathy. The “kid” was arrested for shooting a police officer, 
who had not died, and the officer had shot him; Thomas realized that the situation 
perfectly mirrored the circumstances of his own arrest six years earlier, and he lamented 
what the future held for his young bunkmate. Thomas, on the other hand, was released 
with three years of probation; to him, it was freedom.  
Back in Harlem, Thomas noticed that the majority of his old friends from the 
neighborhood had fallen victim to drug addiction or incarceration, while those remaining 
still participated in illicit activities. Although Thomas started a legitimate job within the 
formal economy, he still wanted to supplement his income with some of the illicit money 
his friends were earning. The cycle between drugs, street crime, and prison was hard to 
break despite the hard lessons that Thomas had learned in the previous six years. It took 
some time for him to confront the sadness of the cycle of poverty that was depressing the 
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lives of people in his community, people he had cared for. Prisoner reentry back into 
society has often occurred without the charge for parole boards to create a plan for the 
released individual to effectively (re)integrate into society and the workforce.70 After 
release, former inmates have faced what have been called the “collateral consequences” 
of imprisonment or an “invisible punishment” of the hardships that people endure upon 
leaving a prison cell and returning to their former homes, including voting 
disenfranchisement, hiring discrimination, and disqualification from the public safety net 
of government subsidized housing and other welfare benefits.71 Eventually, Thomas 
published the memoir he had started writing in prison and tried to use his story to help 
troubled youth avoid the wrath of the criminal justice system. Over in a Los Angeles 
barrio, Thomas’ tale resonated with a Chicano teenager who would go on to write about 
his own troubled times on the street and in-and-out of jail. 
Latino Carceral Experiences: Always Running 
In 1993, Luis J. Rodriguez published his memoir, Always Running, which 
revealed his coming-of-age story as a youth growing up in Los Angeles in the 1960s and 
1970s. Rodriguez described his teenage life as the quintessential cholo—a term 
“appropriated by Chicano barrio youth to describe the style and people linked to local 
gang structures.”72 He painted a picture filled with lowrider cars, sex, alcohol, and drug 
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use, alongside violence, poverty, discrimination, and death, juxtaposed with the rays of 
light he saw in family members, teachers, and especially community organizers. Woven 
throughout his story are the normalized confrontations with law enforcement and 
incarceration.  
Rodriguez begins his origins story talking about how his parents and grandparents 
met in Chihuahua, Mexico. He notes that his great-great-grandmother was a Tarahumara 
Indian—a tribe that hid in the Chihuahua mountains, never conquered by Spanish 
settlers. Rodriguez discusses how his father was a respectable citizen in Ciudad Juarez, 
Mexico, as the principal of a local high school. Despite, or perhaps because of, his 
father’s selflessness to serve his students, corrupt government officials 
targeted Rodriguez’s father, resulting in months spent in jail before proving his 
innocence. Rodriguez had not been born at the time his father was held in jail, but he 
notes the burden it put on his mother and his older brother, who was only two years old at 
the time. Although Rodriguez and his siblings spent their first years growing up in Juarez, 
they had all been born in El Paso, Texas, “to help ease the transition from alien status to 
legal residency.”73 When he was a child, his family relocated to Watts, settling in a 
Mexican enclave within the larger black enclave that the neighborhood came to be known 
for.74  
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response to an incident of police racism and brutality, see Gerald Horne, Fire This Time: The 
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By age 10, Rodriguez had his first traumatic experience with police officers. He 
and a friend climbed the fence of an elementary school to play basketball on the school’s 
court; it was early evening, but late enough that the two boys were technically 
trespassing. Sheriff’s deputies had been patrolling the area and caught them on the 
property, prompting the officers to pursue the boys with batons in hand. Rodriguez and 
his friend ran, attempting to climb the roof of the school cafeteria to escape. While one of 
the officers grasped Rodriguez and pulled him down, his friend fled across the roof in a 
panic as a deputy called after him, “get down here… you greaser.” In his flight across the 
roof, the friend hit a skylight and fell through to his death.75  
In the years to follow, the antagonism between Rodriguez’s inner circle and law 
enforcement continued. Rodriguez recalled how he and his peers were already 
“hardened” by middle school, committed to a gang lifestyle and expected to fail 
academically, with half dropping out even before starting high school. At twelve years 
old, Rodriguez acquired his first tattoo—a cross and the words, “Mi Vida Loca,” an 
epithet that translated to “My Crazy Life” and referred to the chaos of existing within 
gang culture.76 Without structure at the school, it was easy to take on the role of a 
troublemaker. Rodriguez and his friends found an identity in being “vatos locos;” that is, 
“crazy guys” in the sense of living outside the boundaries of rules and laws. Soon, this 
translated to recruitment in the neighborhood “cliques” and “clubs.” The deeper 
Rodriguez and his friends went into gang life, the more they tried to build their reputation 
                                               
75 Rodriguez, 35-37. 
76 Ibid., 44-45. 
 49 
on the street and the tougher they tried to prove themselves, turning their defensive stance 
against “Anglos” into an offensive challenge when confronted by tensions with white 
groups.  
On a trip to the beach in “‘whitebread’ country,” Rodriguez and his friends found 
a spot to have to themselves and the girls they invited. The teens spent the day playing 
football on the sand, splashing in the water, flirting, and snacking on chips, with some 
feeding their sense of rebellion by sipping on beer, smoking marijuana, or trying the LSD 
one friend had brought. Later in the afternoon, they caught some blonde, surfer types 
observing them and who eventually taunted, “Fuck you, beaners” and “Mexicans suck,” 
which seemed like part of the typical battle Rodriguez had come to expect on a visit to 
the beach. That time, however, the young blonde men identified themselves as the 
Huntington Beach Police Department, drew their guns, and made the group of 
teenagers—boys and girls—kneel with their hands on their heads. It became clear that the 
officers initially had no reason to arrest anyone as they continued to search, eventually 
letting the girls stand but forcing the boys to maintain a squatted position until they found 
a cause for arrest. The officers threatened Rodriguez and his friends not to move: 
“greaser… don’t understand English or what?” Finally the officers uncovered the beer 
and found the LSD in a jacket pocket. Rodriguez recalled, “The cops were ecstatic. They 
had something to book us for.”77 Along with his friends, Rodriguez was arrested and 
taken to the local jail; he was only fourteen. Although Rodriguez and most of his friends 
were soon released to their parents, his friend, Black Dog, who was nicknamed for his 
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dark skin, was held and charged for the LSD, which only added to the list of prior 
charges he had already accrued on his record.   
Although Rodriguez recognized the crimes he was committing, while drawing his 
own lines between right and wrong, he determined that “police are just another gang.”78 
They did their part to instigate the fights between the gangs, telling members of one gang 
the insults they heard from another club, a strategy that would inevitably destroy the 
young men from both neighborhoods. In one of his in-and-out of jail stints as a teenager, 
Rodriguez talked to the deputy on the other side of the bars, who he recognized as 
“Chicano like me,” but also someone who chose the Sheriff’s Department over his own 
people. To add insult to injury, the deputy defended the officers’ plot to arrest juveniles 
for every minimal charge possible in an effort to compile a record for each youth from 
the barrio; it would make it easier to convict them for charges as soon as they became 
adults.79 It was effective entrapment. 
Yet, it was also clear to Rodriguez that this strategy was employed to target him 
and his peers in the barrio and protect the white kids from the suburbs. When Rodriguez 
entered high school, the racial divides became even more palpable as the school served 
one wealthy neighborhood which housed white and Asian families and one impoverished 
neighborhood, primarily home to Mexican families: “The school had two principal 
languages. Two skin tones and two cultures.”80  
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 Rodriguez described how that tension turned into a traditional battle between the 
groups. Every year some incident was bound to spark violence between the rich white 
students and the socially outcast Mexicans. In his freshman year, it started at a football 
game, where the teams and the crowd were white, while Rodriguez and his friends stood 
out as the unwelcome guests in attendance. They owned up to the vatos locos image they 
portrayed as a strategy to navigate the world where they existed as an underclass, 
knowing that their threats were empty. Once again, the cops intervened on behalf of the 
opposition to Rodriguez and his friends, stopping them as they walked away from the 
football game. Rodriguez’s friend, Carlitos, challenged the police officers, asking why 
they were always being harassed by the police. In response, officers choked Carlitos until 
he passed out. After an ambulance finally took Carlitos, Rodriguez and his friends 
erupted into a rage that they unleashed on the white crowd at the game. Violence 
perpetuated more violence between the white and Mexican students, with the police 
officers taking a stance against the latter—“As usual, they went after the Mexicans.” The 
officers brought Rodriguez and his friends to the high school office, taking those who had 
already dropped out of school to the police station, while those still enrolled at the time, 
like Rodriguez, were expelled from school.81 The cops played their role in replacing 
education with incarceration as the predominant institution in the lives of Mexican youth 
like Rodriguez. In essence, this experience from Rodriguez’s memoir revealed an 
example of a school-to-prison pipeline—the intervention of law enforcement at schools 
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with disproportionate punitive discipline being applied to black and Latino students—at 
the onset of the prison boom.82  
In addition to his own father’s experience in jail across the border, Rodriguez’s 
beloved cousin, Pancho, relayed his adventures behind bars, normalizing work in Texas 
and visiting girls in Denver with jail time in Oakland.83 By age 15, Rodriguez had seen 
the members of his gang fall victim to gang violence, heroin addiction, or incarceration. 
After being expelled, Rodriguez’s idle time led him to huffing and joining a more serious 
gang that expected him to commit more violence in order to exude power and take 
governance over their neighborhood, Lomas. The violence did not go unnoticed.  
Rodriguez listed the various efforts that started in the barrio in response to havoc 
wreaked by the gangs: “Committees, task forces, community centers, born-again store-
front churches and behavior guidance counselors proliferated.”84 Rodriguez had the 
strong sense that his behavior resulted from the ultimate feeling of being out of balance; 
he lacked a sense of direction for his future and had not found a place where he had a 
sense of belonging. The community centers appealed to him; he found people who 
impressed him such as Chente Ramírez who had grown up in an East Los Angeles barrio, 
gone to college, and been a part of the founding of major Chicano rights activist groups: 
United Mexican American Students (UMAS), the school walkouts of 1968, MEChA 
(Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán), and the Brown Berets.  
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At another community center, Rodriguez observed the work of Sal Basuto, who 
primarily dealt with youth from Sangra, the home of a rival gang, who lived in even more 
desperate circumstances than Rodriguez and his peers. Sangra youth were further 
marginalized at their school and had become such enemies of the police, they proved 
their worthiness of gang membership by attacking cops.85 At least with these youth 
through the doors of the community center, Ramírez and Basuto had a chance to change 
the life course for some; they had made an impact in Rodriguez’s life even if it was not 
immediately effective.  
Rodriguez continued to fill his idle time with drug use and gang activity, whether 
it was stealing something or hurting someone from a rival group: “We tried to enter death 
and emerge from it. We sought it in heroin… We craved it in our pursuit of Sangra and in 
battles with the police.” Rodriguez explained that the threats he and his friends made 
translated to death wishes: “We yelled: You can’t touch this!, but Come kill me! was the 
inner cry.”86 This dire outlook reflected the idea that people suffering from internal 
turmoil could commit “suicide by cop;” that is, intentionally seek the wrath of police 
violence as a means to end a seemingly inescapable predicament.87 For Rodriguez and his 
friends, the predicament was addiction, poverty, and a caste system that relegated them to 
the bottom of society. 
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Addiction and incarceration complemented one another, and became a regular 
facet of life for Chicano youth in the barrio. Rodriguez conveyed a sense that his struggle 
with drugs and the inevitability of time in prison was a tradition that had been handed 
down to cholos from the pachucos before them: “Most of the old-timers in prison, 
the pachucos of the 30s and 40s, were incarcerated because of chiva,” which was slang 
for low-quality heroin that was distributed through Mexico, “Then every ten years or so a 
generation of ex-gang bangers became hooked. Now it was our time.”88 Meanwhile, 
sheriff’s helicopters patrolled the skies above Rodriguez’s neighborhood on a nightly 
basis, ready to pounce on any activity, a reaction certain to end in the death or 
incarceration of Mexican youth, as well as their black peers.  
When Rodriguez enrolled back in high school, he found himself identifying with 
his black classmates; his main friend, “a black dude,” robbed houses with Rodriguez until 
he was caught stealing a car on his own and sent to a youth correctional facility.89 
Rodriguez discussed the significant interplay that black and Mexican youth gangs had in 
the Los Angeles area, on the street as well as in youth and adult correctional facilities: 
For the most part, the Mexicans in and around Los Angeles were 
economically and socially closest to blacks. As soon as we understood 
English, it was usually the Black English we first tried to master. Later in 
the youth authority camps and prisons, blacks used Mexican slang and 
the cholo style; Mexicans imitated the Southside swagger and style—
although this didn't mean at times we didn't war with one another, such 
being the state of affairs at the bottom.90 
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Rodriguez acknowledged the irony of simultaneous cultural sharing and racial 
divides, as well as class solidarity and a battle for resources. In his second round of high 
school, Rodriguez seemed set on situating his identity and finding balance in an 
environment that was not meant to cater to him. Rodriguez struggled to focus within the 
parameters that his teachers set, instead turning toward and identifying with books on the 
black experience in America, such as Eldridge Cleaver’s Soul On Ice and the 
Autobiography of Malcolm X–texts which discuss each author’s experiences in prison.91 
Even more than these, Thomas’ Down These Mean Streets resonated with Rodriguez, 
becoming “like a bible” to him. Rodriguez described Thomas as “a barrio boy like me, on 
the other side of America.”92 
This heightened social and political consciousness led Rodriguez to participate in 
a Vietnam War Protest in 1970.93 Along with other Chicano youth, Rodriguez confronted 
the armed deputies that lined up to stop them; Rodriguez was determined to resist the 
“alien authority.”94 The deputies exerted their power, driving Rodriguez’s face into the 
dirt, exposing him and others to tear gas, and eventually arresting hordes of protesters. 
Rodriguez and other arrested minors were bussed to a juvenile correctional facility, but 
were eventually booked in the county jail alongside adults facing serious charges—
murder, rape, and drugs. Later, Rodriguez was transferred to the Hall of Justice jail, 
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known as the Glasshouse, placed in a cell next to hardcore offenders including Charles 
Manson.  
While at Glasshouse, Rodriguez and other Chicano inmates learned that Ruben 
Salazar, a journalist and an icon in the Chicano Rights Movement, had been killed during 
the protests. In response, the Chicanos erupted within the confines of their cells. The 
most they could do to express their rage was find a way to set a fire to their mattresses. 
Their anger was only further fueled by Manson—when he left his cell to attend a hearing, 
guards forced all of the inmates into lockdown in their cells. Manson used the 
opportunity of a controlled audience to preach to the white inmates that they should kill 
all the “niggers and spics.”95 While the many black and Chicano inmates responded with 
threats, everyone in the jail knew the guards would protect Manson.  
By this arrest in 1970, Rodriguez had been a regular at local juvenile facilities and 
jails. It was a routine for his parents to find him and take him out. This time he 
“disappeared into the criminal justice system.”96 As Rodriguez noted, “a disproportionate 
number of Chicano males ended up” in prison, but this sizeable contingent also meant 
that “pinto [Latino prisoner] organizations and publications flowered into existence.”97 
That is, Chicano inmates participated in race-based groups and activities, and these 
“Chicano self-help groups on the inside paralleled the creation of such groups on the 
outside,” as people like Rodriguez made the connections between the support and 
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solidarity needed as they confronted issues of economic, social, and educational 
discrimination that steered them in and out of jail cells.98  
The next couple of years, while Rodriguez finished high school, were marked by 
the back and forth between the pull of the activism and social justice efforts that appealed 
to him and gang life; and between white classmates who began to understand the plight 
of Mexican students and practice more cultural sensitivity and white classmates that 
resisted the social change, vandalizing the school with the words, “Mexicans go home! 
Greasers stink! Remember the Alamo!”99 For the Mexican youth who had been 
committed to a life of violence, the instinct for revenge was difficult to overcome. Yet, 
more powerful than the battle with white students was the battle between rival Mexican 
street gangs. Rodriguez made arguments to his peers about the senselessness of rivalry, 
arguing that the violence would never end. He supported the truces between gangs that 
community leaders tried to facilitate, but still fell in line with some missions for street 
justice.  
Angered that bikers had jumped one of their own, Rodriguez and his friends 
sought revenge, arming themselves and taking two vehicles to unleash bullets on the 
accused motorcycle club. Although, the car that Rodriguez rode in had arrived to the 
scene late, and they played a minor role in the incident, police apprehended their car. 
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Rodriguez went to jail once again—this time for assault with intent to commit murder. 
Rodriguez wrote, “Jail in the barrio is only a prelude; for many homeboys the walls 
would soon taste of San Quentin, Folsom, and Soledad, the pathway through The Crazy 
Life.”100 Luckily for Rodriguez, the community leaders with whom he had bonded 
worked to have him released expediently. After his release, the bikers chose to identify 
someone with whom they had a long-standing feud instead of Rodriguez and his friends, 
and yet, Rodriguez still maintained the sense that his life trajectory likely pointed toward 
hard time in prison.  
In the wake of this stint in jail, the community debated whether they should be 
directing their efforts toward a truce between the rival gangs. At a meeting for multiple 
community centers, a woman argued against the truce, seeing it as condoning the 
violence, saying, “We need more police protection—we need to stand up to these 
hoodlums and put them behind bars.”101 This stance, which reflected a politics of 
respectability, echoed throughout generations of Mexican parents contemplating the best 
solution to protect their children from the ire of law enforcement and mainstream society, 
from the parents of zoot suiters to those of Chicano activists and youth who embraced 
cholo style.102 
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Rodriguez had the fortune of Ramírez’s ongoing support; Ramírez commissioned 
Rodriguez to lead a project of painting Mexican-inspired murals at community centers as 
well as over graffiti around the barrio. Rodriguez recruited other gang members for the 
project. They sketched and painted pre-Columbian imagery—pyramids and Aztec 
warriors—alongside street life aesthetics: cholos, needles, and coffins.103 The expression 
of Aztec pride became a common theme in Rodriguez’s reform efforts. His high school’s 
mascot was the Aztec, but the white, middle class half of the student body that dominated 
school activities hardly regarded the figure with respect, instead using a caricature “like 
Pocahontas with tommy hawks [who] prance around like fools.”104 In response, 
Rodriguez and another student auditioned for the mascot roles by learning and 
performing a traditional Aztec dance in more culturally appropriate costumes. 
Rodriguez’s street crew tattoos juxtaposed the armbands he wore. That he and his partner 
won the mascot roles validated the efforts of the Chicano students seeking a place at their 
own school whether it was in an existing organization or through Chicano-targeted 
programming. 
The programs kept some off the streets, but violence continued for others, as 
Rodriguez had a growing sense that much of the pain inflicted had been committed by the 
police. A friend who used to participate in gang life with Rodriguez when they were 
young teens, Miguel, died from a gunshot wound at the hands of a deputy officer, 
becoming an incident that brought the community together to demand justice. The officer 
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faced a murder charge, only to be found innocent on all counts, transferred to another 
county, and accused of brutality against a black youth.105  
Other friends of Rodriguez had been gunned down mysteriously during the truce 
as well; Rodriguez suspected that their deaths also came at the hands of the sheriff’s 
department. But he also knew there would be no justice for any officers accused of 
harassing, assaulting, or murdering black or brown youth. In 1972, in the wake of these 
types of incidents, the Congress of Mexican American Unity and the Chicano 
Moratorium Committee asked UCLA professor Armando Morales to publish a study on 
Mexican American-police relations. Morales argued that “not one police officer in the 
United States… has ever been prosecuted in the federal courts for assaulting or killing… 
a person of Spanish surname,” who Morales claimed should be protected as persons of 
color, because “police administrators, prosecutors, county and federal grand juries, judges 
and the public have been dangerously overprotective of police in police brutality cases.” 
It was even extremely rare for police officers to be prosecuted locally. As a result, 
Morales explained, this injustice led people to “take the law into their own hands and 
administer ‘curbside justice’ to police—they literally begin to kill random police.”106  
 Rodriguez, however, seemed on track to put the violence behind him and work on 
problems in the barrio through the social justice and community service methods he 
continued to develop in college; a grant to partially fund his education and a book deal 
                                               
105 Rodriguez, 240.  
106 Armando Morales, Ando Sangrando: A Study of Mexican American-Police Conflict (La 
Puente, CA: Perspectiva Publications, 1972), 20. Morales also noted that only one of 30 recent 
cases processed by law enforcement agencies through the East Los Angeles Police Center had 
been sustained; Morales, 60. 
 61 
seemed to insure his place in school, rather than in jail. Instead his mission to do the right 
thing resulted in him intervening when he witnessed deputies roughly arresting a woman, 
pushing her face to ground to the point of drawing blood. When Rodriguez intervened, 
the deputies turned on him, and with reinforcements, beat him into submission. In the 
struggle, Rodriguez inadvertently kicked one of the deputies, leading to a charge for 
assaulting an officer. This time Rodriguez was an adult facing hard time for the charge, 
and yet, going to jail was “familiar territory” to him.107 After much consideration, 
Rodriguez convinced himself to take a plea bargain. This meant a fine and a few months 
in the county jail; it also meant falling behind in school and dropping out.  
 Various incidents converged around 1972 to bring clarity to Rodriguez and 
understanding about his place in the community. Former friends became enemies; the old 
neighborhood and community centers were overrun by prison gangs; phencyclidine 
(PCP) addictions ran rampant; Rodriguez’s murals at the community centers and around 
the barrio had been whitewashed; the prison activist, Al “Pache” Alvarez—who had been 
an institution in the barrio, bringing together works of the Black Panthers, the American 
Indian Movement, and the Puerto Rican group, the Young Lords—had been shot in the 
head at a local park. While the future seemed grim, Rodriguez maintained his friendship 
and partnership with Ramírez. Together they continued their work to address the issues 
afflicting communities of color—everything from education, employment, and poverty to 
immigration and incarceration, working with mothers, veterans, unions, students, and 
unemployed workers, anyone who was struggling to exist. In the 1980s, Rodriguez took 
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this work to Chicago, where he also continued to pursue his literary career, in part, to 
reach troubled youth.108  
Perhaps the ultimate irony of Rodriguez’s memoir is that he published the text for 
his son, Ramiro, who had joined a gang in Chicago in the early 1990s when the book was 
published, to steer him away from la vida loca. Just several years later in 1997, however, 
Ramiro was sentenced to 28 years in prison for three counts of murder; he served 13 and 
half years, making a circuit in the Illinois Department of Corrections facilities. The 
experience brought Rodriguez and his son closer, leading the two to work together with 
an organization, Youth Struggling for Survival (YSS) in Chicago. Rodriguez’s book and 
his experience have resonated with minority youth who have been tempted to join gangs, 
marked by law enforcement, and at high risk of incarceration. It has been a text that 
“nonreaders love to read” and often has been stolen as well as banned. Rodriguez’s story 
has meaning to its readers, he claimed, as “the first major account of Chicano barrio 
experiences from an actual participant (unlike the major sociological studies by social 
scientists).”109 Rodriguez’s work has been in direct conversation with that of Piri 
Thomas, not only because Thomas’ book impacted Rodriguez as a teenager, but Thomas’ 
praise, “Bravo, Luis Rodriguez, for the beauty of a strong singular voice… Must reading. 
Punto!” graced the inside cover of Rodriguez’s book.110  
In 1997, several years after the publication of Always Running and when 
Rodriguez’s son began his prison sentence, the thirtieth anniversary of Thomas’ own 
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memoir arrived. Upon reflection on his story, Thomas asserted, “the sad truth is that 
people caught in the ghettoes have not made much progress, and in fact, have moved 
backwards in many respects… Unfortunately, it’s the same old Mean Streets, only 
worse.”111 While poverty rates for black New Yorkers increased in the 1970s, declined in 
the 1980s, and rose a bit again in the 1990s to land at 25 percent, Hispanic poverty rates 
in New York City, although declining from 35 percent in 1979 to 30 percent in 1999, 
have typically surpassed those of other demographic groups.112 Furthermore, race and 
poverty continued to concentrate in the city throughout the 1990s, resulting in greater 
exposure to violent crimes for people of color than for non-Hispanic white New Yorkers, 
with the highest rates of exposure for non-Hispanic black residents, followed closely by 
rates for Hispanic black and “Other Race” (primarily Hispanic) residents, and Hispanic 
white rates slightly above average.113 This concentrated social disadvantage was coupled 
with New York becoming “an increasingly polarized city,” in which wealthier residents 
and visitors shunned the “visible signs” of this growing urban poverty. In response, law 
enforcement aggressively targeted crime in poor neighborhoods, leaving racial minorities 
to bear the cost of this program of “policing a class society.”114    
Toward Racial Consciousness   
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For David Ruíz, Piri Tomas, and Luis J. Rodriguez, racial consciousness inspired 
political activism in prison, and in turn, experiences in prison influenced social activism 
on the outside, even though Ruíz could only ever relate to the struggle on the outside 
from behind bars. While these individual narratives uncover personal identity formations, 
they also complement the perceptions of race showcased in prison records before 1950. 
That is, the registers reveal how prisons codified race for people from Latin American 
countries, whether it meant labeling them as racial others in California and Texas, or 
forcing them into an ill-fitting black-white dichotomous system in New York. After 1950, 
the stories from Thomas and Rodriguez not only demonstrate how pervasive and 
normalized antagonistic relationships with law enforcement and the criminal justice 
system have been for Latinos living in areas of concentrated social disadvantage, but also 
how those interactions have shaped their understanding of self—from relationships with 
blackness and whiteness, to finding pride in Indian resistance, connections across Latin 







Chapter Two – Latinos as Criminal Aliens 
 Mexican American artist, Manuel Acosta, immigrated to the United States from 
the city of Aldama in northern Mexico as a small child in 1924. As a young man, Acosta 
fought in World War II like many of his peers from El Paso, Texas. When he returned 
from the war, Acosta attended the local college to begin studying art. Soon, he was 
traveling to California to further his studies, and by the 1950s, Acosta was being 
commissioned to paint murals and hosting exhibitions across the country. He painted 
people from El Paso’s barrios and images reminiscent of the Mexican Revolution. His 
work was revered by the Chicano movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Acosta painted a 
portrait of Cesar Chavez, which now resides in the National Portrait Gallery, and he 
provided artwork for books by Chicano activists, Ricardo Sánchez and Gonzalo Gómez.1 
In his personal life, Acosta acted as a sort of Truman Capote of El Paso’s border culture, 
hosting parties covered in the local news that brought together people from different 
walks of life.2  
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While Acosta’s Mexican pride has taken center stage in his work and life story, 
his homosexuality eludes his biographies. His story ended tragically when he was 
murdered in his home in 1989, with biographies and most media accounts noting that the 
culprit was Cesar Nájera Flores, “a Mexican national.” The media framed the brutal 
murder, in which Flores bludgeoned Acosta in the head with a hammer and stabbed him 
in the heart with a screwdriver to ensure death, as a robbery of an employer by a former 
employee. These accounts explain that Acosta had employed Flores in an attempt to help 
an undocumented immigrant, ignoring Nájera’s version of the story, in which he 
explained, “I just kept thinking of what he did to me and I just had to kill him, I’m not 
homosexual.”3 The El Paso Police Department held up the robbery as the motive for 
murder, as opposed to the accusations of sexual assault by Nájera. In doing so, they 
avoided the possible motive of homophobia, evading an acknowledgment of Acosta’s 
homosexuality in the process. Instead, the focus of the narrative of Acosta’s death 
centered on Nájera as a Mexican citizen who worked in the U.S. illegally and committed 
not only property crimes, but violent crimes as well. As such, Nájera murdered a 
successful American artist, not a fellow immigrant. Rather than discuss the homophobic 
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motives that Acosta’s murderer proclaimed, the media also focused on the story of the 
killer as a Mexican national—a cautionary tale of employing and trying to help illegal 
immigrants.  
The narrative crafted to describe Nájera’s actions exemplifies the types of stories 
that anti-immigration groups circulate to create a blanket characterization of immigrants 
who have come to the United States from Latin American, predominantly non-white 
countries.4 Not only do these anecdotes reflect nationalist attitudes, they showcase the 
brand of criminalization aimed at Latinos that has become increasingly palpable in the 
latter part of the twentieth century. Because a significant share of the Latino population 
are immigrants (34 percent), a substantial portion of immigrants in recent decades have 
been from Latin American countries (52 percent), and because the majority of 
                                               
4 In 2015, Donald Trump launched his campaign and appealed to voters by describing immigrants 
as “criminals, drug dealers, and rapists.” On more than one occasion, Trump pointed to the death 
of Kate Steinle, who was allegedly murdered by Jose Ines Garcia Zarate, a Mexican man who 
“had been deported several times and was convicted of illegal re-entry to the U.S.” See Tom 
Porter, “Kate Steinle Killing: Mexican Immigrant Who Inspired Trump’s Wall Denies Murder,” 
Newsweek, October 24, 2017. Fox News TV host Sean Hannity described the Steinle case as a 
woman who was “gunned down,” even though the prosecution argued that Zarate had killed 
Steinle by carelessly pointing the gun. A jury eventually acquitted Zarate of the murder charge, 
and he was sentenced to “time served” for illegal gun possession after he had spent two and a half 
years in jail, being detained from his arrest to the end of his trial. Zarate has since been released 
to federal authorities to serve a sentence for two felony charges of illegal gun possession. While 
in federal custody, Zarate will be subject to processing by federal immigration officials. See Paul 
Elias, “Immigrant Acquitted of Murder in Kate Steinle Case Sentenced to Time Served,” Time, 
January 5, 2018. Hannity also brought up Sabine Durden, Mary Ann Mendoza, and Jamiel Shaw, 
the mothers of children who had allegedly been killed by undocumented immigrants and who 
were showcased at the Republican National Convention in July 2016. See “Sean Hannity: 
Trump’s warning on illegal immigrants proves grimly prophetic,” Fox News, March 22, 2017, 
available at http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/03/22/sean-hannity-trumps-warning-on-
illegal-immigrants-proves-grimly-prophetic.html. For more on the portrayal of immigrants in the 
media and by politicians, see Ediberto Román, “Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric,” in Those Damned 
Immigrants: America’s Hysteria over Undocumented Immigration (New York: New York 
University Press, 2013). 
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unauthorized immigrants are of Latin American origins (75 percent), the conflation of 
Latinos and immigrants, as well as immigrants and “illegal aliens,” results in the 
misguided and misplaced criminalization of Latinos and Latino immigrants alike.5  
While this conflation of Latinos and criminal aliens has been evident in the media, 
in political discourse, and in police actions, carceral studies scholars also conflate Latinos 
of varying citizenship statuses in their discussions of Latinos and crime. And while 
immigration from Latin American countries to the United States certainly became 
increasingly apparent after 1965, the short-term memory focused on recent immigration 
ignores the significant presence of multiple generations of Latinos in the United States 
before this time period, especially in particular regions of the country, that have had a 
long-standing, adversarial relationship with law enforcement and a history of punishment 
under U.S. law.6 Therefore, this chapter purposefully disaggregates the data on Latino 
incarceration by citizenship to illuminate what distinguishes the experiences of the Latino 
U.S.-born citizen, authorized immigrants, and undocumented immigrants in the criminal 
justice system, while considering the historical impact of the all-encompassing 
                                               
5 Gustavo López and Jynnah Radford, Facts on U.S. Immigrants, 2015: Statistical portrait of the 
foreign-born population in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2017); Antonio Flores, Facts 
on U.S. Latinos, 2015: Statistical portrait of Hispanics in the United States (Pew Research 
Center, 2017); Marta Tienda and Susana Sanchez, “Latin American Immigration to the United 
States,” Daedalus 142, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 48-64. For more statistics on immigrants, also see 
Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in 
the United States (Migration Policy Institute, 2017). 
6 Large waves of immigration from Latin American countries followed the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Cellar Act. The complexity of this act and its 
effect of Latino immigration merits further discussion.  
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characterization of Latinos as “alien citizens;” that is, as permanent foreign others, 
regardless of nativity.7 
To be sure, anti-immigrant sentiment has been an important contributing factor to 
Latino criminalization, which has manifested in anti-immigration enforcement and Latino 
incarceration. For instance, the fear generated from the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, created a hostile environment for non-white immigrants and resulted in anti-
immigrant laws geared to identify and apprehend undesirable foreigners. While some 
policies targeted Muslim immigrants in particular, others were more far-reaching, 
including the establishment of screening systems and interlinked databases, as well as 
cooperative enforcement programs, such as the 287(g) program and Secure Communities 
which have emboldened local and state authorities to capture and detain immigrants.8 
This, along with large waves of immigration in the later part of the twentieth century, has 
made for greater proportions of immigrants among incarcerated Latinos in more recent 
decades. However, that immigrants make up a majority of the incarcerated Latino 
population cannot be assumed in all contexts, especially when many Latino communities 
have experienced downward assimilation—that is, downward social and economic 
                                               
7 Mae Ngai uses this term in her discussion of immigrants to the U.S. during the exclusion period 
between 1924 and 1965. See Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of 
Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
8 See Muzzaffar Christi and Claire Bergeron, Post-9/11 Policies Dramatically Alter the U.S. 
Immigration Landscape (Migration Policy Institute, 2011). Lisa Magaña further explains the 
repercussions of post-9/11 hysteria on immigration writ large, writing “After 9/11, Republicans in 
Arizona and elsewhere seized the opportunity to highlight the potential dangers of unauthorized 
cross-border immigration. Making matters worse, fear and concern over terrorism and 
immigration were exacerbated when it turned out that several of the 9/11 terrorists had briefly 
lived in the Phoenix area,” see “Comparing and Contrasting the Rationales for SB 1070 and HB 
56: A Short Analysis,” Journal of American Ethnic History 35, no. 3 (Spring 2016): 82-86. 
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mobility—and when Puerto Ricans reside in the states with the most disproportionate 
Latino incarceration rates.9  
For those reasons, I find it necessary to track the fallacies that prevail in the 
rhetorical landscape on Latino criminality, and nuance and complicate the understandings 
of immigrants as criminals, incarcerated Latinos as immigrants, and the Latino-as-
foreigner paradigm in general. Legal scholar Linda Bosniak explains that citizenship can 
be thought of in four ways: citizenship as formal legal status, citizenship as rights, 
citizenship as political activity, and citizenship as identity/solidarity.10 Although Latinos 
in the United States vary in citizenship as a legal status, their experiences have often 
overlapped in terms of citizenship as rights, political activity, and identity/solidarity. In 
other words, the treatment of Latinos as foreigners and second-class citizens has played 
an important role in their life outcomes, including their likelihood to come into contact 
with the criminal justice system. Still, legal statuses determine the collateral 
consequences of that similar treatment of all Latinos; criminalization only results in 
deportation for non-citizens.11  
As immigrant studies scholar Alicia Schmidt Camacho has argued, there have 
been “conflicted relationships between Mexican migrants and Mexican Americans as 
they have pursued civil rights.”12 Likewise immigration advocacy, which had tended to 
                                               
9 Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons (The 
Sentencing Project, 2016). 
10 Linda Bosniak, “Citizenship Denationalized,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 7, no. 2 
(Spring 2000): 447-509.  
11 Repatriation of Mexican Americans born in the United States during the 1940s will be 
discussed later in the chapter.  
12 Alicia Schmidt Camacho, Migrant Imaginaries: Latino Cultural Politics in the U.S.-Mexico 
Borderlands (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 4. 
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invoke a politics of respectability that esteems “good immigrants,” has often undermined 
a broader critique of mass incarceration and the racial profiling of people of color: “By 
insisting that most immigrants do not deserve to be deported, advocates leave 
unchallenged the idea that the criminals do. The good immigrant narrative misses the 
ways that overpolicing and mass incarceration produce a reservoir of immigrants with 
criminal records, creating an endless chain of detentions and deportations.”13 Likewise, 
the targeting of undocumented immigrants, an effort that opponents argue relies on 
ethno-racial profiling, also results in U.S.-born Latinos entering the criminal justice 
system. And while immigrants may not be responsible for the majority of crimes 
committed by Latinos, their immigrant status make them vulnerable to treatment as 
criminals, and the severe punishment of deportation.  
In this chapter, I begin by reviewing the history of conflating Latinos and 
immigrants, a phenomenon that speaks to the racialization of Latinos by virtue of their 
perceived permanent foreignness. I then turn to the well-documented past of attributing 
criminal activity to increases in immigration, an accusation which dates back to the 
nineteenth century and which has been levied against various ethnic groups depending on 
the political context. But no matter the group of concern nor the decade that the charge 
has been made linking immigrants to crime, there has always been evidence to the 
contrary, which will also be explored in this chapter. While the conflation of Latinos as 
immigrants and immigrants as criminals has proved unwarranted, the criminalization of 
                                               
13 Alan A. Aja and Alejandra Marchevsky, “How Immigrants Became Criminals,” Boston 
Review, March 17, 2017, http://bostonreview.net/politics/alan-j-aja-alejandra-marchevsky-how-
immigrants-became-criminals. 
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Latino immigrants and the high incarceration rates of Latinos, immigrant and otherwise, 
are realities that must be addressed. Latino identity has been constructed in light of this 
presumption of foreignness and the increased restrictions against and criminalization of 
immigration. 
Conflating Latino and Immigrants 
 In 2008, police officers in Allentown, Pennsylvania, detained Ernesto Galarza and 
reported him to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, holding him in a Lehigh County 
jail cell for three days until ICE agents arrived. Galarza, however, was a U.S. citizen, 
born in New Jersey, who had presented documents—including his Pennsylvania driver’s 
license and Social Security card—to the police officers. With the help of the ACLU, 
Galarza filed a lawsuit against the county for unjustly detaining him; he claimed that as a 
Latino, someone of Puerto Rican heritage, he had been racially profiled—assumed not 
only to be an immigrant, but an illegal alien, a status believed to merit jail time. Although 
Galarza settled a civil lawsuit for $50,000, he was dissatisfied with the failure of the 
courts to hold the jail accountable for his unjustifiable detention. The county’s attorneys 
argued that jails are not responsible for verifying a person’s immigration status; and yet, 
the Lehigh County Jail held Galarza solely on the basis of questioning his immigration 
status. Given that Allentown police had detained 120 undocumented immigrants in a 
single year, they had evidently made it their agenda to conduct “roundups” of people 
suspected to be in the country illegally. And yet, that high number of detainees only tells 
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part of the story; the police department had no statistics for the number individuals 
racially profiled like Galarza, who were not unauthorized immigrants.14 
 As one study on the overpolicing of Latinos argued, “Latinos and undocumented 
immigrants are functionally equivalent,” especially under the purview of the law.15 
Latinos report being racially profiled, targeted by police under the assumption of being an 
undocumented immigrant.16 While the Arizona state government asserted that their SB 
1070 law in 2010 would be accompanied with training to restrict racial profiling, the 
police instructional videos advised officers to look for cues with racial overtones—
clothing, crowded vehicles, and an out-of-place demeanor.17 When presented with 
scenarios depicting these types of cues and absent of any racial descriptions, people 
surveyed still believed that the suspects were more likely to be Latino (52-53 percent 
                                               
14 “US Citizen Mistaken for Undocumented and Jailed Wages Court Fight,” Fox News, November 
12, 2012, available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/12/us-citizen-mistaken-for-
undocumented-immigrant-and-jailed-for-three-days-takes.html. 
15 Liana Maris Epstein, “A Policy of Stereotype Threat: The Intergroup Impact of Policing 
Stereotypes” (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2012), 21. 
16 See Ramiro Martinez Jr., “Incorporating Latinos and Immigrants into Policing Research,” 
Criminology and Public Policy 6 (February 2007): 57-64; Cecilia Menjívar and Cynthia 
Bejarano, “Latino immigrants’ perceptions of crime and police authorities in the United States: A 
case study from the Phoenix Metropolitan area,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27, no. 1 (2004): 120-
148; John D. Reitzel, Stephen K. Rice, and Alex R. Piquero, “Lines and shadows: Perceptions of 
racial profiling and the Hispanic experience,” Journal of Criminal Justice 32, no. 6 (2004): 607-
616; Susan Rakosi Rosenbloom and Niobe Way, “Experiences of Discrimination among African 
American, Asian American, and Latino Adolescents in an Urban High School,” Youth and 
Society 35, no. 4 (June 2004): 420-451.  
17 Arizona’s SB 1070 granted “broad authority to state and local law enforcement agents to target 
unauthorized immigrants has focused national and international attention on the larger 
immigration debate in an unprecedented way.” See Muzaffar Chishti and Claire Bergeron, New 
Arizona Law Engulfs Immigration Debate (Migration Policy Institute, 2010). The stereotype of 
the crowded car reflects descriptions of certain immigrant groups in the 1910 Immigration 
Commission Reports that associate “tendencies toward congestion” and a “lower standard of 
living” with Mexican immigrants. Abstract of the Report on Immigration in Manufacturing and 
Mining (United States Immigration Commission, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1911).  
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likelihood) than any other race.18 Camacho argues that the creation of the “illegal alien” 
in the early twentieth century and “the criminalization of Mexican migration marked 
Mexican Americans and migrants, lawful and undocumented alike, as trespassers in the 
United States.”19  
Camacho goes on to explain that even as early as the 1930s, “popular anxieties 
about ‘illegal aliens’ made all Mexicans suspect, thus putting Mexican Americans in an 
impossible bind.”20 Historian Mae Ngai has also employed the word “impossible” to 
describe the precarious situation created for Mexican Americans and fellow Latinos by 
the conflation of race, undocumented status, and the criminalization of immigration. Ngai 
refers to those affected as “impossible subjects,” arguing that “numerical restriction 
[through the Immigration Act of 1924] created a new class of persons within the national 
body—illegal aliens—whose inclusion in the nation was at once a social reality and a 
legal impossibility.” This impossibility birthed the oxymoron of what Ngai calls the 
“alien citizen,” those born in the U.S. who had formal citizenship but were persistently 
seen as foreigners as a result of racial othering.21  
The understanding of Latinos being synonymous with immigrants has been 
pervasive in American public discourse. And because immigration has been criminalized 
in the United States for decades, Latinos have endured surveillance and punishment, in 
                                               
18 Liana Maris Epstein and Phillip Atiba Goff, “Safety or Liberty?: The Bogus Tradeoff of Cross-
Deputization,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 11, no. 1 (2011): 314-324.  
19 Camacho, 29. For similar arguments, see David G. Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican 
Americans, Mexican Immigrants and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995). 
20 Camacho, 48.  
21 Ngai, 8, 57, 267. 
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part, as a result of this conflation. The ACLU has taken up the issue of Latino racial 
profiling, submitting reports to the United Nations regarding their concerns on the cross-
deputization of local and state police officers which has enabled them to act as 
immigration agents. Opponents of policies such as Section 287(g) of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and Arizona’s SB 1070 
which call for cross-deputization argue that these policies allow, and even encourage, law 
enforcement agencies to illegally racially profile people and harass Latino communities, 
immigrants and U.S. citizens alike.22 
The persistent image of Latinos as foreigners has several implications: (1) 
Because the American public equates Latinos with immigrants and immigrants with 
criminals, “Latino” also connotes criminality in the American mind, (2) Latino U.S. 
citizens become collateral damage in anti-immigration movements, resulting in high 
incarceration rates of all Latinos, regardless of immigration status, (3) Latinos, regardless 
of their immigration status, feel targeted by police officers and therefore distrust them, 
perpetuating tension between Latino communities and the law, (4) The antagonism 
between Latinos and state authorities informs Latinos’ social identities, (5) Because anti-
immigration sentiment in the greater part of the twentieth century has been highly 
racialized, xenophobic and racial undertones in state policy have entangled consequences 
for Latino communities that undermine carceral studies attempts to define potential 
                                               
22 American Civil Liberties Union and the Rights Working Group, The Persistence of Racial and 
Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (August 2009), 13, 
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf. 
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causes for high rates of Latino incarceration. This is evidenced even in the studies that 
attempt to disprove the link between immigration and increased crime, some of which 
will be discussed later in the chapter. In the following section, I explore the history of 
linking immigrants to crime that began with the hysteria about immigration focused on 
Southern and Eastern European as well as Asian immigrants. However, even at that time, 
immigrants of the “Latin races” were singled out for their perceived high levels of 
criminality.   
A History of the Immigrant-Crime Linkage 
 
 The linkage between immigrants and crime has deep historical roots, with the 
connection consistently resulting from nativist and restrictionist sentiments as opposed to 
criminal realities. By 1875, the imagined threat of immigrants as criminals became salient 
enough to pass the Page Law, which sought to exclude “persons who are undergoing a 
sentence for conviction in their own country of felonious crimes other than political or 
growing out of or the result of such political offenses, or whose sentence has been 
remitted on condition of their emigration.”23 This law established the federal 
government’s ability to regulate immigration and prohibit the entry of those immigrants 
they deemed undesirable.24 Prior to the Page Law and as early as 1788, states asserted 
governance over immigration regulation. Northeastern states were particularly restrictive 
                                               
23 1875 Page Law (An act supplementary to the acts in relation to immigration), Sess. II, Chap. 
141; 18 Stat. 477, 43rd Congress, March 3, 1875. 
24 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1989/90), Ai-2. See also Eithne Luibheid, Entry 
Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
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given their concerns about convicts and paupers.25 State agents enforced these policies by 
requiring masters or owners of ships transporting immigrants to post bonds to ensure that 
the passengers they brought to U.S. shores would not become public charges.  
While the Supreme Court found states’ handling of immigrant matters to be an 
imposition on the regulation of foreign commerce, which was under federal jurisdiction, 
in 1837 the Court upheld requirements for ship masters to provide a detailed list of 
passengers so that states would know who was entering their borders.26 The Page Act of 
1875 also indicated that inspecting officers should board vessels to determine if any 
immigrating passenger was among the forbidden classes outlined in the law. Although 
the text suggested that those accused of being among the forbidden classes could appeal 
the designation to a judge, the inspecting officer’s subjective analysis still held the weight 
to determine the fate of the passengers. In other words, each inspecting officer merely 
had his observations in the context of the vessel to assess whether the individual was a 
convict, a public charge, etc. While visual cues such as clothing and cleanliness could 
have factored into inspection officers’ evaluations of immigrants, so too could racial 
markers.  
And as Matthew Jacobson argued, “restrictions on ‘convicts, idiots, lunatics, and 
people likely to be public charges’ (1882)… rested upon racial distinctions, as the 
scientific probabilities for such conditions were themselves determined by a calculus of 
                                               
25 Lucy E. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern 
Immigration Law (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 3-4. 
26 Ibid., 4.  
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race.”27 Indeed, charity leaders in the 1870s argued that pauperism and crime were 
hereditary characteristics.28 The Immigrant Act of 1891 followed the 1882 Act, 
specifying that individuals who had been “convicted of a felony or other infamous crime 
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” were not admissible to the country.29 
Furthermore, the 1891 Act entrusted inspection officers with more power, stating, “All 
decisions made by the inspection officers or their assistants touching the right of any 
alien to land, when adverse to such right, shall be final,” as it “severely [limited] judicial 
review in immigration cases and provided the foundation for the unprecedented power of 
the Bureau of Immigration.”30  
In the decades to come, however, restrictionists still argued that “aliens who 
belong to [the ‘morally unfit’ group] are among the most difficult to detect, and so far no 
feasible means have been discovered for making it possible to increase largely the 
                                               
27 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the 
Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Jacobson argues that even in acts 
passed prior to 1924, including the Immigration Act of 1882 that he references, the logic was 
racial. Then the “frankly eugenic nativists of the 1910s and 1920s” crafted the more explicitly 
racial quota system for the Immigration Act of 1924. Jacobson cites Michael C. LeMay, From 
Open Door to Dutch Door: An Analysis of U.S. Immigration Policy since 1980 (New York: 
Praeger, 1897), 38-72; Stephen J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton, 1981); 
Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the 
United States between the World Wars (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992). 
28 John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925 (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 44; Proceedings of the Conference of Charities, 
held in connection with the general meeting of the American Social Science Association, 
Saratoga, September 1876, 174.  
29 Jessica T. Simes and Mary C. Waters, “The Politics of Immigration and Crime,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration, eds. Sandra M. Bucerius and Michael Tonry 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 459-460.  
30 Salyer, 26. See Salyer for more on the Immigration Act of 1891, and a focus on the impact of 
the act on Chinese immigrants.  
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number of the ‘morally unfit’ who are debarred.”31 In fact, the Immigration Commission, 
headed by William Dillingham, in its series of reports to Congress from 1908 to 1910 
explained: 
While control of the immigration movement so far as physical and mental 
defectives are concerned has reached a high degree of efficiency, no 
adequate means have been adopted for preventing the immigration of 
criminals, prostitutes, and other morally undesirable aliens. The control of 
the latter classes is a much more difficult matter. In spite of the stringent 
law, criminals or moral defectives of any class, provided they pass the 
medical inspection, can usually embark at European ports and enter the 
United States without much danger of detection. A considerable number of 
criminals or aliens with criminal records are debarred annually at United 
States ports, but this results from the vigilance of immigrant inspectors or 
from chance information rather than from our system of regulation.32  
 
With the Immigration Act of 1907, the President of the United States was 
authorized to send representatives to foreign countries to establish agreements for those 
governments to prevent the issuing of passports to documented criminals, “as the best 
place to bar alien criminals is in their own countries, and the best way is through the 
utilization of the police records of such countries.”33 With particular concern over Italian 
                                               
31 Robert DeCourcy Ward, “The Crisis in Our Immigration Policy,” Publications of the 
Immigration Restriction League 61 (1913): 23. Ward explains that the “morally unfit” group to 
which he refers includes “(1) Prostitutes; (2) Procurers or persons attempting to bring in women 
or girls for immoral purposes; (3) Polygamists; (4) Anarchists, (5) Convicts and self-confessed 
criminals.” Ward was an alumnus of and professor at Harvard University in the field of 
climatology, and he has been described as “undoubtedly a major figure in turn-of-the-20th-century 
American geography. However, his “vocal advocacy of restriction on immigration may have 
lessened the impact of his pioneering work as a geographer and climatologist.” See Robert V. 
Rohli and Gregory D. Bierly, “The lost legacy of Robert CeCourcy Ward in American 
geographical climatology,” Progress in Physical Geography 35, no. 4 (June 7, 2011): 560. By the 
end of his life, Ward was particularly concerned about Mexican immigration, as expressed in his 
article, “The second year of the new immigration law,” Journal of Heredity 18(1): 3-18.  
32 Brief Statement of the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Immigration Commission, with 
Views of the Minority (U.S. Immigration Commission, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1910), 19.  
33 U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Documents 7, 61st Congress, 3d Session, December 5, 1910-
March 4, 1911, 28.  
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immigrants, the Italian government set up a system to assist the United States by refusing 
to issue passports to their citizens with criminal records. Although the Dillingham 
Commission seemed to laud the efforts of the Italian government, they noted that the 
system still allowed minor officials enough discretion to evade the policy and grant 
passports to some criminals. Moreover, despite Italy being the one example of a country 
with established efforts to prevent the emigration of their country’s criminals to the 
United States, the commission’s discussions of crimes focused on the criminal stereotype 
of Italian immigrants.  
The Dillingham Commission claimed that the disproportionate level of crime 
among the foreign-born was “due principally to the prevalence of homicides and other 
crimes of personal violence among Italians and to the violation of city ordinances,” which 
were deemed crimes only because those committing those acts were foreign born.34 
Nevertheless, the commission warned that Italy “still holds first place for the number of 
crimes committed against the person,” and that “the chief difficulty with the crimes of 
Italians seems to be their determination not to testify in court against an enemy, but to 
insist on settling their wrongs after the manner of the vendetta.”35 This caricature of 
Italian immigrants even made its way into the discourse of rural America, with an 
editorial in the Farmers’ Union News, a national publication based in Union City, 
Georgia, which lamented that the waves of immigrants coming into the country in 1909 
                                               
34 U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Documents 85, 61st Congress, 3d Session, December 5, 1910-
March 4, 1911, 25.  
35 Brief Statement of the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Immigration Commission, 
251.  
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were mainly “dark-visaged gentlemen of the Mafia, Camorra, and the Black Hand,” as 
opposed to hard-working, law-abiding individuals who would contribute to the 
development of the country.36 And although the commission reports explained that the 
proportion of convictions among the foreign-born was only higher than the native-born 
due to a greater share of the “criminal age” among immigrants, the commission still 
validated concerns about the criminal element among the foreign-born by suggesting that 
they could not quantify the crimes that had occurred but had gone unpunished.  
While the Dillingham Commission’s reports on crime often highlighted Italian 
immigrants and their likelihood to commit criminal acts, they discussed other immigrant 
groups of concern to restrictionists—Japanese and Mexican immigrants. A report 
explained that Japanese immigrants “seldom become public charges,” but had been 
known for prostitution. Nevertheless, the commission argued that Japanese immigrants 
had “not given much trouble on account of misdemeanors or crimes much less than the 
Mexicans and the Latin races.”37 
In the report, Mexicans received a complicated assessment, with numbers of “the 
foreign-born of that race” being seemingly difficult to count given the migrant laborers, 
permanently-settled families, and large waves crossing the border “freely.”38 Even the 
                                               
36 Lee S. Overman, “Foreign Immigration: Burden, Evils, and the Urgent Need of Immediate 
Restriction,” 1909. Overman quotes an article published June 30, 1909. He explains that the 
Farmers’ Union News “[represented] the attitude of over 3,000,000 organized farmers and 
planters of the South and West.” 
37 Abstract of the Report on Japanese and Other Immigrant Races in the Pacific Coast and Rocky 
Mountain States (U.S. Immigration Commission, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1911), 61.  
38 Ibid., 684. The report explains that “Mexicans have been permitted to enter this country freely 
when without money if employment was to be obtained” through “employment agencies some of 
which have been organized to supply particular railroads with laborers of that race.” 
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definition given to Mexicans in the commission’s “dictionary of races or peoples” proves 
problematic: for the purposes of immigration records, the commission suggested that only 
those Mexican nationals of pure European blood should be considered Mexican 
immigrants even though they claimed that 83 percent of Mexico’s population was either 
of “pure Indian blood” or “mixed blood.”39 On the one hand, the commission found it 
important to differentiate Mexicans of Spanish descent from the Spanish or “Spanish-
Americans,” finding their “race” to be distinct enough to merit their own category, and 
yet the very circumstances which made the Mexican people’s racial heritage unique in 
comparison to other Spanish-speaking countries—that is, the prevalence of people of 
American Indian descent—is excluded from the definition of Mexican immigrants. On 
the other hand, the commission discusses the innumerable Mexicans working in U.S. 
industries in a broader way than the filtered counts of immigrants they provided for 
Mexicans, as defined by pure European blood.40 Mexicans were characterized as “being 
without ambition and thrift and being content with… a dependent position.” In other 
words, Mexican were believed likely to be public charges as the commission claimed that 
they “regard public relief as a ‘pension,’” and especially since they were paid the lowest 
wages in the West, and therefore among the undesirable classes as people who would not 
only depend on charity but resort to crime. The report details: 
                                               
39 The report claims that 43 percent if Mexico’s population of 13 million at the time was of pure 
Indian blood, while 40 percent were of mixed Indian and European blood. The report also 
contrasted this with Cuba’s population, which they believed to be 70 percent white—that is, of 
pure European heritage.  
40 Ibid. The report indicated that 5,682 “Mexicans” were admitted to the U.S. in 1908, while 
15,591 were admitted in 1909, and 17,760 were admitted in 1910, not including “so-called 
‘nonimmigrant aliens.’” 
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In [1908] there were approximately 20,000 arrests in Los Angeles, 2,357 
being of Mexicans perhaps little more than a fair proportion of the total 
when differences in age distribution of the different racial elements in the 
population are taken into consideration. Mexicans, including the native-
born, constitute a large percentage of the inmates of the penal institutions 
of Arizona. In the spring of 1909, 268 Mexicans in the territorial prison 
constituted 61 per cent, in the Pima County jail the 83 Mexican prisoners 
were 62 per cent, and in the Tucson city jail the 22 constituted 24.2 per cent, 
of the entire numbers imprisoned. The principal offenses of the members of 
this race are petit larceny and drunkenness, with fights among themselves.41  
 
Like Italians, Mexicans were stereotyped as criminals by those investigating 
immigration in the early twentieth century. Cofounder of the Immigration Restriction 
League, Robert DeCourcy Ward, criticized the practice to only “shut up [criminals] for 
varying periods of time, but allow[ing them], in the intervals when they are out of prison, 
to populate the world with children whose inheritance is criminal.” Ward not only 
suggested immigration restriction, however, he also advocated for society to do its “full 
eugenic duty” and prevent “criminal descendants” from even being born.42 To 
restrictionists like Ward, foreign-born people convicted of a crime had “the spirit of the 
vendetta” running in their blood and there were several solutions with which to contend: 
(1) prevent foreign-born criminals from procreating, (2) keep foreign-born criminals or 
the foreign-born believed likely to commit crimes out of the country, and/or (3) deport 
the foreign born who commit crimes in the United States.43 The latter solution was what 
                                               
41 Ibid., 690. 
42 Robert DeCourcy Ward, “The Crisis in Our Immigration Policy,” Publications of the 
Immigration Restriction League 61 (1913): 5.  
43 Senator Lee S. Overman quoted the former New York police commissioner in his 1909 speech 
to Congress. The police commissioner supported Overman’s restrictionist leanings, saying, “We 
are trying to handle mediaeval criminals, men in whose blood runs the spirit of the vendetta, by 
modern Anglo-Saxon procedure. It is wrong to allow these people to slip into this country. But 
besides allowing this, we give them, once in, every chance to work their blackmail without 
getting caught. Against this sort of crime our laws are weak. Either they must be kept out or else a 
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Senator Lee S. Overman of South Carolina advocated. Lee expressed these views in a 
speech he delivered to Congress in 1909 in which he cited many supporters, as “nearly 
every patriotic society and charitable organization in this country” agreed with his 
assessment of the “burdens” and “evils” of immigration and the “urgent need of 
immediate restriction.”44  
In 1916, adding to the call for restriction coming from Congress and the 
Immigration Restriction League, the American Bar Association released a statement on 
the connection between immigration and crime: “the volume of crime in the United 
States is disproportionately increased by immigration, and that, in consequence to reduce 
crime, immigration must be reduced.”45 Eventually, these restrictionist and eugenicist 
arguments culminated in the even more exclusionary Immigration Act of 1924, which in 
essence created the “illegal alien” and started a forty-year period of extreme exclusion of 
immigrants.46 
Consequently, exclusion of undesirable foreigners translated to the expulsion of 
those perceived to be unassimilable foreigners, even U.S.-born Mexican Americans. Ngai 
explains that as economic anxieties in the 1930s grew, white Americans sought 
mechanisms to deport and repatriate Mexicans, but “the movement did not distinguish 
                                               
system of procedure must be devised which is potent and immediate enough to handle that sort of 
crime.” See Overman, “Foreign Immigration,” 4. 
44 Ibid. Overman listed the following organizations as supporters in the restriction movement: 
Farmers’ Educational and Cooperative Union of America, the National Farmers’ Congress, the 
National Grange, the Cotton Manufacturing Association of America, the American Federation of 
Labor, and the Knights of Labor. 
45 Simes and Waters, 459-460, citing Grace Abbott, “Immigration and Crime,” The American Bar 
Association Journal 2, no. 1 (January 1916): 116. 
46 For more on the Immigration Act of 1924 and the creation of the “illegal alien,” see Ngai, 
Impossible Subjects. 
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between legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and American citizens,” who all “reaped 
the consequences of racialized foreignness that had been constructed throughout the 
1920s.”47 The repatriation efforts faced the obstacle of many members within Mexican 
communities being longtime residents and even American citizens. Still, over one million 
people of Mexican heritage were repatriated from the Southwest and Midwest United 
States in an effort to remove public charges and “troublemakers.”48 Among those 
repatriated, an estimated majority were believed to be American citizens by nativity, 
including children, and many spoke English and had lived in the United States for over a 
decade. All people of Mexican heritage, despite their legal status, were treated as 
“foreigners and social inferiors” who posed a threat to the well-being of American 
society.49 
Efforts to exclude and expel unwanted Latinos continued beyond the exclusion 
era between the Immigration Act of 1924 and the Immigration Act of 1965. With the 
latter act, the faces of immigration waves changed from the Southern and Eastern 
Europeans of turn-of-the-century immigration to immigrants primarily from Latin 
America, Asia, and the Caribbean. In response, more immigration policies that aimed to 
restrict and criminalize immigration were ushered in: California’s Proposition 187 
(1994), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996), the 
                                               
47 Ngai, 71.  
48 See Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade Of Betrayal: Mexican 
Repatriation in the 1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995). 
49 Ibid., 72-75. Also see Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great 
Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939 (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 
1974), 86-87; George J. Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity 
in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 224-
225.  
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PATRIOT Act (2001), the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (2001), 
and the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (2001).50  
Furthermore, the image of immigrants as criminals seemed to seep into public 
consciousness in the 1990s. A U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform report indicated 
that “many people believe that undocumented aliens are the source of an increase in 
serious crime.”51 And a 1996 Wall Street Journal article reaffirmed this claim, reporting 
that the public tied crime and drug problems to immigration.52 Even a scholarly article 
from 1993 argued, based on a survey of newspaper articles, that new immigrants saw 
“crime as their avenue to the American Dream,” even though those methods hardly gave 
the researchers a glimpse into the perspective of immigrants.53  
Polling data in recent decades also reveal the American public’s belief that 
immigrants cause increases in crime. In 2001, before September 11, 50 percent of 
Americans responding to a Gallup poll indicated that they believed immigrants to the 
United States make the crime situation worse. In 2007, 58 percent believed immigrants 
made the crime situation worse. It should be noted that when this question was asked in 
2001, 2002, 2004, and 2007, white respondents had the highest percentages believing the 
crime situation was worsened by immigrants—54 percent in 2001, 52 percent in 2002, 49 
                                               
50 For more on the impact of these policies and programs in relation to the criminalization of 
immigrants, see Simes and Waters, 465-468.  
51 Frank D. Bean, R. Chanove, R.G. Cushing, and Rodolfo de la Garza, Illegal Mexican 
Migration and the United States/Mexico border: The Effects of Operation Hold the Line on El 
Paso/Juarez (U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Population Research Center,1994).  
52 George Seib, “Backlash Over Immigration Has Entered Mainstream This Year,” The Wall 
Street Journal, September 26, 1996. 
53 John Tanton and Wayne Lutton, “Immigration and Criminality,” Journal of Social, Political 
and Economic Studies 18 (1993): 217-234. 
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percent in 2004, and 63 percent in 2007. Black respondents followed white respondents 
in this belief—44 percent in 2001, 49 percent in 2002, 44 percent in 2004, and 52 percent 
in 2007. Only in 2001 did Hispanics not have the lowest percent of respondents believing 
that immigrants made the crime situation worse—47 percent; a lower percent of Hispanic 
respondents believed this in the other years: 41 percent in 2002, 44 percent in 2004, 41 
percent in 2007. One might assume that Hispanic percentages were lower on this measure 
as more may know immigrants—or even be immigrants themselves—than their fellow 
black and white respondents, and therefore, they would not share the same bias toward 
immigrants. On the other hand, a higher percent of Hispanic respondents chose to frame 
the effect of immigrants on the crime situation as making it “worse,” as opposed to 
“better” (11-18 percent), “not much effect” (33-41 percent), or “no opinion” (7-8 
percent), demonstrating how prevailing this belief is among the American general public.  
In the 1996 General Social Survey, 34 percent of respondents indicated that they 
agreed with the statement that immigrants increase crime rates. In 2000, 73 percent of 
respondents thought that immigrants were likely to cause higher crime rates.54 In 2004, 
the question mirrored the 1996 framing, but just 27 percent agreed that immigrants 
caused increased crime rates. Like the Gallup poll, 2004 proved to be a year with lower 
suspicions about the link between immigrants and increases in crime. Yet by 2006 and 
2007, the fear seemed to reappear with 61 percent of Gallop poll respondents believing 
that illegal immigration should be a crime and 52 percent suggesting that providing 
                                               
54 The percent for “likely” is a collapsed measure, combining 48 percent who selected “somewhat 
likely” and 25 percent who selected “very likely” for the question on more immigrants causing 
higher crime rates. See the General Social Survey (GSS) database at http://gss.norc.org/.  
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assistance to illegal immigrants should be a crime for U.S. citizens. As sociologists 
Jessica T. Simes and Mary C. Waters argue, “these polling data suggest that Americans 
tend to conflate illegality and criminality.”55 
In 2006 an article from The New York Times Magazine asked the provocative 
question, “Do Immigrants Make Us Safer?” The article cited a national survey from 2000 
which found that “73 percent of Americans said they believe that immigrants are either 
‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ likely to increase crime, higher than the 60 percent who fear they 
are ‘likely to cause Americans to lose jobs.’” The article also noted the speech President 
George W. Bush made in May of that year in which he claimed that illegal immigration 
“strains state and local budgets and brings crime to our communities.” However, the 
remainder of the article cited the research of various scholars who argue that immigrants 
are less likely to commit crimes, and might actually “make us safer.”56 
In the past few years, within the political climate for immigrants that has been 
underscored with the election of Donald Trump, this forced narrative of linking 
immigrants to crime in a sensational manner has only escalated. In October 2017, a cache 
of emails circulated by Immigration and Customs Enforcement unearthed a directive by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security at the time to portray the undocumented immigrants 
being arrested through mass raids as criminals. In other words, the department wanted to 
manufacture a narrative to justify their raid. Thus, local ICE agents were ordered to 
                                               
55 Simes and Waters, 464.  
56 Eyal Press, “Do Immigrants Make Us Safer?” The New York Times Magazine, December 3, 
2006. Press mentions the following scholars in regards to the studies showing that immigrants are 
less likely to commit crimes: Ramiro Martinez, Jr., Andrew Karmen, Robert J. Sampson, 
Alejandro Portes, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 
 89 
identify “three egregious cases” of undocumented immigrants who had been detained in 
order to highlight their criminal acts in the media. The directive further ordered, “If a 
location has only one egregious case – then include an extra egregious case from another 
city.” The department attempted to support their claim that “by removing from the streets 
criminal aliens and other threats to the public, ICE helps improve public safety.” 
Evidently, general statistics could not support this argument; even the department 
believed that they would need to cherry-pick anecdotes to make their case to the public 
for their extreme levels of enforcement.57 Indeed, reviews of crime data generally 
disprove the imagined association between immigrants and crime as the next section 
discusses. 
Evidence to the Contrary  
 In all the years that anti-immigration forces have tried to claim a connection 
between immigration and crime, there have been studies not far behind to disprove these 
claims. In 1896, sociologist Hastings H. Hart published an article to contrast what he 
acknowledged as “the popular impressions” about immigrants and crime as well as an 
article by F.W. Hewes, “Delinquents,” which relied on a superficial analysis of prison 
census data. Hart’s more in-depth analysis uncovered that “the foreign-born population 
furnishes only two-thirds as many criminals in proportion as the native born,” the 
proportion of prisoners per million foreign born and children of foreign-born parents was 
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84 percent of the proportion of native-born individuals of native-born parents, and even 
though the proportion of prisoners among children of foreign-born parents exceeded the 
proportion among the children of native-born parents, Hart pointed out that these 
proportions varied by state, with some states showing the reverse. Hart also pointed out 
important factors that contributed to the high rates of incarceration for the foreign-born 
population and their children including the share of males and people in the age range 
most likely to commit crimes.58 
Despite Hart’s and other scholar’s efforts to put forth more robust analyses of the 
correlation between citizenship and crime, the false link between the foreign born and 
criminality persisted. In her study of Mexican immigrants in early twentieth-century 
Chicago, historian Gabriela Arredondo noted that “ideological debates flared over the 
nature of poverty, child delinquency, and crime and over the relationship of these factors 
to ethnic and immigrant peoples.”59 By 1925, the Chicago School of sociological theory 
put forth seminal works hypothesizing why immigrants would be prone to commit 
criminal acts.60 Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Robert Duncan McKenzie put 
forth a theory on social disorganization, claiming that migrants—whether “Negro 
migrants” to northern cities or the waves of immigrants from Europe—fall to delinquency 
                                               
58 Hastings H. Hart, “Immigration and Crime,” American Journal of Sociology 2, no. 3 
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59 Gabriela Arredondo, Mexican Chicago: Race, Identity, and Nation, 1916-39 (Urbana: 
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as a result of not being able to immediately “accommodate themselves” to their new 
place of residence. While Park, Burgess, and McKenzie focused on the migrants to 
Northern cities in their discussion of social disorganization, they also noted that 
Mexicans had the highest crime rate of all immigrant groups according to the 1910 U.S. 
Census, arguing that the cause would be their social traditions.61  
Thorstein Sellin introduced his cultural conflict theory in 1938, suggesting that 
immigrants are likely to commit crimes due to the differences between the systems of 
laws, expectations, and values in their country of origin and the country of arrival.62 
Robert K. Merton also offered his strain theory in 1938, arguing that when people such as 
immigrants aspired to the “American Dream” and discovered that it could not be realized 
through traditional means such as education and hard work due to their low social status, 
they resorted to other means and/or other cultural goals—that is, a life of crime.63 
Although these theories have continued to inform studies throughout the twentieth 
century and beyond, as Simes and Waters argue, they “continue to lack strong empirical 
                                               
61 Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Robert Duncan McKenzie, The City (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1925), 121. Park, Burgess, and McKenzie wrote, “The enormous 
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foundation… and therefore are not supported. Immigrants are far less likely than natives 
and their more assimilated children to commit crimes.”64  
Echoing Hart’s efforts, economists Carolyn Moehling and Anne Morrison Piehl 
published their study in 2010, in which they reviewed prison census data and determined 
that immigrants were no more likely to be incarcerated than those who were native born 
between 1904 and 1930, except for 18- and 19-year-olds. In that time period, the 
incarceration rates of the native-born population increased sharply, while those of 
immigrants remained “remarkably stable.” Moehling and Piehl considered selection and 
deterrence to be factors in the lower commitment rates that resulted by 1930; that is, 
stricter immigration laws reduced the number of arrivals and the threat of deportation 
likely swayed immigrants from criminal activity.65  
While Moehling and Piehl’s analysis addressed the aggregation bias that plagued 
previous studies of immigrants and incarceration rates, the authors explained the 
complicated nature of disaggregating incarceration rates for Mexican Americans in the 
early twentieth century. Prior to 1930, Mexicans were classified as “whites,” and were 
therefore included in the counts of foreign- and native-born white incarcerated 
populations in the 1904 and 1923 comparisons that the authors present. In 1930, however, 
in both the population and prison census, Mexicans were identified by their own racial 
category and then grouped with “all other races” other than white and black, along with 
the Native American, Chinese, and Japanese categories. Prison administrators classified 
                                               
64 Simes and Waters, 461.  
65 Carolyn Moehling and Anne Morrison Piehl, “Immigration, Crime, and Incarceration in Early 
Twentieth-Century America,” Demography 46, no. 4 (November 2009): 739-763. 
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individuals as “Mexicans” without distinguishing them by nativity. The only category 
disaggregated by nativity in the prison census was white. As a result, Moehling and Piehl 
decided to combine the foreign-born population with the “all other races” category for the 
purposes of their analysis of immigrant incarceration rates. They justify this decision by 
explaining that Mexicans comprised the majority of the “all other races” category, and 
two-thirds of those identified as Mexican males over age 15 were not born in the United 
States. In practice, this decision equates not only U.S.-born Mexicans and Asians, but 
also Native Americans, with foreigners.  
As a result, for all age groups, the rates for the combined foreign-born whites and 
all other races category surpassed those of foreign-born whites alone. As for Mexicans 
alone, regardless of nativity, their actual incarceration rate was five times the predicted 
rate based on age distribution—the greatest disparity of any ethnic group. Moehling and 
Piehl point to likely predictive factors other than age for Mexicans: they had the lowest 
wages in manufacturing, lowest literacy rates, and lowest English proficiency rates 
among all ethnic groups. Still, these rates suggest that the imagined link between the 
“foreign element” and crime in the early twentieth century was based on the false notion 
that immigrants committed more crimes, as well as the perception of “other races” who 
were incarcerated at higher rates being foreign to the United States, regardless of their 
place of birth.  
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In their 1999 study, sociologists John Hagan and Alberto Palloni were able to 
disaggregate Hispanic incarceration data by citizenship.66 Whereas Moehling and Piehl’s 
study of immigration and incarceration centered on the large waves of Southern and 
Eastern European immigrants in the early twentieth century, Hagan and Palloni 
considered the post-1965 waves of immigrants, many of whom hailed from Latin 
American countries. With the new face of immigration in that time period, media 
coverage on immigration in the late period of the twentieth century revived the narrative 
linking crime to immigrants. While some immigration scholars would argue that “today’s 
immigrants enter a society that is far more tolerant of diversity,” the hostility toward 
immigrants has merely been reframed. Whereas the fear of immigrants around the turn of 
the century revolved around the presumed criminal inclinations of foreigners, the 
restriction era birthed the concept of people thought of as criminals because they were 
immigrants, which then complicated the narratives extrapolated from data on immigrants 
and crime.67  
 For that reason, Hagan and Palloni argued that statistics suggesting a correlation 
between immigration and crime were distorted. Hagan and Palloni reviewed records of 
arrest rates in 1989 for El Paso, Texas and San Diego, California. This dataset compared 
U.S. citizens, illegal aliens, immigrants, and people with unconfirmed citizen status by 
the crime for which they were arrested—violent, property, or narcotics. When key factors 
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such as gender, age, and pre-trial detention were taken into account, they found that 
immigrants proved no more prone to crime than citizens. Indeed, once they adjusted for 
these factors, they found that Hispanic immigrants, compared by country of origin, were 
less likely than citizens to be incarcerated.  
Hagan and Palloni also suggested that arrest rates provided a more accurate 
measure of immigrant criminality as opposed to citizen criminality, since immigrants are 
more likely to be incarcerated following their arrests given the high probability that they 
will remain detained pre-trial. Not only may immigrants lack the resources to post bail, 
they have also been subject to holds by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. After 
recalculating these misrepresentative statistics, Hagan and Palloni found that Mexican 
nationals were only half as likely to be involved with crime than were Hispanics who 
were U.S. citizens.68 They concluded that “immigration and criminal justice policies 
inflate the rate of Hispanic incarceration,” thereby mischaracterizing immigrants as 
criminals.69  
 Still, Hagan and Palloni’s study suffered from a certain level of conflation as well. 
They reviewed data disaggregated by citizenship status and framed their analysis as a 
comparison between citizens and Hispanic immigrants. However, the cities used in their 
case study—El Paso and San Diego—not only had large Hispanic immigrant populations 
during the period of analysis (late 1980s to early 1990s), they also have had significant 
U.S.-born Hispanic populations since the nineteenth century. Therefore, their analysis 
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compares Hispanic immigrants to both Hispanic and non-Hispanic citizens.70 Yet, Hagan 
and Palloni equate “Hispanics and Mexicans” with “immigrants,” referring to the former 
group as a subcategory of the latter. 71 Furthermore, the authors also muddied their usage 
of “immigrant” by employing it to refer more specifically to those designated as illegal 
aliens, as opposed to any person who had immigrated to the United States, regardless of 
whether they had attained citizenship. So, when the authors describe their analysis as a 
comparison between Hispanic immigrants and citizens, it erased the experiences of those 
immigrants who have become citizens and those Hispanics who were born in the United 
States, while somewhat evading the concern of Hispanic immigrant criminality as it 
impacts the safety of non-Hispanic communities.  
This issue in their analysis highlights the blurring between U.S.-born Latinos, 
Latino immigrants who have become citizens, Latino immigrants who are in the country 
legally but without U.S. citizenship, and Latinos who are unauthorized to be in the 
country. The second and third groups likely have unique experiences and perspectives as 
Latinos who have endured the obstacles of immigration—including facing 
criminalization and harassment—but do not meet the stereotype of the Latino immigrant 
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in terms of being an “illegal alien.” This blurring is simultaneously reflected in carceral 
records and popular discourse. Hagan and Palloni simply obscure these categories to 
address the typical juxtaposition of Americans and immigrants. Furthermore, as 
sociologists Matthew T. Lee, Ramiro Martinez, Jr., and Richard Rosenfeld argue, 
“‘illegal aliens’ cannot be thoroughly separated from legal ones… many are blended into 
poor Latino families and neighborhoods.”72 
In their own study, Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld reviewed homicide data from 
1985 to 1995 from three “border” cities—El Paso, Miami, and San Diego—and for recent 
immigrants to investigate their counterclaim: “strong ties to the labor market and 
family… offset the potential crime-producing consequences of disadvantage, culture 
conflict, and community instability and thereby suppress the level of crime in immigrant 
communities.”73 Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld’s analysis was not limited by having 
access only to aggregate data as was Hagan and Palloni’s study. The former group of 
scholars had the opportunity to review individual arrest records to assess the details of 
each case and better grasp the demographics of the parties involved in each incident, 
because as Hagan and Palloni acknowledged, “Prison statistics on immigration and crime 
                                               
72 Matthew T. Lee, Ramiro Martinez, Jr., and Richard Rosenfeld, “Does Immigration Increase 
Homicide? Negative Evidence from Three Border Cities,” The Sociological Quarterly 42, no. 4 
(September 2001): 574. 
73 Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld, 564. They considered immigrants “new” if they had immigrated 
between 1980 and 1990, while the homicide data reviewed came from 1985-1995 police records. 
The authors also explained that they chose to analyze homicide data because their counterclaim is 
addressed to the public anxiety over immigration leading to increases in violent crimes as well as 
the sociological theories that aim to explain the connection between immigration and various 
crime types. Additionally, homicide records are more reliable than those for other crimes.   
 98 
cannot be taken at face value.”74 In doing so, Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld are able to 
distinguish homicide rates by race—black, Latino, and white.  
For Latinos homicides, they found that there was either no correlation between 
recent immigration and homicide—as was the case in Miami and San Diego—or there 
was a significant, negative correlation, as was the case in El Paso. For white homicides, 
they found recent immigration did not act as a predictor of homicide in El Paso and 
Miami, but it did act as a significant negative predictor in San Diego. And, while new 
immigration did not act as a predictor of black homicides in El Paso and Miami, it did act 
as a significant positive predictor of black homicides in San Diego—the only case among 
the three cities and three groups for which immigration did seem to predict crime. Lee, 
Martinez, and Rosenfeld explain that this could point to intergroup conflict specific to 
settling patterns of immigrants in San Diego. Nevertheless, they conclude that 
“immigration generally is not ‘disorganizing’ these communities,” echoing Alejandro 
Portes’s argument that immigration having a disorganizing effect on communities 
ultimately is a myth.75 
However, many scholars, included those noted above—Hart, Moehling and Piehl, 
and Hagan and Palloni—have found that among the earlier waves of immigrants which 
consisted predominantly of Southern and Eastern European immigrants, as well as waves 
of more recent immigrants from Latin American and Asian countries, second-generation 
immigrants (the children of immigrants) did have higher crime rates than first-generation 
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immigrants and children of parents born in the United States. Hagan and Palloni, citing 
the work of Michael Tonry, argued that children of immigrants come from disadvantaged 
families, making them more prone to commit a crime.76 These statistics, however, 
generally have not figured into the public imagination. Rubén Rumbaut’s study, “The 
Coming of the Second Generation: Immigration and Ethnic Mobility in Southern 
California,” addressed this seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon.77  
Rumbaut’s work carefully nuanced the differences between recent immigrant 
groups and long-established racial groups in the United States including not only whites 
and blacks, but Mexican Americans as well. Rumbaut considered the mobility trajectories 
of second generation immigrants in comparison to their ethnic peers within the diverse 
context of Southern California, primarily Los Angeles. He notes the diversity among 
those categorized as Hispanics, arguing that despite the diversity of the Hispanic 
population, with more recent Hispanic immigrants and Hispanic communities that have 
been established in the United States for many generations, as well as the social 
stratification by citizenship status, both immigrant and citizen Hispanics have been 
subsumed by “the official construction of [a] one-size-fits-all panethnic categor[y].”78 
Given this, Rumbaut analyzed his data by juxtaposing the entire Hispanic population with 
native-born blacks and whites, as well as by differentiating the group according to 
                                               
76 Report on crime and the foreign-born (National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1931); Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race Crime, and 
Punishment in America (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Note that Hart and 
Moehling and Piehl also conceded this point about the second generation. 
77 Rubén G. Rumbaut, “The Coming of the Second Generation: Immigration and Ethnic Mobility 
in Southern California,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 620 
(November 2008): 196-236. 
78 Ibid., 197. 
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immigrant generation. For instance, he states that “the rate of incarceration among 
Hispanic men sharply increases from less than [one] percent among the foreign-born to 
6.7 percent among the U.S.-born—less than the 11.6 percent incarceration rate seen 
among native blacks, but much higher than the 1.7 percent rate among native whites.”79  
For Rumbaut, those rates signal a greater issue for the Hispanic community than 
just the stereotype of immigrants being criminals: “Given the large size of the Mexican-
origin first and second generations, [the high incarceration rates among second-
generation Mexicans] is fraught with implications—not only for the downward mobility 
prospects of the men caught in a cycle of arrest and imprisonment… but also for the 
short- and long-term effects on their ethnic communities.”80 In other words, Latino 
immigrants may not be arrested at high rates, but their descendants have demonstrated a 
pattern of downward assimilation which makes them vulnerable to more interactions with 
the criminal justice system.81  
 Despite all the evidence dismantling the imagined connection between 
immigration, from Latin America or elsewhere, and crime, Latinos do make up a 
                                               
79 Ibid., 205. 
80 Ibid., 219. 
81 Downward assimilation refers to the second of three tracks presented within the segmented 
assimilation theory proposed by sociologists Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou: (1) acculturation 
and upward mobility into the white middle class, (2) opposite of the first track, downward 
mobility into permanent poverty and the underclass; and (3) economic advancement in 
conjunction with the maintenance of the ethnic community’s values and solidarity. Portes and 
Zhou, “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants among Post-1965 
Immigrant Youth,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530 (1993): 
74-98; Also see Rumbaut et al., “Immigration and Incarceration: Patterns and Predictors of 
Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Adults,” in Immigration and Crime: 
Race, Ethnicity, and Violence, eds. Ramiro Martinez, Jr. and Abel Valenzuela, Jr. (New York: 
New York University Press, 2006).  
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significant proportion of the incarcerated population. And Latino immigrants account for 
a significant percentage of the federal inmate population. While Latino immigrants may 
not be more likely to commit crimes than U.S.-born Latinos, or anyone born in the United 
States for that matter, they do occupy space in prison blocks at alarming rates due in part 
to civil, rather than criminal, offenses—that is, being in the country without 
authorization. The journey to get to those jail cells and the destiny that follows jail time, 
however, can vary greatly for Latinos depending on their citizenship status.  
Immigrant Experiences of Latino U.S. Citizens 
 Perhaps the best example to showcase the realities and repercussions of 
attributing foreignness to Latino U.S. citizens is the case of Puerto Ricans, none of whom 
lack U.S. citizenship. As Ngai notes, “Congress granted U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans 
in 1917, but this was a second class of citizenship, still without the right of representation 
and, moreover, subject to revocation by Congress.” When Congress created a national 
origins quota system for the Immigration Act of 1924, it failed to account for various 
racial minorities that were U.S. citizens by birth—Puerto Ricans, as well as Alaskans and 
Hawaiians.82 Like Mexicans, Puerto Ricans have been treated as permanent foreign 
others, even as they have U.S. citizenship whether they are born in Puerto Rico or on the 
U.S. mainland. Furthermore, those relocating from the island to the mainland, have 
experienced some of the obstacles of immigration including language barriers, 
socioeconomic disadvantage, and xenophobic discrimination.  
                                               
82 Ngai, 26, 100.  
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That Puerto Ricans migrating from the island to the mainland face the same sort 
of surveillance and criminalization as other Latino immigrants is evidenced by a case 
study of Massachusetts Department of Correction prison records. From 1987 to 1997, 
Massachusetts DOC statistics listed the citizenship status and place of birth of its inmate 
population. The non-citizen population rose from 3 percent in 1987 to 7 percent in 1991 
and then declined again to reach 4 percent of the total state prison population in 1997. 
The non-U.S.-born citizen population increased from 2 percent in 1987 to 6 percent in 
1997. And most tellingly, the U.S.-territory-born population remained steady between 9 
and 11 percent throughout the 11-year period.83  
Given that the U.S. only has a handful of territories, the most populous of which 
is Puerto Rico, and that that there were less than 1,000 Guamanians and Samoans in 
Massachusetts between 2006 and 2010, but 266,125 Puerto Ricans in the state in 2010, it 
can be assumed that those who the DOC listed as being born in a U.S. territory were 
Puerto Rican.84 In that case, between 50 and 75 percent of the Hispanic prison population 
immigrated from Puerto Rico—though more may have been stateside born Puerto Ricans. 
Even though this population would not have had to go through a formal foreign country 
to U.S. immigration process, they had an immigration experience nonetheless, and they 
carry the same markers of foreignness that subject them to discrimination and the social 
                                               
83 Massachusetts Department of Corrections population statistics archives, 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/law-enforce-and-cj/prisons/rsch-data/january-1-population-
statistics.html. 
84 See United States Census Bureau, American FactFinder, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml. 
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forces that make immigrants more likely to be incarcerable.85 And like Latinos who do 
not identify as black can suffer from colorism, non-immigrant Puerto Ricans and other 
U.S.-born Latinos can suffer from the criminalization of the Latino immigrant.  
On September 12, 2011, Republican presidential hopefuls met in Tampa, Florida, 
for their fifth debate in the campaign leading up to the 2012 election. When asked how 
they would attempt to attract the Latino vote, most candidates continued to speak about 
illegal immigration, suggesting that illegal immigrants (i.e., Latinos) were not law-
abiding citizens and that they had no respect for the law. Former Massachusetts governor, 
Mitt Romney, boasted that one of the things he did while in office was to authorize state 
police to enforce immigration laws by checking if those arrested and in jail were in the 
country illegally, and if so, having them deported. He did not mention what might 
become of those Latinos found to be legal immigrants or U.S. citizens since, as some 
critics have noted, such policies may result in the surveillance and targeting of all brown-
skinned, Spanish-speaking residents, such as the majority Puerto Rican population in the 
state of Massachusetts.86  
Sociologists Matthew Desmond and Mustafa Emirbayer have suggested that, “like 
blackness, foreignness (and ethnic markers connected to foreignness, such as speaking 
Spanish) has become intimately intertwined with our notions of criminality, so much so 
that immigration itself is conceived as a criminal act, as something that offends the 
                                               
85 Matthew Desmond and Mustafa Emirbayer, Racial Progress, Racial Domination: The 
Sociology of Race in America (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2009), 270.  
86 Nationally, the ACLU has led efforts to fight such laws; in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts 
Immigrant and Refugee Coalition (MIRA) have been outspoken critics of immigration policies 
targeting Hispanic communities.  
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American consciousness.”87 Carrying markers of foreignness—brown skin, the Spanish 
language, and the pan-ethnic identity of Hispanic/Latino—every Latino, Puerto Ricans 
included, are alien citizens, subject to the same discrimination as illegal aliens, including 
criminalization.  
In 1971, Puerto Rican Americans: The Meaning of Migration to the Mainland was 
published as part of the Prentice-Hall Ethnic Group in American Life Series, and in 1987 
a second edition was released. Milton Gordon, known for his theory on the Seven Stages 
of Assimilation, served as the series editor, while each book was written by an “expert in 
the field of intergroup relations and the social life of the group about which he or she writes, 
and in many cases the author derives ethnically from that group.” This text not only offers 
historical information, it provides a perspective from the past on the place and conditions 
of the ethnic group. This text illuminates the perspective of American society in 1971 and 
1987, crucial moments in the rise of mass incarceration: the onset of the prison boom and 
the peak of the War on Drugs, respectively. Author Joseph P. Fitzpatrick writes: 
The central problem of identity among Puerto Ricans is made more 
complicated by the increasing presence of other Hispanics. Now Puerto 
Ricans must distinguish themselves from other Hispanics before the non-
Hispanic world. This is not easy. If other Hispanics are publicized for 
criminal behavior, the Puerto Ricans face the problem of having the guilt 
attributed to them. The problem of so many undocumented persons among 
the other Hispanics involved other complications. Puerto Ricans may be 
questioned or challenged by employers to provide identification that they 
are not illegal immigrants. Puerto Ricans, like other American citizens, have 
no papers such as a visa or a passport to identify them as citizens. Because 
they lack documents, they sometimes do not get the jobs.88  
 
                                               
87 Desmond and Emirbayer, 270.  
88 Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, Puerto Rican Americans: The Meaning of Migration to the Mainland 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987), 11. 
 105 
Fitzpatrick later comments that news reports that identified drug dealers simply as 
“Hispanics” led communities to believe that these vilified criminals were Puerto Ricans, 
rather than other Latinos.89  These observations confirm that Puerto Ricans, despite their 
U.S. citizenship, have suffered the criminalization of the Latino foreign born.  
After facing much controversy and criticism for his views on illegal immigration, 
news personality Geraldo Rivera wrote His Panic: Why Americans Fear Hispanics in the 
U.S. In the book, published in 2008, Rivera recounts his own experience growing up half-
Puerto Rican, as well as the many news stories that he has reported or to which he has 
responded in order to address the ever-present hostility that Hispanics face in America.90 
He argued that the tactic which “anti-immigration panicmongers” have most successfully 
employed is citing an isolated incident of a heinous crime committed by an illegal 
immigrant, which in turn vilifies all immigrants, and all Hispanics, Puerto Ricans 
included. As Rivera argued, “this bad vibe is inevitably going to have a negative impact 
on other, quieter Hispanic-American citizens and legal immigrants, regardless of their 
station in life or how they feel about the issue.”91  
In a sense, Puerto Ricans can be both immigrants and technically U.S.-born. 
However, the body of scholarship that does investigate the relationship between Latino 
                                               
89 Ibid., 169. 
90 Geraldo Rivera, His Panic: Why American Fear Hispanics in the U.S. (New York: Celebra, 
2008), 138; Rivera provides examples of the media and politicians amplifying the link between 
immigration and crime: in 2007, U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter appeared on The O’Reilly 
Factor, claiming that prisons housed over a quarter million illegal immigrants; congressman 
Steve King claimed that illegal immigrants killed twenty-five Americans every day. Rivera found 
that the former claim was untrue, as prisons only held 55,322 illegal immigrants in 2005, a 
significant portion of which had only been incarcerated for being in the country illegally, no other 
crime. The latter claim could not be substantiated by any existing statistic. 
91 Ibid., 259. 
 106 
immigrants and crime has not distinguished between island-born and mainland-born 
Puerto Ricans to determine if the first- versus second-generation trend held across this 
Latino population as well, despite their unchanging citizenship status across generations. 
Furthermore, the effect of efforts to apprehend illegal immigrants on non-immigrant 
Latino populations demonstrates that mass incarceration and increased deportation 
complement one another, affecting Latino citizens and non-citizens alike.  
 
Figure 2.1: Largest Detailed Hispanic Origin Group by State: 2010 
Source: Sharon R. Ennis, Merarys Rios-Vargas, and Nora G. Albert, The Hispanic Population: 
2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).  
 
The Census Bureau’s report, The Hispanic Population: 2010, also supports this 
argument. The report offers a map (see Figure 2.1 above) that showcases the largest 
Hispanic origin group of each state. Whereas Mexicans are the largest Latino ethnic 
group for the vast majority of states, the states with the highest Hispanic-to-white 
incarceration ratios (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York) represent the 
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region where Puerto Ricans make up the largest Latino group.92 In that case, these states 
are unique in that the majority of their Latino populations are non-deportable. While 
other states can use deportation as a more efficient tool for the social control of the Latino 
population, Northeastern states have employed incarceration to manage their growing 
non-deportable Latino populations—Puerto Ricans.  
Carceral Realities for Immigrants 
As noted earlier, the American public tends to equate “illegality” with 
“criminality,” and therefore many believe that undocumented immigrants are criminals 
by virtue of their immigrant status. Between one-quarter and half of undocumented 
immigrants did not enter the United States illegally; they merely overstayed their visas, 
and therefore, never committed a crime in regards to their immigrant status.93 Even those 
who have entered the country illegally often do not get charged with a crime. So, while 
Americans presume that the very essence of being in the country illegally makes a person 
a criminal, many undocumented immigrants who are caught, detained in prisons, and 
deported have never committed a criminal offense. Yet, they endure what is considered 
punishment for U.S. citizens who have committed crimes.94 While offenders officially 
only face detention as an “administrative, civil measure,” those detained nevertheless find 
themselves in prison and jail cells in the same conditions as those who are there for the 
                                               
92 Sharon R. Ennis, Merarys Ríos-Vargas, and Nora G. Albert, The Hispanic Population: 2010 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2011), 9; Nellis, The Color of Justice. The Sentencing Project also 
published an earlier report with 2005 data and similar findings: Marc Mauer and Ryan S. King, 
Uneven Justice: State Rates of Incarceration By Race and Ethnicity (The Sentencing Project, 
2007). 
93 Simes and Waters, 466. 
94 Ibid., 475-476. 
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sake of punishment. And on top of the punishment of detention, immigrants face 
removal—“though technically an administrative measure rather than a criminal sentence, 
deportation is an extreme form of punishment that rips people from their families and 
communities.”95 
Non-citizen Latinos make up the largest percent of the federal prison population, 
mostly for “immigration-related crimes.”96 From 2003 to 2017, over four million 
immigrants to the United States were deported back to their country of citizenship, only 
half of whom were convicted of any crime.97 Crimes for those who were convicted prior 
to their removal include illegal entry (16 percent), illegal re-entry (three percent), and 
possession of fraudulent immigration documents (two percent). In other words, a fifth of 
those immigrants convicted of crimes are guilty only of actions related to their immigrant 
status, as opposed to acts considered crimes for U.S. citizens as well. So, even though 
many Americans imagine deportees as criminals, less than 40 percent of those who have 
faced removal have been found guilty of an act considered criminal for their non-
immigrant counterparts. 
Other than immigration-related offenses, the most common conviction leading to 
removal has been for DUIs (nine percent)—an offense that requires no jail time for U.S. 
citizens in some states. And despite the stereotype of removed immigrants, less than one 
                                               
95 Aja and Marchevsky. 
96 Federal prison numbers from 2007: 29 percent Hispanic non-citizens; 25 percent white U.S. 
citizens; 21 percent black U.S. citizens; 11 percent Hispanic U.S. citizens; 2 percent white non-
citizens; 1 percent black non-citizens. Mark Hugo Lopez and Michael T. Light, A Rising Share: 
Hispanics and Federal Crime (Pew Research Center, 2009). 
97 According to the data reported by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), 49 
percent of immigrant removals from 2003 to 2017 had no conviction leading to their deportation. 
See http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/. 
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percent of all removals between 2003 and 2017 followed a conviction for a drug crime. 
Even among Latino immigrants alone, just 7 percent of removals followed a conviction 
for a drug-related crime.98 While Latinos constituted nearly one third of the total federal 
prison population in 2015, they accounted for 38 percent of drug offenders in federal 
prison and 96 percent of the population that was serving time for an immigration 
offense.99   
As of 2001, a Bureau of Justice report estimated that, based on data from 1974 to 
2001, there were 3.8 million Americans who were either in prison or had previously been 
in prison.100 In nearly half that time, from 2003 to 2017, more immigrants have been 
removed from the United States. In other words, the number of immigrants that the 
criminal justice system has processed and removed in the past couple of decades rivals 
the number of people who were incarcerated during the rise of mass incarceration in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century. While the Bureau of Justice report estimates that 18 
percent of the ever-incarcerated population as of 2001 was Hispanic, 95 percent of 
immigrant removals between 2003 and 2017 were to Latin American countries. The 
incarceration experience for Latinos is largely defined by immigration enforcement 
efforts, whether immigrants are apprehended, detained, and eventually removed, or 
Latino U.S. citizens are racially profiled in the wake of those efforts.  
                                               
98 Ibid. This is an estimate based on records for removals of Mexican, Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru—the top Latin 
American countries receiving removals. Brazil is included given the broader definition of 
“Latino,” which includes Brazilians.  
99 E. Ann Carson and Elizabeth Anderson, Prisoners in 2015 (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, 2016).  
100 Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001 (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003). 
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Conclusion 
When waves of people from Latin American countries became the face of 
immigration following the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965, the law-and-order politician was on 
the rise and the prison boom was taking off. As these two major phenomena in American 
society coincided, the proportion of Latinos and Latino immigrants in prison inevitably 
grew. To add to this upsurge in Latino incarceration, unauthorized immigrants have come 
under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system regardless of whether they have 
committed any criminal act. 
To perpetuate the concept of Latino immigrants as criminals, the media have done 
their part to discuss immigration by and large as an illegal activity as opposed to the 
authorized process that applies to the vast majority of immigrants.101 However, the image 
of Latino immigrants as criminals in recent decades reflects a deeper legacy that dates 
back before the Immigration Act of 1965. Latinos have been treated as foreigners, 
regardless of whether they have been born in the United States or abroad, and 
simultaneously painted as criminals or public charges likely to be attracted to a life of 
crime. Latinos have been conceived of as foreigners, alien citizens, illegal aliens, and 
criminal aliens—labels which have all informed the racialized othering of Latinos in the 
United States. 
                                               
101 See Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, Vivian Louie, and Roberto Suro, Writing Immigration: Scholars 
and Journalists in Dialogue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).  
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Chapter Three – Perceptions and Criminalization of Blackness Among Latinos 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the coupling of “black” and “Puerto 
Rican” became a staple in narratives about urban poverty and decay, the underclass, and 
crime in Northeastern states. In the Southwest, “black” and “Mexican” shared the 
spotlight in stories about uprisings, discrimination, and delinquency. Then toward the last 
quarter of the century, the adoption of pan-ethnic terminology like “Hispanic” and 
“Latino” enabled political and popular discourses to make national comparisons between 
communities, treating them as two mutually exclusive groups—black and Hispanic—
despite the heterogeneity of each group and the sameness of both groups in certain 
contexts, particularly in the case of Afro-Latinos. At the same time, expressions such as 
“people of color” efficaciously conveyed the treatment that these communities have 
similarly endured when it comes to both historical and contemporary dispossession and 
criminalization across the United States. However, such expressions also obscure what 
distinguishes each experience, as well as the multitude of ways in which American 
societies have contemplated Latino identities in relation to blackness, a blackness that 
renders individuals subject to the heavy hand of the law.  
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow, “the secular bible for a new social 
movement” according to Cornel West, reviews the history that has led to the age of mass 
incarceration and identifies the repercussions of this system for people of color.1 This 
scholarly research has entered popular discourse, making widely known and accepted the 
                                               
1 Cornel West, “Foreward,” in Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in 
the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2012), ix.  
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argument that mass incarceration is the latest peculiar institution—following slavery and 
Jim Crow—to function as a primary mechanism to control African American lives in a 
society still governed by racial hierarchies. Alexander claims that the United States was 
built upon the disenfranchisement of African Americans and the denial of their 
citizenship and that this treatment of African Americans persists today as evidenced by 
the “extraordinary percentage of black men in the United States [who] are legally barred 
from voting” and subjugated to “legalized discrimination in employment, housing, 
education, public benefits, and jury service.”2 Although this discrimination parallels the 
predicaments of their ancestors under slavery and Jim Crow, theirs is the result of a 
criminal record. Alexander goes on to explain that in the age of supposed colorblindness, 
U.S. society no longer enforces laws that explicitly employ racial terminology to 
distinguish the population to which they apply. Rather, in practice, the criminal justice 
system assigns “people of color” the label of “criminal,” which society has deemed 
deserving of such discrimination.3 Alexander immediately returns to her argument that 
this treatment is akin to the practices in which the country once legally discriminated 
against African Americans.4  
Alexander’s argument relies on the histories of African slaves and their 
descendants that suffered through Jim Crow. Alexander and the studies that she cites 
                                               
2 Ibid., 1-2.  
3 Ibid., 2.  
4 I use the term “African American” to refer to residents of the United States who are of African 
descent and do not identify as Latino (i.e. do not have cultural ties to Latin American countries). 
Although I reference other scholars’ use of “black” as interchangeable with “African American,” 
my use of “black” refers to transnational understandings of race where the darkest members of 
societies are deemed black as a result of perception, which may also include an assessment of 
other physical features including hair and facial features.  
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focus on the treatment of African Americans by society and agents of the state, and as 
Alexander notes, the rise of mass incarceration began with the turn toward street crime 
and the War on Drugs in the 1970s. But African Americans, the descendants of Africans 
brought to the American colonies and the United States for the purposes of slavery, were 
not the only group made to populate dilapidated urban neighborhoods that came under 
surveillance with the War on Drugs; Latinos have been relegated to these neighborhoods 
across the country, from Los Angeles to New York City, as well. Furthermore, the history 
Alexander recounts from the antebellum period to the ascent of the law-and-order 
politician in the 1960s fails to account for the Latinos who have been classified as black 
in that same time period. Instead, Latinos enter this story in the post-1965 era, when a 
wave of immigration from Latin American countries incidentally coincided with the rise 
of mass incarceration and the War on Drugs. This framing evades the analogous histories 
of Latino and black experiences from the nineteenth century through the twentieth 
century, as well as the black racial identities and experiences among Latinos over the 
course of those histories.  
Like Alexander’s research, those studies that explore the racial disparities within 
the criminal justice system generally juxtapose the experiences of white and black 
Americans. In doing so, it is evident that race is a key factor in what shapes a person’s 
encounters with police, judges, and prisons. While these studies bring to light various 
dynamics at play at the intersection of race and incarceration, they often neglect to think 
critically about definitions of race and ethnicity. This chapter departs from essentialized 
racial categories which disregard the nuances that distinguish black and Latino racial 
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trajectories, the histories that illuminate their sameness, and the experiences of people 
who identify as both. When implicit bias leads police to target people with dark skin, 
their actions impact African Americans and black Latinos alike; when the consequences 
of arrest mean deportation, this collateral consequence takes its toll on black immigrants, 
Latino and non-Latino alike.5  
 To begin, this chapter deconstructs definitions of dichotomous racial categories, 
questioning what it has meant to be “black” not only in the United States, but in Latin 
America as well. Scholars who investigate race and incarceration tend to discuss the 
black subjects of their studies without defining blackness, but just alluding to the 
common connotations of at least partial African heritage, dark skin, and/or a history of 
slavery in the Americas.6 Although these connotations translate across the Americas to 
some degree, definitions of blackness have evolved along different paths in Latin 
                                               
5 For more on implicit bias, see Nazgol Ghandnoosh and Christopher Lewis, Race and 
Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and Support for Punitive Policies (The Sentencing 
Project, 2014); Report of The Sentencing Project to the United Nations Human Rights Committee: 
Regarding Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice System (The Sentencing 
Project, 2014); Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons 
(The Sentencing Project, 2016). For more on collateral consequences or invisible punishments, 
see Marc Mauer and Meda Chesney-Lind, eds., Invisible Punishment: Collateral Consequences 
of Mass Imprisonment (New York: The New Press, 2002); The National Inventory of the 
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, available at http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/; 
Collateral Consequences Resource Center, available at http://ccresourcecenter.org/.  
6 As examples of this practice, see the following studies, as well as other works by the authors: 
Christopher J. Lyons and Becky Pettit, “Compounded Disadvantage: Race, Incarceration, and 
Wage Growth,” Social Problems 58, no. 2 (2011): 257-80; Michael Massoglia, “Incarceration, 
Health, and Racial Disparities in Health,” Law & Society Review 42, no. 2 (2008): 275-306; 
Devah Pager, “The Mark of a Criminal Record,” American Journal of Sociology 108, no. 5 
(2003): 937-975; Sara Wakefield and Christopher Uggen, “Incarceration and Stratification,” 
Annual Review of Sociology 36 (2010): 387-406; Bruce Western and Christopher Muller, “Mass 
Incarceration, Macrosociology, and the Poor,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 647 (2013): 166-189. 
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America than in the United States from the sixteenth century to the present. In the context 
of comparing and contrasting black and Latino racial experiences, it is also important to 
consider the Afro-Latino perspective. That is, it is disingenuous to distinguish the black 
carceral experience from the Latino carceral experience. There are people who identify as 
black Hispanic or black Latino. There are Latinos who may not identify as black 
themselves, but are seen as black due to their appearance and assumed African ancestry. 
And, as a result of residential patterns where Latinos and African Americans live together 
in the same neighborhoods in the United States, there are multiracial individuals that 
identify as black and Latino as mutually exclusive categories. And, as neighbors, blacks 
and Latinos have shared experiences with surveillance and criminalization under the War 
on Drugs and crackdowns on street crime and gang activity. This shared experience is 
underscored in various cases—the parallel experiences of black and Latino communities 
in states across the country; northeastern states, such as Massachusetts and New York, 
that have the highest rates of black Latinos as well as the most disproportionate Hispanic-
to-white rates of incarceration per 100 people; the disenfranchisement of Afro-Mestizos 
in the Southwest, and the collateral consequence of deportation awaiting the black 
immigrants, Latino and non-Latino, who come under the jurisdiction of the criminal 
justice system.7  
 
 
                                               
7 For more on disproportionate rates of incarceration by state and ethnicity, see Nellis, “The Color 
of Justice.” 
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Translating Blackness Across the Americas 
 In the United States, the historical treatment of blackness has been punitive in 
character, from slavery to the current state of criminal justice. The United States, 
however, is not unique in this practice; rather, the concept of black as inferior and the 
inclination to control black bodies goes back to the European societies that colonized the 
Americas, which in turn disseminated their racialized thinking to their colonies. Of 
course, the interaction between Europeans, Asians, and Africans predated the encounters 
between Europeans and the peoples of the Americas and the subsequent forced migration 
of Africans. Likewise, English prejudice toward Africans also predated the importation of 
Africans to the American colonies.8 Elizabethan and early Stuart Englishmen identified 
Africans by their dark skin color, connecting it to their negative connotations of 
blackness—filth, evil, repugnance—and finding them to be wholly unlike themselves—
                                               
8 Alden T. Vaughan reviews the historiography of the debate over which came first: slavery or 
racism. Some scholars have argued that racism followed the use of Africans for slavery in the 
Americas as a sort of justification for the practice. For instance, Oscar and Mary Handlin argued 
that the roots of racism rested in “economic and legal debasement rather than in the mind-set of 
American colonies, a contention which was widely embraced in the field; they echoed the 
arguments of Wesley Frank Craven, James C. Ballagh, Ulrich B. Phillips, and John H. Russell. 
Carl Degler challenged the Handlins, claiming that “law reflected attitudes.” Winthrop D. Jordon 
bolstered Degler’s arguments by providing evidence of prejudiced attitudes against blacks 
predating slavery in the colonies. George M. Frederickson argued that American racism was 
evolutionary and typological, with implicit racism developing in the late seventeenth century and 
explicit racism in the antebellum period. Historians Edmund S. Morgan and his student Timothy 
H. Breen supported the Handlin argument, even though Morgan acknowledged that Englishmen 
among other Europeans held prejudiced views against dark complexioned peoples prior to 
colonization of the Americas. For more on this “chicken-and-egg” debate, see Alden T. Vaughan, 
“The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism in Seventeenth-Century Virginia,” in Roots of 
American Racism: Essays on the Colonial Experience (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995).  
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civilized, white Christians. And because English colonists saw Africans as strange 
heathens, they qualified “Negroes” as potential slaves.9  
 Like other European colonizers, the Spanish also relied on racial hierarchies that 
subjugated Africans to the bottom of society. In colonial Veracruz, Mexico, Spaniards 
asserted that people with any African ancestry could not live by reason and that “the only 
proper condition for them is slavery.”10 However, Spanish colonies also confronted the 
realities of prevalent racial mixing. Racial catalogers assigned people to one of six racial 
categories, three of which were “pure”—white, Indian, and black—while the other three 
were mixed racial categories—mestizo (white and Indian), mulatto (white and black), and 
pardo (Indian and black). Even though whiteness was associated with European heritage, 
blackness with African heritage, and Indian with American heritage, racial catalogers did 
not assign races based on a person’s genetic background. Rather, the catalogers used 
three types of physical features to classify individuals: skin color, beard thickness, and 
facial features. This process was aided through projects like eighteenth-century casta 
paintings, which depicted the six main racial categories by their respective popularly-
accepted physical features, as well as new categories of offspring resulting from further 
miscegenation. As historian Patrick Carroll argued, this “hybrid social order” in Veracruz 
“helped set important precedents for much of the rest of mainland Latin America.”11 That 
                                               
9 Vaughan, Roots of American Racism, 144. Winthrop D. Jordan, White over Black: American 
Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1968), 599.  
10 Patrick Carroll, Blacks in Colonial Veracruz: Race, Ethnicity, and Regional Development 
(Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1991), 94.  
11 Ibid., 80. 
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is, these mixed-race people, castas, “experienced economic mobility without comparable 
social change,” and in the end, “race still outweighed other factors including economic 
class in determining social station.”12  
But between 1620 and 1750, the “purely” black category was virtually eradicated 
by ongoing miscegenation as well as a decline in the slave trade. As a result, Afro-castas, 
mulattos and especially pardos, became the most discriminated-against peoples in 
mainstream society in the late colonial period due to their African phenotypical 
characteristics. Meanwhile, naturales or Indians—even Hispanicized Indians—were 
pushed to the outskirts of society, both geographically and socially. And by the end of the 
colonial period in 1821, the social order transitioned toward Spaniards opening up social 
mobility to include Euro-castas. So, while mestizos were always at the top of the casta 
social order, in the early nineteenth century, mulattoes were recognized as having the one 
redeeming quality of some European heritage. This racial hierarchy could be understood 
as a sort of “opposite one-drop rule,” where Mexicans upheld the heritage that advanced 
one’s social status rather than the heritage that tainted it, while also privileging ocular 
tests rather than ancestral records. Although this contrasts the U.S. manner of assessing 
race, Laura E. Gómez argues that the United States has often borrowed this system to 
categorize the Latinos within its borders, despite the strict and common use of a one-drop 
rule for African Americans.13 In doing so, the practice tends to complicate the 
                                               
12 Ibid., 113, 128.  
13 Laura E. Gómez explains that the Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) decision gave “the green light to 
pass Jim Crow laws,” which meant the “proliferation of anti-black segregation statutes across the 
nation (north, and south, east and west) and in virtually every aspect of social life. And with the 
rise of such statutes came the dire need for a workable definition of ‘black’ and ‘white’: a 
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experiences of self-identified Afro-Latinos, as well as those Latinos who fall in the 
middle of the color spectrum of their home country, but on the darker side of the 
spectrum in the United States.14   
 In fact, blackness throughout Latin America has been confronted and experienced 
in various ways since the decline of slavery and as encounters with agents from the 
United States increased. The fight for Mexican Independence in the early nineteenth 
century had its racial overtones as the leaders of the movement, Miguel Hidalgo Y 
Castillo and José María Morelos y Pavón, both explicitly called for an end to slavery. In 
fact, Morelos was of African ancestry himself, Hidlago’s forces consisted primarily of 
nonwhite troops, and in heavily slave-populated locales, bondspersons responded to 
Hidalgo’s call for emancipation, leaving the plantations to fight “for the cause that 
promised them freedom.”15 Furthermore, Vicente Guerrero, the revolutionary general 
                                               
definition that was easy enough to understand and easy to apply… Only an easy definition would 
work because the management of this apartheid system would work only if individuals could 
assist, informally, in the process of enforcement (in all senses of the word) of racial 
categorization. The hypodescent rule under which one drop of black ancestry defines black status 
was the result and eventually emerged as the American rule by about 1930;” see Laura E. Gómez, 
“Opposite One-Drop Rules: Mexican Americans, African Americans, and the Need to 
Reconceive Turn-of-the-Century Race Relations,” in How the United States Racializes Latinos: 
White Hegemony & Its Consequences, eds. José A. Cobas, Jorge Duany, and Joe R. Feagin 
(Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2009); Edward E. Telles, Race and Another America: The 
Significance of Skin Color in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 80.  
14 Wendy D. Roth highlights two patterns among Latinos’ racial identification: “(pa)ethnicity as 
middle race” and “(pan)ethnicity as undefined race.” In the former pattern, individuals see all 
fellow Latinos as brown; “it tends to ignore those who fall at the Caucasian or African extreme of 
the racial spectrum, or to define them as not Latino but as white or black.” In the latter pattern, no 
one is purely any one race, and therefore no one is “really black.” And, it both patterns, it is only 
the U.S. that “white,” “black,” and “Latino” are mutually exclusive categories. See Wendy D. 
Roth “Transnational Racializations: The Extension of Racial Boundaries from Receiving to 
Sending Societies,” in How the United States Racializes Latinos: White Hegemony & Its 
Consequences, eds. José A. Cobas, Jorge Duany, and Joe R. Feagin (Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2009), 235-240. 
15 Carroll, Blacks in Colonial Veracruz, 100.  
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who went on to become president in 1829, was an Afro-Mestizo himself who advocated 
for the end of slavery and social and economic equality during his time in politics.16  
Meanwhile, by 1821, Stephen F. Austin was carrying out his father’s plan to 
colonize the Spanish territory of Texas with Anglo American migrants. In that same year, 
Mexico officially gained independence from Spain, banning slavery in the wake.17 While 
Anglo colonists advocated to have their rights to hold slaves preserved and protected, 
Mexico extended its ban on slavery, increasingly advancing the threat to the slave society 
of the Texas territory. The conflict resulted in the Anglo settlers calling for a necessary 
break from the Mexican state in 1835. While Austin made legal and political cases for 
secession from Mexico, he also framed the conflict in racial terms, stating that the war 
was being waged by a “mongrel Spanish-Indian and negro race, against civilization and 
                                               
16 Conservative elites in Mexico opposed Guerrero and overthrew and executed early in his 
presidency. Historians believe that Guerrero’s opposition feared his appeal to those at the bottom 
of the social and racial hierarchies. See Jan Baznat, “The Aftermath of Independence,” in Mexico 
Since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991).  
17 Sean M. Kelley writes, “During the 1820s, both national and Coahuila y Texas governments 
began a halting attack on the institution. Between 1823 and 1829, a national authority decreed a  
prohibition of the foreign slave trade (1823); the emancipation of slave children under fourteen 
(1823); an extra grant of land to settlers who brought in large numbers of enslaved laborers 
(1823); a reconfirmation of the proslavery article in the national colonization law (1824); the 
abolition of the internal slave trade (1824); the abolition of slavery in Mexico (1829); and the 
subsequent exemption of Texas from the abolition decree (1829. The state government of at 
Saltillo was equally erratic. Among its decrees were a six-month period during which slaves 
could be brought into the state (1824); a six-month sunset period for slave importations (1827); a 
post-national emancipation law (1827); a law providing for the emancipation of 10 percent of the 
slaves on any estate undergoing sale or transfer (1827); and a contract labor law that allowed 
Anglo slave-owners to sign their bondsmen to ninety-nine year indentures, essentially 
undercutting all previous antislavery legislation (1827). See Kelley, Los Brazos de Dios: A 
Plantation Society in the Texas Borderlands, 1821-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2010), 98-99; Randolph B. Campbell, An Empire for Slavery: The Peculiar 
Institution in Texas, 1821-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989). 
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the Anglo-American race.”18 In fact, Austin’s degradation of the Mexican opposition was 
not merely emblematic of hierarchical understandings of the white races, where Anglo 
Americans saw themselves as superior to Mediterranean peoples; the northern territories 
of Mexico had attracted a more indigenous and African population, which could benefit 
from a “looser racial order on Mexico’s frontier.”19 In fact, 1792 census records show 
that roughly one in four Mexicans, outside of missions and garrisons, were of African 
descent.20 And after Texas gained independence from Mexico in 1836, travelers through 
the Republic regarded the Mexican population as a “mongrel Black race,” noting that 
they would be “taken anywhere for negroes” or were “nearly black” except for having 
less curly hair.21 While it is not always clear whether Euro-Americans recognized African 
racial mixing among Mexican peoples or they simply cast them into the same racial 
otherness as black Americans, it became common in the nineteenth century from Texas to 
California for white Americans to refer to Mexicans as “niggers” and “dirty mongrels.”22 
                                               
18 To Mary Austin Holley, August 21, 1835, Austin Papers, cited in Arnoldo De León, They 
Called Them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes toward Mexicans in Texas, 1821-1900 (Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 1983), 12.  
19 Gómez, “Opposite One-Drop Rules,” 90, citing José Antonio Esquibel, “The Formative Era for 
New Mexico’s Colonial Population, 1693-1700,” in Transforming Images: New Mexican Santos 
In-Between Worlds (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2006), 65-69.  
20 Martha Menchaca notes that 782 of 3005 individuals living in colonial Texas in 1792, outside 
of missions and garrisons, were of African decscent. See Menchaca, “The Anti-Miscegenation 
History of the American Southwest, 1837 to 1970,” Cultural Dynamics 20, no. 3 (2008): 284-
285, citing Alicia V. Tjarks, “Comparative Demographic Analysis of Texas, 1777-1793,” 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 77 (1974): 325. 
21 Menchaca, 2008: 284, citing William Fairfax Gray, From Virginia to Texas, 1835: Diary of 
Colonel William F. Gray (Houston, TX: Fletcher Young Publishing Co., 1909, 1965), 89; De 
León, They Call Them Greasers, 16; Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor 
Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 20-25.  
22 José A Cobas, Jorge Duany, Joe R. Feagin, “Racializing Latinos: Historical Background and 
Current Forms,” in How the United States Racializes Latinos: White Hegemony & Its 
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 This same understanding of blackness among Latin American countries played 
into the arguments of U.S. politicians in the second half of the nineteenth century as 
Manifest Destiny turned toward the Caribbean. Although some politicians, including 
President James Polk and President Ulysses S. Grant, made cases for acquiring Cuba or 
the Dominican Republic, accounts from travel journalists dissuaded other lawmakers who 
were concerned that Cuba consisted of “black, mixed, degraded, and ignorant, or inferior 
races” and that “most Dominicans were of African origin or mixed race.”23 This 
conception of Latin American countries continued to pervade the depictions of their 
peoples throughout the Spanish-Cuban-American War of 1898. Cubans and Puerto 
Ricans, as well as Filipinos, were “pictured as dark-skinned, childlike, effeminate, poor, 
and primitive peoples” in media forms ranging from paintings and postcards to 
photographs and films.24 These caricatures closely mimicked the portrayals of black 
Americans, who were under attack in the aftermath of the Reconstruction era and with 
the introduction of Jim Crow laws in southern U.S. states.  
At that same time, Italians, Spaniards, and Cubans coexisted harmoniously in the 
cigarmaking industry and in the ethnic enclave of Ybor City in Tampa, Florida, accepting 
the Afro-Cubans among them despite the Jim Crow laws coming into practice in the 
                                               
Consequences, eds. José A Cobas, Jorge Duany, and Joe R. Feagin (Boulder: Paradign 
Publishers, 2009), 4.  
23 Ibid., 5, citing Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial 
Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 282; Ginetta B. Candelario, 
Black Behind the Ears: Dominican Racial Identity from Museums to Beauty Shops (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2007). 
24 See Jorge Duany, The Puerto Rican Nation on the Move: Identities on the Island and in the 
United States (Chapel Hill: The University of the North Carolina Press, 2002); Lanny Thompson, 
Nuestra isla y su gente: La construcción del “otro” puertorriqueño en Our Islands and Their 
People (Río Piedras: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2007).  
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southern state. Anglo Tampa, however, did not participate in the same comradery that 
existed in Ybor City; rather, they referred to all “Latins” derisively as “Cuban niggers.”25 
Yet the Spanish-speaking islands of the Caribbean and their immigrants have not always 
shown that same resistance to U.S. racism that Ybor City did. Instead, some Dominicans, 
Puerto Ricans, and Cubans have adopted it, using the U.S. language for and 
understandings of racial hierarchies to classify their compatriots on their respective island 
nations.  
Indeed, colorism and the denigration of African heritage exists in Latin American 
countries. The pride that the residents of Latin American countries take in their mixed 
racial heritage, even the ambiguity of it, is usually accompanied by the degradation of 
blackness. As in Mexico, notions of one’s race in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, 
and Cuba rest primarily on physical appearance and others’ perception of it, rather than 
ancestry. This assessment of physical appearance takes hair texture and facial features 
into account, as well as skin color. These factors considered, Dominicans have labeled 
their Haitian neighbors and immigrants as the black members of their society situating 
them at the bottom of the social ranks. In turn, Puerto Ricans have regarded Dominicans 
in this same way, understanding blackness as undesirable as it has been treated in the 
United States.26  
                                               
25 Gary Ross Mormino and George E. Pozzetta, The Immigrant World of Ybor City: Italians and 
Their Latin Neighbors in Tampa, 1885-1985 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987). 
 
26 See Roth “Transnational Racializations.” 
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Meanwhile, Afro-Cubans have faced inequalities and discrimination both on the 
Island and in the United States. Given that Cuba’s major importation of African slaves 
came late in the nineteenth century just before slavery was abolished, it has been one of 
the most African Latin American countries, with African cultural influences remaining 
strong on the Island into the twentieth century. But, as a country whose independence 
from Spain came later than others, the Island also saw a wave of Spanish migration in the 
early twentieth century, making it one of the most Spanish (i.e. European and white) of 
Latin American countries. And since white, middle-class Cubans made their mass exodus 
in the wake of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Island did not have as extensive an 
opportunity for racial mixing as did other former Spanish colonies in the Americas.27  
Given this racial dichotomy, Cuba’s call for independence and revolution, like 
that of Mexico, included a rallying cry for racial equality as articulated by the visionary 
José Martí. To some degree, the vision was idealistic; the shift in power following 
independence moved from Spain toward white Cubans, leaving Afro-Cubans 
disenfranchised, which even resulted in a race war in 1912. But with the success of the 
Cuban Revolution in 1959, white Cubans in the top ranks of society fled the Island, as 
they stood to lose their wealth and power as a result of the plans for redistribution. 
Martí’s vision was, however, realized in the experiences of black Cubans who gained 
access to health care, education, and employment through the programs of the new 
socialist regime. Even when surveyed in recent decades, black Cubans expressed more 
                                               
27 Lisandro Pérez, “Racialization Among Cubans and Cuban Americans,” in How the United 
States Racializes Latinos: White Hegemony & Its Consequences, eds. José A. Cobas, Jorge 
Duany, and Joe R. Feagin (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2009). 
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patriotism for their country than their black neighbors in Puerto Rico and the Dominican 
Republic. Scholars attribute this to the “rhetoric and policies of the Cuban Revolution.”28 
But when the Soviet bloc fell, socialist Cuba lost support, and as a result, there 
were three major changes that came about in order to supplement Cuba’s struggling 
economy in the 1990s: (1) the government cut spending for social programs (2) emigrants 
gained the ability to send remittances to relatives who remained on the Island, and (3) 
foreign investors were able to develop the tourist industry. All three of these changes 
either benefited white Cubans or diminished the positive impact that socialist policies had 
made in the lives of black Cubans since 1959. Because the vast majority of Cubans who 
had left the Island in the post-1959 era were white and white Cubans fared better than 
black Cubans in the United States anyway, white relatives on the Island benefitted more 
from remittances than did the relatives of black Cuban emigrants. With the rise of the 
tourist industry, employment opportunities opened up to many Cubans, but employers’ 
racially-coded emphasis on “good presence” has meant discrimination in hiring against 
black Cubans.29  
Even those black Cubans who left the Island, primarily through the Mariel 
boatlifts in the 1980s, have faced discrimination in their experiences in the United States. 
Many black Cubans were discouraged from going to the United States in the first place, 
                                               
28 Mark Sawyer, Yesilernis Peña, and Jim Sidanius, “Cuban Exceptionalism: Group-Based 
Hierarchy and the Dynamics of Patriotism in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba” 
(working paper no. 190, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002).  
29 Pérez, “Racialization Among Cubans and Cuban Americans,” 140-141; Alejandro de la Fuente, 
A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001).  
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with the Cuban government doing its part to depict it as a racist society. The lived 
experiences of black Cubans, particularly in Miami, have validated this claim with its 
highly segregated urban neighborhoods and reduced life chances for its black residents—
African American and Afro-Latino alike.30  
Like Cubans, Dominicans’ experiences with their perceived blackness have also 
been marked by complexity. With high levels of racial mixing and racial hierarchies 
based on subjective assignments, Dominicans have negotiated their blackness across time 
depending on the historical and political context. The Dominican experience 
demonstrates that race has not only been a social construction, but a construction shaped 
by political agendas, such as U.S. imperialism, Dominican nation-building, and anti-
Haitianism. In many cases, Dominicans have reconciled the political agendas that have 
surrounded them through the promotion of Indo-Hispanicity; that is, claims to whiteness 
and indigeneity, while hardly embracing blackness. Instead, embracing the “Indio” 
identity has served as a means for Dominicans to assert political autonomy and account 
for racial ambiguities. In fact, historian Ginetta Candelario finds that Dominicans have 
continually translated racial ambiguity into “strategic ambiguity:” to be able to claim 
different racial identities has meant entitlement within different power structures, 
including the reclaiming of black heritage in contexts where black identity and solidarity 
can come with status and cachet, such as Washington, D.C.31 
                                               
30 Pérez, 142.  
31 Candelario, Black behind the Ears. 
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These accounts of African heritage and blackness across Latin American 
countries and the experiences of Afro-Latinos and Latinos perceived as black complicate 
the distinctions that scholars and data analysts attempt to make in their discussions of 
“black and Latino” interactions with law enforcement and the criminal justice system. 
For one, the categories of “black” and “Latino” do not exist as mutually exclusive 
identities for people from Latin American countries. Secondly, individuals who identify 
as Latino but are seen and treated as black in the United States experience the wrath of 
the one-drop rule as it has applied to African Americans for centuries, discrimination and 
criminalization included. Lastly, the Latinos who have been seen and treated as black in 
their home country know that the consequences of racial hierarchies are not unique to the 
United States; there is no racial sanctuary to where they can return, despite the mixed-
race pride of so many Latin American countries. And while African heritage has 
contributed to the racial makeup of all Latin American countries, it has contributed to 
some more than others, and as a result of patterns of migration to the United States 
among those populations over the past couple of centuries, African heritage among 
Latinos has also been concentrated regionally in the U.S., resulting in regional patterns of 
criminal justice experiences for those Latinos who identify or are perceived as black.32  
Being Black/Latino in the Northeast 
States in the Southwest host a greater number of Latinos who also make up a 
greater percentage of their total population compared to the rest of the United States. In 
turn, prisons in the Southwestern states of New Mexico, Arizona, California, Texas, and 
                                               
32 Nellis, “The Color of Justice.”  
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Colorado host the highest percentages of Latino inmates, only to be followed by the 
Northeastern states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York, states which also have 
the highest racial disparities in incarceration rates when comparing Latino rates to those 
of white populations.33 In fact, the Latino populations in the Southwest and the Northeast 
consist of very different demographics. Of note, the Northeast Latino population has a 
much greater percentage who identify as black Hispanic compared to the Southwest 
population.  
In Northeastern states with the largest Latino populations, around 7 percent 
identified as black Hispanic (8 percent in New York, 7 percent in Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania, 6 percent in Connecticut, and 5 percent in New Jersey), while only one 
percent of Latinos identified as black in the Southwestern states of California, Texas, 
Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico in the 2010 U.S. Census count.34 Of course, the 
Northeast is distinct from the rest of the country in that Mexicans do not make up the 
majority of Latinos in the region. Rather, Puerto Ricans (35 percent) and Dominicans (16 
percent) account for the majority of Latinos in the area. As a whole, members of these 
groups also identify as black at much higher rates than other groups: 13 percent of 
Dominicans and 9 percent of Puerto Ricans identified as black in 2010, while only one 
percent of Central American (Mexican included) and South American Latinos identified 
                                               
33 Ibid. 
34 Among other states with large Latino populations, 4 percent of Latinos in Florida and 2 percent 
of Latinos in Illinois identified as black. In Puerto Rico, 13 percent of Latinos identified as black 
in 2010. Figures derived from U.S. Census Bureau’s American FactFinder, retrieved from 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#.  
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as black in that same year (see Table 3.1).35  
Table 3.1: Latino Racial Classifications 2010 by State 






















Southwest        
Arizona 51% 1% 2% 0% 0% 40% 5% 
California 46% 1% 1% 1% 0% 44% 6% 
Colorado 55% 1% 2% 0% 0% 34% 7% 
New Mexico 60% 1% 2% 0% 0% 32% 5% 
Texas 67% 1% 1% 0% 0% 27% 4% 
Northeast        
Connecticut 47% 6% 1% 0% 0% 39% 7% 
Massachusetts 45% 7% 1% 0% 0% 39% 8% 
New Jersey 52% 5% 1% 0% 0% 34% 7% 
New York 42% 8% 2% 0% 0% 40% 8% 
Pennsylvania 43% 7% 1% 0% 0% 40% 8% 
Other        
Florida 76% 4% 1% 0% 0% 15% 4% 
Illinois 50% 2% 1% 0% 0% 42% 5% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau’s American FactFinder 
Research suggests that those who self-reported as “black Hispanic” have done so 
as a result of their relatively darker skin.36 Many scholars have written about the process 
of racialization that dark-skinned Puerto Ricans and Dominicans undergo as a result of 
                                               
35 Sharon R. Ennis, Merarys Ríos-Vargas, and Nora G. Albert, The Hispanic Population: 2010 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). 
36 Nancy S. Landale and R.S. Oropesa, “White, Black, or Puerto Rican? Racial Self-Identification 
among Mainland and Island Puerto Ricans.” Social Forces 81, no. 1 (September 2002): 235; 
Terry Brown, Frances C. Dane, and Marcus D. Durham, “Perception of Race and Ethnicity,” 
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 13 (1998): 295-306. 
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migrating from their respective islands to Northeastern U.S. cities.37 On both islands, race 
is seen as a spectrum of color, in which people can be light-skinned or dark-skinned 
without fully identifying as white as synonymous with European, or black as 
synonymous with African. Rather, an acknowledged history of racial mixing leaves room 
for ambiguity and choice of racial affiliations, which may be related to but not 
necessarily dictated by appearances.38  
However, when Puerto Ricans or Dominicans have immigrated, they have 
confronted the U.S. historical legacy of a black-white racial dichotomy. Their spectrum 
of color usually gets translated so that light-skinned people identify and/or are identified 
as white, and dark-skinned people identify and/or are identified as black. But given the 
choice, many Puerto Ricans and Dominicans have rejected blackness, “because they 
recognize that black people are stigmatized in the U.S.”39 In fact, this trope has entered 
the realm of popular culture, having been noted in the television series, Orange Is the 
New Black, when white characters regurgitate the stereotypes associated with the various 
ethnic clans in a Connecticut women’s prison, saying, “[Dominicans] talk a lot and play 
baseball and they’re always like ‘I’m super not black’ even though Haiti is the exact 
same island.”40 
                                               
37 Landale and Oropesa, “White, Black, or Puerto Rican? Racial Self-Identification among 
Mainland and Island Puerto Ricans,” 234; Also see Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, Puerto Rican 
Americans: The Meaning of Migration to the Mainland (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1987); Candelario, Black Behind the Ears; Piri Thomas, Down These Mean Streets (New 
York: Knopf, 1967; reprint, Graymalkin Media, 2015). 
38 See Roth, “Transnational Racializations.” 
39 Landale and Oropesa, 234. 
40 Orange Is the New Black, “Power Suit,” Season 2, Episode 4, Directed by Constantine Makris, 
Written by Sara Hess, Netflix, June 17, 2016. 
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But while some Puerto Ricans and Dominicans who have been perceived to be 
black may altogether reject that identity, others may associate with another background in 
addition to acknowledging black heritage in defiance of the essentialized blackness that 
has been assigned to them. In fact, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans were also more likely 
than other groups to identify with two or more races than were other Latinos—9 and 10 
percent respectively compared to 6 percent among all Latinos—which perhaps alludes to 
even higher rates of black racial affiliations among these two groups.41 Moreover, when 
surveyed, Dominican immigrants in New York identified as black at a rate of 17 percent, 
but when asked, “How do you think most Americans classify you racially?” the 
percentage selecting “black” jumped to 37 percent.42 In other words, the proportion of 
Puerto Ricans and Dominicans who have been seen as black is potentially higher than the 
proportion who have self-reported as black. Ultimately, because Northeastern states host 
the largest numbers of Latinos most likely to identify or be identified as black, the 
Latinos in these states have been vulnerable to the racial profiling which has targeted the 
dark skin that they share with their African American counterparts and which often acts 
as the primary measure of racial otherness.43  
                                               
41 Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert, The Hispanic Population: 2010. 
42 When asked, “Are you: white, black, or other?” the 21 percent of the Dominican immigrant 
respondents chose “other” and specified, “Hispanic,” 19 percent chose “other” and specified 
“Indio,” 17 percent chose “Black,” and 12 percent chose “White.” When asked, “How do you 
think most Americans would classify you racially?” 37 percent indicated “Black,” 30 percent 
indicated “Hispanic,” and 6 percent indicated “White.” For the full set of survey data, see José 
Itzigsohn, “The Formation of Latino and Latina Panethnic Identities,” in Not Just Black and 
White: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the 
United States, eds. Nancy Foner and George Frederickson (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2004).  
43 Elizabeth M. Aranda, Emotional Bridges to Puerto Rico: Migration, Return Migration, and the 
Struggles of Incorporation (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 108. 
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As noted above, the criminalization of blackness that entangles black Latinos and 
Latinos seen as black coincides with increased racial disparities between white and 
Latino incarceration rates in Northeastern states. As of 2014, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and New York topped the list for the highest ratios of Hispanic-to-White 
incarceration rates, representing the largest racial disparities for Latinos by state.44 It 
should be noted that considering data by state is important for several reasons: (1) states 
host the majority of the correctional population at 59 percent as opposed to federal 
prisons at nine percent and local jails at 32 percent on a given day, (2) much of law 
enforcement and criminal justice policy is handled at the state level, and (3) looking at 
the data by state aids in the investigation of regional trends. Although jails host a 
significant portion of the correctional population, some are being transferred to or from 
another facility (state, federal, or immigration), some of the population is being held 
without a conviction, and the vast majority who are serving a sentence are not being held 
for felony charges. Therefore, some of the jail population is being accounted for in the 
state numbers, some leave jail without a record, and the many individuals who leave jail 
with only a misdemeanor do not face the level of draconian collateral consequences, 
                                               
44 Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice. The Sentencing Project also published an earlier report 
with 2005 data and similar findings: Marc Mauer and Ryan S. King, Uneven Justice: State Rates 
of Incarceration By Race and Ethnicity (The Sentencing Project, 2007). Although both reports 
only reference state prison populations, which made up about 59 percent of correctional 
population at year-end 2015, racial disparities in local jails (32 percent of the correctional 
population, based on an average day estimate for 2015) mirror those of state prisons. Therefore, 
these disparities are present among 91 percent of the correctional population. For combined state 
prison and local jail rates in 2005, see Paige M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck, Prison and Jail 
Inmates at Midyear 2005 (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005). For 
2015 correctional population counts, see Todd D. Minton and Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2015 
(U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015); E. Ann Carson and Elizabeth 
Anderson, Prisoners in 2015 (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015).  
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including disenfranchisement, that those who go to state prisons do. Still, the experience 
of being jailed has significant impacts as well, as will be discussed later in the chapter.  
In order to contemplate the role of the state in the incarceration of racial 
minorities, one can view the process over the past several decades through the lens of the 
Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC). The case of Massachusetts illuminates 
the demographic shifts that resulted in the state prison population as incarceration rates 
skyrocketed with the War on Drugs and as the Latino population multiplied and changed 
composition, with Puerto Ricans increasingly leaving the island to come to the mainland, 
stateside Puerto Ricans repopulating at high rates, and the Dominican population—78 
percent of which lives in the Northeast—growing by 90 percent over the course of the 
1990s.45  
Between 1973 and 1983, the white prison population in Massachusetts fluctuated 
between 62 and 64 percent of the total prison population, although whites made up 92 
percent of the total state population. After 1984, the white prison population began a 
steady decline to 43 percent as seen in 2011, while in 2010 whites represented 80 percent 
of the total state population.46 Meanwhile, the black prison population in Massachusetts 
fluctuated between 32 and 37 percent from 1973 to 1978. After 1980, the black prison 
population steadily declined from 36 percent to 28 percent in 2011.47  
                                               
45 D’vera Cohn, Eileen Patten, and Mark Hugo Lopez, Puerto Rican Population Declines on 
Island, Grows on U.S. Mainland (Pew Research Center, 2014); Elizabeth Grieco, The Dominican 
Population in the United States: Growth and Distribution (Migration Policy Institute, 2004).  
46 Massachusetts Department of Correction, January 1 Population Statistics, 1973-2009.  
47 Ibid. 
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 The Hispanic prison population in Massachusetts is more difficult to track than 
the white and black populations, as record-keeping strategies have changed over the years 
most notably for people with Latino backgrounds. These changes, however, still provide 
insight into the characteristics of the incarcerated Hispanic population and how 
mainstream American society has conceived of the Hispanic population in general. The 
changes include: not including “Hispanic” as a racial category in prison population 
records from 1973 to 1978, with the exception of 1975; indicating both race and Hispanic 
ethnicity as mutually exclusive categories from 1981 to 1990 and again from 2002 to 
2007; identifying place of birth from 1987 to 1997 and from 2002 to 2008; culture, 
primary language, and English comprehension from 2001 to 2008; and citizenship from 
2007 to 2009.48  
 Between 1973 and 1978, the “unknown” race category ranged from 1 to about 3 
percent of the total prison population. With the exception of 1975, which reported a 
Hispanic population of 1 percent, the number of Hispanics counted in those unspecified 
categories as opposed to the black or white categories cannot be determined. But in 1980, 
the “Hispanic” category became a permanent fixture in the Massachusetts DOC annual 
inmate statistical reports. Contrary to the black and white prison populations, the 
Hispanic population has been steadily increasing from 3 percent in 1980 to about 29  














        
 
 
Figure 3.1: Massachusetts Prison Population by Race/Ethnicity 




Figure 3.2: Proportion of Hispanic Offenders Identified/Identifying as Black 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Correction. January 1 Population Statistics, 1973-2009. 



















1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Year
MA Prison Population by Race/Ethnicity





















Proportion of Hispanics Identified/Identifying as Black
 136 
percent in recent years. From 1981 to 1990, the DOC categorized inmates first by their 
race, with white, black, Native American, Asiatic, Hispanic-unspecified as listed 
categories. Inmates were then categorized by “Hispanic status,” with non-Hispanic, white 
Hispanic, black Hispanic, and Hispanic-unspecified as options. From 2002 to 2007, this 
practice was reinstituted, but without a “Hispanic-unspecified” category for either set of 
information, and in 2003, the datasets began noting that the information was “self-
reported.”49  
During the first period, record-keepers indicated that between 27 and 50 percent 
of the state’s Hispanic prison population was black. In the second period, in which 
inmates were allowed to self-report, between 10 and 17 percent of the state’s Hispanic 
prison population identified as black. The methods for reporting race and ethnicity may 
have changed, but perhaps the percentage of people that prison staff would have 
considered black Hispanic and the percentage of inmates that would have considered 
themselves black Hispanic did not change significantly between the two periods. 
Consider that in 2000, between the two eras when the DOC measured its black Hispanic 
population, only around 5 percent of Hispanics in Massachusetts identified as black. 
Taking this into account, the large percentages of black Hispanics in the prison 
population between 1981 and 1990 and between 2002 and 2007 are highly 
disproportionate to how the general population in the state of Massachusetts has 
identified, suggesting that black Latinos and Latinos perceived to be black are more 
likely to be arrested, charged, convicted, and incarcerated than their Latino peers who do 
                                               
49 Ibid.  
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not identify as black and are not seen as black. And without these significant proportions 
of black Latinos among the prison population, the Hispanic-to-White ratio of 
incarceration rates (i.e. the racial disparities) for Massachusetts would not have been as 
high.  
In fact, sociologist Elizabeth Aranda asserts that dark-skinned Puerto Ricans are 
more likely to be “labeled and discriminated against,” as per the consequences of 
colorism.50 According to sociologist Margaret Hunter, “colorism is the process of 
discrimination that privileges light-skinned people of color over their dark-skinned 
counterparts.”51 This theory would suggest that Latinos of darker skin (i.e. black Latinos 
and Latinos perceived to be black) have experienced more intense discrimination along 
each step of the criminal justice process, from arrest to conviction to sentencing, than 
their lighter-skinned Latino peers. Indeed, a 2006 study found that darker-skinned black 
defendants were more than twice as likely to receive the death penalty than lighter-
skinned black defendants for crimes of equivalent seriousness against white victims.52  
While there is no research to suggest that people of darker skin are more likely to 
commit crimes, research does show that people with darker skin face more discrimination 
throughout their lives than do lighter-skinned individuals. This discrimination might lead 
some to be constrained by the conditions that lead to incarceration, such as poor 
                                               
50 Aranda, Emotional Bridges to Puerto Rico, 118. 
51 Margaret Hunter, “The Persistent Problem of Colorism: Skin Tone, Status, and Inequality,” 
Sociology Compass 1, no. 1 (September 2007): 237-254; Margaret Hunter, Race, Gender, and the 
Politics of Skin Tone (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
52 Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., "Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black 
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes," Psychological Science 17, no. 5 (May 2006): 
383-386.  
 138 
education, poverty, and unemployment.53 Furthermore, studies also show that the 
American public has a tendency to fear and criminalize darkness. When people see a 
dark-skinned person, they suspect danger. When asked to picture a criminal, they picture 
a dark-skinned person.54 Additionally, some Puerto Ricans may have experienced 
colorism not only as a result of their dark skin color, but also because they have been 
“inclined to interact extensively with African Americans,” which would reinforce 
associations with blackness.55 Even as far back as the Harlem Renaissance in the 1920s 
and 1930s, New Yorkers complained of the “invasion” of an “objectionable element,” to 
the neighborhood, referring not only to black migration, but that of Puerto Ricans as well. 
Furthermore, the 1932 article, “The Porto Rican in Harlem,” reported that Puerto Ricans 
“have given loyal support to Negro aspirations for political office… The Negro and the 
Porto Rican have a common interest in the future progress and welfare of Harlem.”56 Yet, 
history shows that this association between black and Puerto Rican Northeasterners has 
not always been cordial or by choice. 
In his “controversial yet highly publicized” book, One Nation, One Standard, 
Herman Badillo, the first Puerto Rican U.S. congressman, warned that Puerto Ricans 
                                               
53 Hunter, Race, Gender, and the Politics of Skin Tone. 
54 See Patricia G. Devine, “Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled 
Components,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56, no. 1 (1989): 5-18; John A. 
Bargh et al., “Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype 
Activation on Action,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71, no. 2 (1996): 230-244; 
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., “Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 87, no. 6 (2004): 876-893. 
55 Landale and Oropesa, 235. 
56 The New York Age, March 19, 1932; Note that the first major wave of migration from Puerto 
Rico to the mainland United States took place in the 1940s. For more on that history, see Regina 
Bernard-Carreño, “Puertoricans in New York,” Counterpoints 366, Nuyorganics: Organic 
Intellectualism, the Search for Racial Identity, and Nuyorican Thought (2010): 61-75.  
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were “becoming part of a permanent underclass.”57 Badillo made no new argument in 
suggesting this. In fact, Oscar Lewis coined the term “culture of poverty” not to describe 
the black community as the infamous 1965 Moynihan Report did, but to explain the 
plight of Mexican and Puerto Rican families.58 Across reports in the Boston Globe in the 
1960s and 1970s, Puerto Ricans and their African American neighbors were coupled in 
discussions of discrimination and portrayed as part of the same underclass despite 
repeated reports of intergroup conflict. At the onset of the rise of mass incarceration, 
black and Puerto Rican Northeasterners lived together under the same poor housing 
conditions, rioted side-by-side from the slums they shared, both faced job discrimination, 
were similarly dispossessed when urban development plans neglected their communities, 
and both sent their children on buses into unwelcoming white schools when the call for 
desegregation came. They spoke out to fight the same social ills, sometimes together, 
sometimes separately, and sometimes they fought each other. Read together, the stories 
                                               
57 Arlene Dávila, Latino Spin: Public Image and the Whitewashing of Race (New York: New 
York University Press, 2008), 86; Herman Badillo, One Nation, One Standard: An Ex-Liberal on 
How Hispanics Can Succeed Just Like Other Immigrant Groups (New York: Sentinel, 2006). 
58 Oscar Lewis, La Vida: The Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty—San Juan and New 
York (New York: Random House, 1966); Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case 
for National Action (U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Policy Planning and Research, 1965). 
In the decades since the report was published, many scholars and civil rights activists have 
criticized the work. Frank F. Furstenberg argues that the report “largely ignored social class 
variations among black families. This gave the erroneous impression that the changes occurring 
in the black family were related to distinctive cultural features rather than the economic position 
of most blacks. See Furstenberg, “If Moynihan Had Only Known: Race, Class, and Family 
Change in the Late Twentieth Century,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 621, The Moynihan Report Revisited: Lessons and Reflections after Four Decades 
(2009): 94. 
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detailed in these articles show that African Americans and Puerto Ricans were seen as 
facing the same problems, or in terms of crime, being part of the same problem.59  
In 1975, a Boston Globe article covered the shooting and murder of a young, 
Puerto Rican man by white police officers, one of whom was previously charged with 
wrongfully wounding a black robbery suspect, in Springfield, Massachusetts. The article 
identified the 18-year-old Puerto Rican shooting victim as a thief, while noting the 
“veteran” careers of the policemen. A Justice Department conciliation specialist and 
police union spokesperson claimed this story followed a common pattern: 
In the scenario, police see a young man—black or Puerto Rican—in an 
illegal act. They give chase. He turns. They see a metallic glint and fire in 
self-defense. He falls mortally wounded. The minority community protests. 
There is an inquest. The officers are cleared of wrongdoing. The protest 
continues.60  
 
This pattern presumes the guilt of the shooting victim, it absolves police officers 
of wrongdoing, and it renders the minority community irrational for seeking justice even 
after an investigation. For his part, the article notes, the police chief tried to build rapport 
with members of the Puerto Rican community by “[urging] them not to be like blacks 
who have tried to live on welfare checks.”61 This officer’s warning encapsulates the 
message delivered by the body of news articles on the Puerto Rican community in the 
                                               
59 For examples, see “A Serious Fear of Crime,” Boston Globe, July 14, 1967; “MCAD Charges 
Several Bay State Firms With Bias in Hiring,” Boston Globe, October 23, 1968; “Urban Panel 
Seeks Support of Negroes,” Boston Globe, February 17, 1968; “Boston to Probe Racial 
Tensions,” Boston Globe, February 21, 1969; “Not much evidence of reconciliation in New 
Bedford,” Boston Globe, August 16, 1970; “The boycott in Brooklyn,” Boston Globe, November 
13, 1972; “Four arrested in Lowell after racial fighting,” Boston Globe, June 19, 1974; 
“Desegregation—until safety’s assured, it won’t happen,” Boston Globe, August 29, 1978.  
60 Jean Caldwell, “Springfield shooting hurts police-Hispanic relations,” The Boston Globe, June 
1, 1975. 
61 Ibid.  
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1960s and 1970s. With the added obstacle of a language barrier and a growing presence, 
Puerto Ricans in Massachusetts seemed more and more like African Americans who had 
been marginalized in Northeastern urban centers for over two centuries.  
Echoing this historical experience, sociologists Nancy Landale and R.S. Oropesa 
have noted that the racial identity of Puerto Ricans, like other Latin American peoples, is 
“an ongoing process that involves negotiation between an individual and others,” in 
which the perception of race outweighs ancestry.62 So again, even people who do not 
identify as black can suffer the discrimination of criminal justice colorism. One such 
negotiation includes instances of Puerto Ricans’ racial identity being compromised when 
racially profiled as black criminals, regardless of their racial self-identification. Puerto 
Ricans and Dominicans who do not identify as black and even actively try to dissociate 
themselves from blackness may also be seen as African American. For some, racism and 
the “persisting significance of skin color” is nothing new and they may more readily 
identify as black after repeated incidents of being “mistaken” as African American.63 
Puerto Rican and Cuban author Piri Thomas recounted such experiences in Down These 
Mean Streets. As a New Yorker, he constantly encountered a world that saw him as 
black, including his own African American friend who informed him, “Ah only sees 
                                               
62 Landale and Oropesa, 233, citing Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the 
United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (New York: Routledge, 1994); Alejandro Portes and 
Rubén Rumbaut, Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2001); Clara E. Rodríguez and Hector Cordero-Guzmán, “Placing Race in 
Context,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 15 (1992): 523-541; Clara E. Rodríguez, Changing Race: 
Latinos, the Census, and the History of Ethnicity in the United States (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000); Mary C. Waters, Racial Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and 
American Realities (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999).  
63 Aranda, 121. 
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another Negro in front of me,” despite Thomas’ consistent insistence on distinguishing 
himself as Puerto Rican.64  
Furthermore, some Puerto Ricans experience colorism not only as a result of their 
dark skin color, but also because of prevalent interactions with African Americans, which 
would reinforce associations with blackness.65 One study across counties in a 
Northeastern state found that “juvenile delinquents who live within areas that have high 
minority populations (more heterogeneous) will more often be detained, regardless of 
their individual race or ethnicity.”66 Moreover, research shows that members of the most 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, regardless of race, are more susceptible to criminal 
activity “because the conditions that encourage criminal behavior are particularly 
pronounced and mechanisms of social control that discourage crime are particularly 
lacking.”67 However, even though that finding holds for both black and white 
neighborhoods, black Americans account for a disproportionate share of those living in 
disadvantaged areas, which urban scholars have identified by their levels of poverty, 
family disruption, male joblessness, and a lack of persons in high-status occupations. 
While this research typically focuses on black-white differences, data from the state of 
                                               
64 Thomas, Down These Mean Streets, 121. 
65 Landale and Oropesa, 235.  
66 The Northeastern state is not named in the study; see Gaylene Armstrong and Nancy 
Rodriguez, “Effects of individual and contextual characteristics on preadjudication detention of 
juvenile delinquents,” Justice Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2005): 534. Victor R. Rios describes the 
connection between criminalizing black and Latino youth and desistance (i.e. interactions with 
the criminal justice system as an adult); see Rios, “The Consequences of the Criminal Justice 
Pipeline on Black and Latino Masculinity,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 623, Race, Crime, and Justice: Contexts and Complexities (2009): 150-162.  
67 Lauren J. Krivo and Ruth D. Peterson, “Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban 
Crime,” Social Forces 75, no. 2 (December 1996): 619-648. 
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Massachusetts show that Puerto Ricans in the state exhibit the same signs of structural 
disadvantage that lead individuals to resort to illegal activity as seen among African 
American communities: low marriage rates, low levels of education, low labor force 
participation, high unemployment, low levels of employment in professional or 
managerial occupations, low hourly wages, low home ownership rates, and residence in 
low-cost housing (see Table 3.2).68 
Table 3.2: Puerto Ricans vs. Total Population in Massachusetts 
  Puerto Ricans Total Population 
Marriage Rates 26% 48% 
Less Than a High School Degree 39% 12% 
Bachelor's Degree and Above 11% 38% 
Labor Force Participation 60% 78% 
Unemployment Rate 15% 6% 
Employed in White Collar Jobs 19% 40% 
Wages in White Collar Jobs $19.22 $29.74 
Wages in Service Jobs $10.72 $14.75 
Wages in Blue Collar Jobs $10.37 $15.33 
Home Ownership Rates 23% 65% 
Average Mortgage $1,347 $1,611 
Average Rent $623 $923 
Figures derived from Phillip Granberry, Foreign-Born Latinos in Massachusetts, 2011. 
 
While the case of Massachusetts illuminates the shared experiences of residents 
who identify as Latino and black, whether as mutually exclusive categories or not, it 
should also be noted that Pennsylvania and Connecticut, other Northeastern states, not 
only top the list for the highest racial disparities between Hispanic and white 
                                               
68 Phillip Granberry, Foreign-Born Latinos in Massachusetts (Gastón Institute for Latino 
Community, Development and Public Policy Publications, 2011). 
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incarceration rates, the states also have some of the highest overall rates of incarceration 
for Latinos in the United States, along with high rates of Latinos identifying as black. 
Nationally, Latinos are incarcerated at a rate of 375 per 100,000 in the general 
population, but Latinos are incarcerated at a rate of 668 per 100,000 in Pennsylvania and 
a rate of 583 per 100,000 in Connecticut.69 Certainly, rates of incarceration for African 
Americans far exceed those of Latinos, but scholars fail to contextualize these rates and 
ratios and account for the geographical differences. Popular convention leads mainstream 
society to conceive of the racial tensions between white Americans and Latinos as set in 
the Southwest and between black and white Americans in the South. And yet, not only 
are disparities most apparent in the Northeast for Latinos, the highest black/white 
incarceration rate disparities can be found not in Southern states, but in New Jersey, 
Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and Vermont. Previous scholarship has focused on the 
question of why racial disparities exist at all, but approaching the question with a 
consideration of geography means asking why disparities are higher in a particular area 
for one group as opposed to another area or another group. The history and politics of 
each locale matters in shaping the experiences of marginalized racial groups, be it in the 
South, Midwest, Northeast, or Southwest.   
Being Black/Latino in the Southwest 
Although the Southwest has far lower rates of Latinos identifying as black 
Hispanic, the region has its own rich history of shared experiences among its black and 
                                               
69 Nellis, “The Color of Justice.” 
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Latino residents.70 Records show that the city of Los Angeles was founded in 1781 by a 
group of “blacks and browns,” or as nineteenth century historian Hubert Howe Bancroft 
described, a group “whose blood was a strange mixture of [Mexican] Indian and Negro 
with here and there a trace of Spanish.”71 And, as noted above, the racial makeup of 
Mexicans in Texas also consisted of more indigenous and African heritage than the 
population in the interior of Mexico. While there are many notable cases in which the 
African ancestry of Mexicans comes into consideration in the legal treatment of certain 
individuals, black and Mexican American populations, even when treated as mutually 
exclusive communities, have undergone parallel experiences of discrimination, from 
segregation to voter disenfranchisement and even violence.  
Going back to the 1830s and the new Republic of Texas, Anglo settlers faced the 
conundrum of determining citizenship for Mexicans, who they commonly conceived to 
be of mixed Spanish, Indian, and African ancestry. The legal conflict was especially 
apparent for Afro-Mestizos. By 1837, Texas laws explicitly prohibited racially mixed 
persons (i.e., Mexicans) from marrying a white person if they had any African ancestry 
going back to their great-grandparents.72 Furthermore, while Texas law practitioners were 
left to sort out citizenship eligibility and rights for Mexicans perceived to be of mixed 
                                               
70 As noted earlier, only one percent of Latinos in California, Texas, Arizona, and Colorado 
identified as black Hispanic in 2010. However, there are important narratives about the Afro-
Mexican experience in the region; see Invisible Roots: Afro-Mexicans of Southern California, 
directed by Tiffany Walton and Lizz Mullis (Third World NewsReel, 2016).  
71 Ruben Salazar, “Chicanos Would Find Identity Before Coalition With Blacks,” Los Angeles 
Times, February 20, 1970; Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of the Pacific States of North America: 
California (British Columbia: A.L. Bancroft & Company, 1884), 345. 
72 Marital Rights, art. 4670, 2466, in George W. Paschal, A Digest of the Law of Texas, 5th ed., 
vol. 1 (Houston, TX: E.H. Cushing, 1878), 783. See Menchaca, “The Anti-Miscegenation History 
of the American Southwest,” 283. 
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European and Indian heritage, laws clearly stated that individuals of African descent 
could not be citizens. In 1840, Texas lawmakers decided that Mexicans of African 
heritage could remain in Texas and become slaves or be deported to Mexico if they 
preferred freedom.73 For his part, Stephen F. Austin advocated to keep Afro-Mestizos, or 
“Mexican mulattos,” out of Texas, seeing them as a “worse nuisance than slaves.”74 It 
also became common for Anglo Texans to think of Mexicans and African Americans in 
alliance, with allegations that Mexicans were “actively encouraging slaves to escape to 
Mexico.” So, in June of 1844, when a group of slaves from Galveston commandeered a 
boat that sailed to Mexico, the fugitives’ success provoked the city to institute a policy 
calling for the inspection of all outgoing ships to Mexico.75 Indeed, as this case suggests, 
Mexico, like Northern U.S. states, had abolished slavery but still supported the South’s 
slave-based economy through the consumption of slave-produced goods.  
Nevertheless, Mexicans more often came across as significant actors for helping 
facilitate paths to freedom and protecting runaway slaves from recapture. Frederick Law 
Olmsted reported that he encountered several former Texas slaves in Piedras Negras, a 
town on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, during his travels in 1854. Olmsted noted 
                                               
73 Menchaca, 2008, citing Menchaca, 2001; Harold Schoen, “The Free Negro in the Republic of 
Texas: The Law in Practice,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1937): 267.  
74 Menchaca, 2008, 284; Stephen F. Austin letter to Richard Ellis, June 16, 1830 (Papers, Center 
for American History).  
75 The Civilian and Galveston Gazette, June 8, 1844; Robert S. Shelton, “Slavery in a Texas 
Seaport: The Peculiar Institution in Galveston,” Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and 
Post-Slave Studies 28, no. 2 (2007): 155-168. This sentiment was also expressed by José Antonio 
Navarro, a Mexican of full Spanish ancestry, in regards to his opposition to Mexican Indians, who 
he referred to as peons, becoming part of Texas’ citizenry: “Notice how often the peons of the 
west have come in and enticed our negroes away, how they meet them on an equality. They do 
not intermarry with the white population, they form their connections with the slaves.” See Wm. 
F. Weeks, reporter, Debates of the Texas Convention (Houston: J.W. Cruger, 1846), 243. 
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that one such former slave had been a native of Virginia and escaped to Mexico after 
having come to Texas with his master. This former slave had learned Spanish, become 
part of the Catholic Church, and traveled throughout Northern Mexico. He also told 
Olmsted that “the Mexican government was very just to them,” and that “they could 
always have their rights as fully protected as if they were Mexicans born.”76 As a result, 
Texas slaveholders made several attempts to cross the border to find fugitive slaves and 
return them to bondage. In response, Mexicans rallied in solidarity with the former slaves 
to defy Texas slaveholders. In 1851, Mexico, along with Wild Cat, a Seminole Indian 
chief, and his band of former slaves, defeated the revolt of hundreds of Texans in 
Northern Mexico who were protesting the Mexican government’s failure to return 
runaway slaves. In 1855, Texas slaveholders commissioned James H. Callahan to attack 
Wild Cat and his people, as well as to recapture fugitive slaves. Again, a combination of 
Mexican, Indian, and black forces quashed these efforts, forcing Callahan and his troops 
to retreat as they burned the town of Piedras Negras to prevent being followed.77  
In 1856, Anglo Texans in Colorado County discovered a plot for over two 
hundred armed slaves to escape to Mexico with the intent of killing anyone who tried to 
stop them. Discovering that Mexicans had aided in the plot, officials concluded, “that the 
lower class of the Mexican population are incendiaries in any country where slaves are 
held, and should be dealt with accordingly,” thereby leading to the expulsion of Mexicans 
                                               
76 Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey Through Texas: Or, a Saddle-Trip on the Southwestern 
Frontier (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), 324-325. 
77 See Alwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History of African Americans in Texas 1858-1995, 2nd ed. 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 32; and Kelley, 99.  
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from the Texas counties in the area. Although the black leaders of the insurrection plan 
were more severely punished, having been hanged, this incident demonstrates the 
connections that Euro-Americans made between rebellious Mexican Americans and 
African Americans breaking out of bondage as a threat to a world in which Euro-
Americans were willing to exert their power and privilege to maintain their status as the 
dominant class.78  
With the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, however, came the promise of 
U.S. citizenship to Mexican nationals living within the ceded territory. Then, the loss of 
the Civil War in 1865 and the subsequent adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 
brought suffrage for African Americans. For Texas—the bridge between the South and 
the Southwest—it meant confronting claims to the rights of citizenship from groups of 
racial others that white Texans had spent years suppressing. At the point when the United 
States adopted the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, only white individuals were eligible for 
citizenship status, while Americans had typically thought of Mexicans as mixed-race 
peoples of European and American indigenous heritage, and therefore ineligible for 
citizenship.79 Seemingly, the treaty exercised the power to reconstruct race: if the treaty 
promised eligibility for citizenship to Mexican residents in the territory, and only white 
people could become citizens, the mandate suggested that Mexicans were to be 
considered white. In practice, however, general citizenship laws regarding racial 
requirements denied naturalization to Mexicans, even those under the jurisdiction of the 
                                               
78 Galveston Daily News, September 11, 1856; see Kelley, 101.  
79 George A. Martinez, “The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican Americans and Whiteness,” 
Harvard Latino Law Review 2 (Fall 1997): 321-347.  
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treaty; they were “white by treaty,” but nonwhite “in practice.”80 In the decades to follow, 
large numbers of Mexican Americans remained completely disenfranchised due to their 
perceived mixed—primarily Indian, sometimes African—heritage, resulting in multiple 
manifestations of courtroom discrimination.81 This immutable racial status also 
discouraged Mexican Americans from attempting to attain formal citizenship given the 
pervasive belief that the dominant class would not alter their discriminatory treatment of 
Mexican Americans simply due to a change in citizenship status.82  
Subsequently, backlash toward black suffrage eventually resulted in the end of 
Reconstruction and the rise of voter intimidation and laws and policies meant to suppress 
black votes. Working in tandem with black disenfranchisement was the Black Codes, “an 
array of interlocking laws essentially intended to criminalize black life.”83 And, by the 
1920s, when government officials, employers, and labor organizations contemplated the 
restriction of Mexican immigration, considering the nature of the Mexican labor force in 
the United States, they compared and contrasted it with slavery and Mexicans with black 
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slaves. One work condition for Mexicans certainly mirrored the black experience at the 
end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century: Mexicans submitted 
to coercive labor contracts under the fear of facing jail and fines otherwise. Not only did 
state and local law enforcement treat breach of contract as a criminal offense, employers 
also worked with sheriffs to charge Mexican workers for vagrancy and other petty 
crimes—like those covered by the Black Codes—only to be turned back to their 
employers to work off the fines. Employers even turned the work place into a police state 
by hiring armed guards.84 Outside of the workplace, the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century in California brought about the policing and punishment of male 
migrant social behavior by constructing laws around racially-biased designations of 
“degeneracy, normalcy, and amorality,” including vagrancy and sexual conduct laws, 
which also reflected the Black Codes of the South.85  
Ultimately, these histories underscore the central argument of Michelle 
Alexander’s work; that is, mass incarceration is the new Jim Crow. But in the era of Jim 
Crow, states also applied Jim Crow-like practices in light of large and growing Mexican 
populations. Furthermore, this period is most notorious for an extralegal form of justice: 
the epidemic of African American lynchings in the South. In this same period, Latinos in 
the Southwest experienced a wave of lynchings as well. From the end of Reconstruction 
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in 1877 to 1950, over 4,000 African Americans were lynched in the South.86 From the 
U.S.-Mexican War in 1846 to 1925, nearly 600 Mexicans and Mexican Americans were 
lynched in the Southwest.87 While the timelines differ for these estimates, the causes, 
methods, and impact of these waves of violence demonstrate that they were part of the 
same campaign to punish and control the racial others in the midst of the dominant class.  
For one, it should be noted that there was a much larger population in the South than in 
the Southwest in those years. Taking 1900 as a snapshot, 9 percent of the U.S. population 
lived in the Southwest in 1900, compared to 32 percent who lived in the South.88 
However, the racial composition of the South and the Southwest also differed in that 
African Americans made up 32 percent of the Southern population in 1900, while 
Mexicans and Mexican Americans likely made up just 6 percent of the population in  
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the Southwest in the same year.89 Of course, Texas is considered part of the South and the 
Southwest. Consequently, it is a region where the lynching campaigns against 
Mexicans/Mexican Americans and African Americans overlapped both in time and 
geography.  
Using the 1900 population estimates along with the total number of lynchings, 
there were 21 lynchings of African Americans per 100,000 people in the South and 10 
lynchings of Mexicans/Mexican Americans per 100,000 people in the Southwest, so 
lynchings in the South were more prevalent than in the Southwest. However, there were 
61 African American lynchings per 100,000 African Americans in the South and 146 
Mexican lynchings per 100,000 Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the Southwest. 
That is not to say that one campaign of violence was more significant than the other, but 
that both campaigns pervaded the lives of each group in different and yet similar ways. 
And as historians William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb note, “The lynchings of 
Mexicans not only occurred in areas where there was a fully operating legal system but 
often involved the active collusion of law officers themselves.”90 It follows that both 
Mexicans and African Americans developed adversarial relationships with the dominant 
class as well as with U.S. systems of law and justice in the decades to follow.  
This shared criminalization of African American and Latino communities in the 
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Southwest continued into the 1940s and was exemplified by the so-called Zoot Suit Riots 
in Los Angeles.  
In June of 1943, hundreds of servicemen launched attacks across the city of Los 
Angeles, targeting ethnic—primarily Mexican—youth dressed in the countercultural garb 
of the zoot suit, in retaliation for supposed advances zoot suitors made on white women. 
Historians have come to the consensus that the servicemen acted out of frustration over 
the war and the different concept of masculinity that the zoot suit culture embraced. 
However, even though ethnic youth were the victims of the riots—with young men being 
dragged out of buildings and into the street, beaten, and stripped of their clothing, and 
young women being raped—police arrested and booked hundreds of the victimized, 
ethnic youth, while quickly releasing the servicemen that they had taken into custody. 
Meanwhile, the mainstream media framed the conflict with similar biases.91 
Even before the riots, the Hearst newspapers and Los Angeles Times demeaned 
and criminalized zooters. Sleepy Lagoon appellate attorney Carey McWilliams 
maintained that the Hearst publications “incited campaigns against the Mexicans, 
promoted police raids, and generally sought to ignite clashes between racial groups.”92 
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For instance, the Los Angeles Times declared that “the ‘zoot suit’ [had become] a badge 
of delinquency.” In the same article, the reporter claimed that language was a “serious 
factor of delinquency” and that “[foreign-born] parents… lack control over their 
offspring.”93 In response to the riots, the newspaper proclaimed that servicemen had 
taught the “gamin dandies” a “moral lesson.”94 It also claimed that Navy men had been 
“taunted” and acted in “self-defense” which shifted the blame to the youth, while also 
noting that of the arrested and booked 200 youths, “only a few of them [were] in zoot 
suits.”95 Indeed, in the wave of violence against zooters, all ethnic youth became subject 
to the violence and prone to the criminalization suffered by the zooters.  
While the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors ignored the issue of race as a 
factor in the riots, the ethnic newspapers in Los Angeles and throughout the country 
responded. However, the oldest African American newspaper in Los Angeles, California 
Eagle, advocated on behalf of the youth, while La Opinión, a Spanish-language 
publication serving the Mexican American community, simply regurgitated the narrative 
espoused by the Times. The Eagle pronounced that it was wrong for anyone to interpret 
the zoot suit as signifying criminality.96 It also continuously emphasized that the victims 
of the riots were Mexican Americans. La Opinión, on the other hand, placed the blame on 
the zooters, claiming that they had triggered the attacks of the serviceman on the entire 
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Mexican American community, continuously referring to the “problem” being the 
zooters.97 Ultimately, La Opinión was far less critical of the military and the racial 
motivations of the attackers than was the Eagle, which condemned the armed forces, the 
police, and the local government for their roles in and responses to the riots.98 A grocery 
store that advertised with the California Eagle went so far as to use a full-page 
announcement to condemn the Hearst publications, the police force, and the servicemen 
for their parts in the “terror campaign against the Mexican minority” in Los Angeles. The 
advertisement made demands and suggestions for what must be done, explaining, 
“Because we in [t]he Negro community are more unified and have greater political 
power, we must lead in the demand for full police protection of the Mexican community 
in Los Angeles.”99 
The African American community made it evident that they saw the role that race 
played in the attacks. In fact, the Eagle ran a front-page headline, “Cops Try to Divide 
Negro, Mexican Youth,” alleging that the Los Angeles police were attempting to halt any 
collaboration between the two groups.100 Meanwhile, some members of the Mexican 
American community still relied on their claim to whiteness, rather than admitting that 
the conflict between the youth and law enforcement resulted from them being seen as 
racial others. The Eagle went on in their campaign for justice, offering an eight-point list 
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of resolutions for Mexican youth. The paper also attributed the troubles experienced by 
ethnic youth to the unacceptable slum conditions in which city officials allowed them to 
live.101 Not only is the foresight of the California Eagle notable, so too is the African 
American newspaper’s initiative to demand justice on behalf of the Mexican American 
community.   
For the next several decades black and Mexican communities from Texas to 
California confronted many of the same social ills, from housing and job discrimination 
to unequal, segregated schooling.102 While figures like Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, 
and Sal Castro recognized the racially-based, unequal treatment of Mexican workers and 
students, many other Mexican leaders, organizations, and community members, 
especially in Texas, clung to a claim to whiteness, to their European heritage, and to the 
ability of some members being light-skinned enough and speaking English well enough 
to pass for white.103  The Texas-based League of United Latin American Citizens 
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(LULAC), for instance, strongly advocated for assimilation, Americanization, and the use 
of English among Mexican Americans, in the hopes to change their organization name 
from “Latin American” to “Loyal American” and for the population whose rights they 
defended to move past the classification “as a peculiar type of American.”104 Members 
attempted to “set the racial record straight,” claiming that Mexican Americans were “the 
first white race to inhabit this vast empire of ours” and were “not only a part and parcel 
but as well the sum and substance of the white race.”105 Over time, the claim to whiteness 
began to disintegrate, especially for younger generations. 
By 1970, Los Angeles Times reporter, Ruben Salazar, who was known for 
covering the Chicano rights movement in Los Angeles, explained, “Faced with an 
identity crisis, many Mexican-Americans—especially the young who were excited by 
black militancy—decided they had been misled by the Mexican establishment into 
apathetic confusion… Though counted as ‘white’ by the Bureau of Census, Mexican-
Americans were never really thought of as such.” Salazar, however, also echoed the 
frustration that had been suggested by the California Eagle nearly three decades earlier, 
writing “blacks, scarred by the bitter and sometimes bloody struggle for equality, 
consider Mexican-Americans or Chicanos as Johnnies-come-lately who should follow 
black leadership until Chicanos earn their spurs… Negroes scoff that Mexican-Americans 
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have not carried their share of the burden in the civil rights movement.”106 Just six 
months after writing these words, a sheriff’s deputy fired a tear-gas canister that fatally 
struck Salazar at the bar in which he was seeking refuge from the Chicano antiwar protest 
that he was covering.107 Indeed, both black and Latino groups came into violent conflict 
with police in their struggles for civil rights leading up to and at the onset of the rise of 
mass incarceration, not only in California, but across the country. In fact, after viewing 
one of his 1968 presidential campaign advertisements on crime waves, Richard Nixon 
reportedly commented that the television ad “hits it right on the nose. It’s all about those 
damn Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there.”108 Then, with the turn toward street crime in 
poor neighborhoods, the lives of black and Latino youth continued to be criminalized.  
In 1989, the Chicago Tribune ran a story, “This drug crackdown targets color,” 
noting that the drug problem was “popularly linked to poor blacks and Hispanics,” not 
because minorities used illegal drugs at higher rates than the general population, but 
because housing discrimination resulted in concentrated poverty, and poverty correlates 
with more visible crime activity, including violent acts.109 To black leaders, the concerted 
effort to take down low-level drug dealers seemed like a conspiracy. Outspoken, Harlem 
priest, Reverend Lawrence Lucas stated, “white, middle-class Americans are the ones 
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who make the money on the billions spent on law enforcement necessary to keep feeding 
black and Hispanic youths through the jail mill.”110 The broken windows theory, which 
governed the lives of ethnic youth in the 1980s and 1990s, mirrored the Black Codes that 
trapped and locked away black men during Jim Crow and Latinos living under a similar 
justice system during the same period.111 Sociologist Victor M. Rios followed the lives of 
young black and Latino men in Oakland, California, as a case study and argued that the 
individuals he observed and interviewed have been entrapped in a perpetual system of 
“hypercriminalization and punishment” in their everyday lives from a very young age, 
which resulted in them resorting to crime and violence as some of the only resources they 
had to feel “dignity and empowerment.”112 This case study exemplified a concern shared 
in cities across the country as police actions to quash gang activity looked toward the 
urban ghettoes that not only housed African Americans, but growing numbers of a Latino 
underclass.  
While some immigration scholars have argued that the Mexican experience of 
recent decades mirrors the experiences of southern and eastern Europeans in the early 
twentieth century, the history herein supports the claim of sociologists Alejandro Portes 
and Rubén Rumbaut, who argue that the Mexican experience is instead analogous to that 
of African Americans: they are an “internally colonized” group, having been racialized as 
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permanently nonwhite, subject to discrimination and excluded from social upward 
mobility.113 Furthermore, the numbers in the Southwest deceive by counting the 
punishment of Latinos in prison separately from the punishment of deportation, which 
consists of a banished population in the millions, along with their torn-apart families, 
rising to what could be argued as comparable to the experiences of black communities 
and the consequences of U.S. incarceration.114  
Compounded Consequences: Being a Black Latino Immigrant 
Nearly half (45 percent) of all immigrants in the United States are from Latin 
America, and a little over a third (34 percent) of all Latinos in the United States are 
immigrants.115 Thus, the criminalization of immigrants may have an extensive impact on 
the entire Latino community, but those Latino immigrants who are black or are perceived 
as black may have a greater chance of coming into contact with the criminal justice 
system by virtue of their dark skin and implicit bias among law enforcement agents. As 
discussed in the second chapter, markers of foreignness can cause Latinos to come into 
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contact with the criminal justice system, and as this chapter has demonstrated, so too can 
black skin. While Latino citizens and immigrants may face the same criminalization for 
the markers of foreignness that they share, the latter group faces the collateral 
consequence of possible deportation. Similarly, black citizens and immigrants may both 
undergo racial profiling as a result of colorism, but an arrest for black immigrants  can 
equate to deportation for those who lack U.S. citizenship, even without a charge for the 
cause behind the initial arrest.  
Indeed, “biases could shape whether an officer decides to stop an individual for 
questioning in the first place, elects to interrogate briefly or at length, decides to frisk the 
individual, and concludes the encounter with an arrest versus a warning.” 116 And studies 
show that the perceived public safety threat of black individuals, regardless of citizenship 
status, render them vulnerable to the consequences of these biases. Legal scholar, Devon 
W. Carbado writes: 
It’s been almost two years since I pledged allegiance to the United States—
that is to say, became an American… Yet, I became a black American long 
before I acquired American citizenship… There was nothing I could do to 
prevent myself from becoming a black American—and more particularly, a 
black American male… Like many black Americans, I developed the ability 
to cope with, manage, and sometimes even normalize micro-aggressive 
racial encounters… I have not, however, been able to normalize my 
experiences with the police.117  
                                               
116 Jerry Kang et al., “Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,” UCLA Law Review 59 (2012): 1124-1186, 
citing Devon W. Carbado, “(E)racing the Fourth Amendment,” Michigan Law Review 100, no. 5 
(2002): 946-1044. 
117 Carbado, “(E)racing the Fourth Amendment;” In this passage, Carbado cites Kenneth L. Karst, 
Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1991), among many other works on black racial identity and the law. For more on black 
immigrants experiences in relation to race and ethnicity, see Marilyn Halter, Between Race and 
Ethnicity: Cape Verdean Immigrants, 1860-1965 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993) and 
Irma Watkins-Owens, Blood Relations: Caribbean Immigrants and the Harlem Community, 
1900-1930 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996). 
 163 
 
In this regard, black immigrants, or immigrants appearing to be black, enter the 
system under the same circumstances as African Americans. They will, however, likely 
face different, and perhaps graver, consequences following arrest. And, like non-black 
Latino immigrants, black immigrants’ markers of foreignness can call their legality and 
respect for the law into question, leading authorities not only to see them as a public 
threat and detain them, but to investigate their citizenship status and report them to 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In fact, the Dominican Republic, the Latin 
American country whose immigrants are most likely to identify as black, has the highest 
percentage (81 percent) of the deportees it receives marked as criminal removals among 
the top deportee-receiving nations. Meanwhile, the other top five receiving countries—all 
Latin American as well—average 38 percent criminal removals among their total 
deported populations (see Table 3.4).118  
Table 3.4: Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Country of Nationality: 
Fiscal Year 2015, Top Deportee Receiving Nations 





Mexico 242,456 136,263 106,193 44% 
Guatemala 33,233 22,755 10,478 32% 
El Salvador 21,471 14,356 7,115 33% 
Honduras 20,204 11,678 8,526 42% 
Dominican Republic 1,865 353 1,512 81% 
Source: United States Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
2015.” 
 
Of course, whether black or non-black, Latino immigrants share a common 
consequence with (other) black immigrants as a result of their incarceration. Unlike other 
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inmates, who will probably encounter a difficult reentry in the United States, non-citizen 
inmates of all races and skin colors face the possibility of deportation to countries where 
opportunities may be scarcer than in the United States, regardless of a criminal record.119 
And yet, black Latino deportees also return to countries with legacies and active systems 
of colorism. These dynamics demonstrate that mass incarceration and increased 
deportation are not mutually exclusive, but intertwined and complementary systems of 
control that affect black and Latino communities, black Latino individuals included. 
Whom these systems of control cannot deport, they incarcerate. 
Conclusion 
Discussions of U.S. mass incarceration tend to frame the intertwined fates of 
black and Latino communities as mutually exclusive groups in a post-1965 context, 
acknowledging the legacy of criminalization of African Americans going back to the 
days of slavery and treating the latter group as collateral damage for entering the national 
scene at an inopportune time.120 Indeed, only in 1970 was “Hispanic” featured for the 
first time on a U.S. Census form, and in the decades to follow, the national visibility of 
Hispanics as a pan-ethnic group, along with the circumstances under which they lived, 
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increased both in the news and in popular culture.121 For the most part, post-1965 
discourses distinguish Latinos and African Americans as two communities facing similar 
plights.  
Dr. Martin Luther King. Jr. recognized the common struggle between African 
Americans and Latinos as evidenced in his public support of and private messages to 
Cesar Chavez, stating, “My colleagues and I commend you for your bravery, salute you 
for your indefatigable work against poverty and injustice, and pray for your health and 
your continuing service as one of the outstanding men in America,” while still describing 
the communities they served as “your people and ours”—two separate groups.122 
Furthermore, when King condemned police brutality against Puerto Ricans, writing, “the 
incidents of social eruption which occurred in Chicago’s predominantly Puerto Rican 
neighborhood are indicative of the flagrant, gross callousness exhibited by law 
enforcement officials… Those who praise the efficient work of riot-control trained 
policemen and dogs should also be vocal in their denouncement of those city agencies 
which ignore dangerous social conditions,” he alluded to the police violence that African 
Americans also endured and the devastating social conditions in which they too lived.123 
In this paradigm, scholarly and political dialogues addressed the need to resolve urban 
poverty and discrimination as an issue affecting “the Negro and other deprived ethnic 
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123 Telegram to MLK Regarding Social Eruption in Chicago, June 14, 1966 (The King Center 
Digital Archives).  
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groups such as Puerto Ricans and Mexicans,” as well.124 And on the other side of the 
political spectrum, black and Latino communities co-starred in the imagery and narratives 
of developing criminality.    
As noted earlier in the chapter, the Zoot Suit Riots placed ethnic youth—Latino, 
African American, and Asian as well—in the same category of racialized delinquency. 
Los Angeles set the stage for other episodes of mutual strife among black and Latino 
communities. After the Zoot Suit Riots, the Watts Riots of 1965 followed, which set the 
African American community against local law enforcement in response to an account of 
police brutality of a black motorist. And although the tension between Mexican 
Americans and African Americans had been festering due to disputes over the 
distribution of public resources at the time, as historian Gerald Horne argued, “there is 
little to question that Watts 1965 had a catalytic impact on Mexican-American militancy 
and the emergence of the Chicano movement.”125  
The Watts Riots also acted as a precursor to the L.A. riots of 1992. While the L.A. 
riots resulted from the outrage among the African American community in reaction to the 
acquittal of police officers who had been filmed brutally beating Rodney King, a young 
black male, Latinos accounted for over half of the 11,000 arrests from the riots.126 And 
even in more recent years, Latinos have indicated that they feel that they have more in 
                                               
124 Letter to MLK from Moynihan about Invitation to Conference, March 27, 1967 (The King 
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125 Gerald Horne, Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and The 1960s (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1995).  
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common with African Americans than with white Americans in terms of job 
opportunities, educational attainment, income, government services, political power and 
representation, and the interdependency of their abilities to “do well.”127 This sentiment, 
like experiences with the law, vary by ethnic group, with Puerto Ricans indicating the 
highest rates of a sense of commonality with African Americans, compared to other large 
population Latino groups, including Mexicans, Dominicans, Cubans, and Salvadorans.128  
Indeed, since 1965, with the compounded factors of a rise in immigration, the 
growing visibility of Latinos in the news and popular culture, and the prevalence of 
structural disadvantage among Latinos, the shared plight of black and Latino 
communities seems obvious. These communities have witnessed and undergone parallel, 
if not joint, episodes of disproportionate surveillance and punishment. But this shared 
experience has historical roots that criminologists often overlook. First, these types of 
shared experiences go back to the nineteenth century, as discussed in this chapter. 
Secondly, the consideration of blackness as a negative in the racial makeup of Latinos 
has its historical roots as well, going back to the Spanish colonies of Latin America.  
Mexico, along with other Spanish colonies, dispossessed its people with black 
heritage even as the use of slavery waned. Then, as independent nations, Latin American 
countries struggled through their own race relations that placed the darkest members of 
their societies at the bottom of the social strata. And while the U.S. eyed the Americas in 
                                               
127 Luis R. Fraga, et al., Latino National Survey (LNS) (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2006).  
128 Ibid.; Sixty-six percent of Puerto Ricans surveyed indicated that they had “Some” or a “A Lot” 
in common with African Americans, compared to 52 percent of all Latinos surveyed, 54 percent 
of Dominicans, 51 percent of Mexicans, 22 percent of Cubans and Salvadorans.  
 168 
realizing Manifest Destiny, white lawmakers questioned and contemplated the blackness 
among Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans as an unwanted element among its 
citizenry. News outlets framed the debate by asking, “Shall we buy a new African 
state?”129 With the annexation of Texas and other Mexican territories, laws had to 
reconcile racial definitions for peoples that had been promised citizenry but who had also 
commonly been considered racial mongrels.  
As a result, the complicated descriptions that police or judges prescribed 
individuals in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century spoke to the 
convoluted racial understandings of Latinos at the time. In the 1890s, the Galveston Daily 
News provided descriptions for suspects, sometimes noting that the person of interest was 
a “Mexican-looking negro.”130 In 1903 and 1908, the Oakland Tribune detailed incidents 
of robbery in which the suspects had already been arrested, describing the individuals as 
“a negro or a Mexican.”131 Meanwhile, courtrooms also wavered on their assessments of 
race among individuals of Latin American heritage given assumptions of African 
ancestry. The 1942 case of Inland Steel Company v. Barcena in Indiana set a precedent in 
defining Latino racial makeup, stating, “We cannot adopt the contention of the appellant 
that the word ‘Mexican’ should necessarily be construed to be a white person from that 
country.”132 As a result of the ruling, an African American widow was able to claim the 
workmen’s compensation owed to her deceased husband, a Mexican immigrant. In other 
                                               
129 The Evening Telegraph (Philadelphia, PA), December 17, 1867, republishing an article from 
the New York World.  
130 Galveston Daily News, October 30, 1895 and August 2, 1896. 
131 Oakland Tribune, May 30, 1903 and March 27, 1908.  
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words, the court suggested that the deceased husband, a Mexican, potentially had African 
ancestry, which would make him non-white and his marriage to a black woman legal. 
Ultimately, anti-miscegenation laws applied to Latinos in complicated ways depending 
on who they tried to marry. In any case, these laws criminalized the private lives and 
personal choices of Latinos seen as black.  
For over a century before the rise of mass incarceration, law and practice 
presumed that Latinos were not “purely” white, and were potentially black and to be 
treated accordingly. In response, many Latinos have rejected blackness. But even when 
Latinos have identified as mixed, multiracial, or white, and not as black alone, many still 
recognize that others see them as black, along with all of that category’s negative 
connotations. Other Latinos, however, have imitated black strategies of resistance and 
also reclaimed blackness. As the Latino population has grown, its composition has 
changed in a variety of ways, and both the numbers and the profile of that group has 
empowered Latinos to articulate their identities in ways that challenge the black-white 
dichotomies with racial definitions as stringent as the one-drop rule that have been in 
place in the United States since the introduction of slavery.  
Indeed, the growth of the Latino population, both in terms of post-1965 
immigration and U.S. births, made it the fastest-growing demographic and the driver of 
over half of all U.S. population growth in the second half of the twentieth century.133 
Although the numbers of Latinos in the general population steadily increased alongside 
the rise of the law-and-order politician, the targeting of street crime, the War on Drugs, 
                                               
133 Richard Fry, Latino Settlement in the New Century (Pew Research Center, 2008).   
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the use of the broken windows theory in policing, the implementation of mandatory 
minimums and three-strikes policies, and the overall rise of mass incarceration, the 
numbers of Latinos affected by the criminal justice system have always faced the issue of 
the “Latino data gap” as a result of Latino racial categorization having been fraught with 
confusion for over a century before “Hispanic” became a formally-recognized identity.134 
Ultimately, U.S. systems of racial cataloging have obscured the numbers of 
people treated as racial others due to their Latin American backgrounds in the many 
decades prior to the federal adoption of the “Hispanic” category. People of Latin 
American heritage have lived in U.S. governed lands in significant numbers since the 
Treaty of Guadalupe in 1848. Since that time, mainstream American society has wavered 
in the words and definitions to classify populations from Spanish-speaking countries, 
often resorting to an analysis of the population’s or a given individual’s blackness. 
Indeed, traces of blackness, as in perceived African ancestry or non-white blood, have 
often been cited among Latin American persons and communities. As a result, the 
historical treatment of Latinos is like that of African Americans, and also is that of 
African Americans, especially when it comes to surveillance, criminalization, 
punishment, and ultimate disenfranchisement.  
 
                                               
134 See Juan Cartagena, “Populous, Multi-Racial and Ignored: Latinos And Police Shootings,” 
Huffington Post, July 13, 2016.  
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Chapter Four – Latino Indianism 
In the wake of the U.S.-Mexican War, Mexican residents of the newly annexed 
Texas territory found themselves simultaneously included in and excluded from U.S. 
citizenry. Within the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was a complicated promise of U.S. 
naturalization to Mexicans living in the ceded territories. As legal scholar George A. 
Martinez notes, citizenship status at the time was reserved for whites, while Mexicans 
had typically been thought of as mixed-race peoples of European and American 
indigenous heritage, and therefore ineligible for citizenship.1 Seemingly, the treaty 
exercised the power to reconstruct race; if Mexican residents in the territory were 
promised eligibility for citizenship, and only white people could become citizens, the 
mandate suggested that Mexicans were to be considered white, or at least in equal 
standing with white citizens. In practice, however, many states’ citizenship laws 
regarding racial requirements denied naturalization to Mexicans, even those under the 
jurisdiction of the treaty. In the decades to follow, large numbers of Mexican Americans 
remained completely disenfranchised due to their perceived Indian heritage, resulting in 
multiple manifestations of courtroom discrimination.2  
This immutable racial status also discouraged Mexican Americans from 
attempting to attain formal citizenship given the strong belief that their treatment by the 
dominant class would be unaltered. But with the Chicano Rights Movement of the 1960s 
                                               
1 George A. Martinez, “The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican Americans and Whiteness,” 
Harvard Latino Law Review 2 (Fall 1997). 
2 Ibid. Also see Martha Menchaca, “Chicano Indianism: A Historical Account of Racial 
Repression in the United States,” American Ethnologist 20, no. 3 (August 1993): 583-603.  
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and 1970s, the Latino-as-Indian concept was reappropriated as a form of resistance to 
social exile, as Mexicans promoted the idea that they had not immigrated to the United 
States, but had returned to the land of their ancestors.3 This claim to a sort of self-
determination and autonomy reverberated in other Latino groups seeking social justice 
and political rights, and it also stood in direct opposition to the reality of police 
governance over Latino neighborhoods at the time.4  
In fact, as Indianism played an important role in the rhetoric of the Chicano 
Rights Movement, so too did Indian (e.g., Aztec) symbolism in Latino street and prison 
gang imagery. This reclamation of Amerindian heritage echoed between prison cells and 
Latino neighborhoods. And by the 2010 U.S. Census, a new trend appeared: more people 
who identified ethnically as Hispanic indicated that they were racially Native American 
Indian than ever before, representing a movement to identify as a non-black and non-
white racial other, while also signifying a unique perspective of both empowerment and 
dispossession.  
In 1982, sociologist Samuel J. Surace argued that many scholars in various 
disciplines had made the case that Mexicans had long been identified as Indians, but 
typically lacked documentation and “theoretical perspective.”5 In his own work to explain 
                                               
3 This concept of “Aztlán” will be further discussed in the dissertation. For more on the Chicano 
Rights Movement, see F. Arturo Rosales, Chicano! The History of the Mexican American Civil 
Rights Movement (Houston, TX: Arte Público Press, 1996).  
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Charles F. Marden and Gladys Meyer, Minorities in American Society, 2nd ed. (New York: 
American Book, 1962), 122; Nancie L. Gonzalez, The Spanish Americans of New Mexico 
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the achievement gap between Mexicans and other ethnic groups, Surace argued that 
Mexicans had been severely discriminated against due to their associations with Indians. 
Like Surace, my argument shall be guided by the following criteria: “the data must (1) 
cover a range of time at least equal to the experience of one generation, (2) be derived 
from a variety of interconnected social contexts, and (3) be highlighted or intensified in 
situations of conflict and confrontation.”6 In this fourth chapter, I will explore the 
episodes in which Indianism has informed the racial status of Latinos in the United States 
and their experience in the criminal justice system, not just in terms of discrimination, but 
also Latino agency.  
Citing Indigeneity to Discriminate 
Mexicans introduced universal suffrage upon gaining independence from Spain in 
1821, and therefore Mexicans of Indian ancestry were then considered full citizens, even 
as Mexicans faced conflicts with Native American tribes in the country’s Northern 
frontier.  But when the U.S.-Mexican War ended in 1848, Mexicans were annexed into a 
society that was hostile toward and exclusionary of Native Americans, not only based on 
their allegiance to tribal governance, but because of statutes on the eligibility for 
citizenship based on race. As a result, white legislators in the new U.S. states and 
territories had to confront a potential contradiction between their foreign and domestic 
                                               
(University of California at Los Angeles, Mexican-American Study Project, 1967), 20-21; 
Surace’s full synopsis appears in Leo Grebler, Joan W. Moore, and Ralph Guzman, The Mexican 
American People (New York: Free Press, 1970): 44-45, 57-58. 
6 Surace, 320-321. 
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strategies for dealing with different types of populations. The Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, which officially ended the U.S.-Mexican War, stated: 
Those who shall prefer to remain in the said territories may either retain the 
title and rights of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United 
States… those who shall remain in the said territories after the expiration of 
that year, without having declared their intention to retain the character of 
Mexicans, shall be considered to have elected to become citizens of the 
United States… The Mexicans who, in the territories aforesaid, shall not 
preserve the character of citizens of the Mexican Republic… shall be 
incorporated into the Union of the United States and be admitted at the 
proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States) to the 
enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States, according to the 
principles of the Constitution; and in the mean time, shall be maintained and 
protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and secured in 
the free exercise of their religion without restriction.7 
 
While this language may have made citizenship seem open to any Mexican within 
the ceded territory regardless of ancestry, U.S. citizenship guidelines at the time 
complicated the implementation of this promise. States had jurisdiction to determine 
citizenship eligibility, and the legislators in the Southwest endorsed policies that excluded 
Indians and other racial minorities from becoming citizens, which following the signing 
of the treaty, were used as a basis for denying citizenship to Mexicans of Indian ancestry, 
even if partial.8 Historian Martha Menchaca noted that, in the decades following the 
treaty, government officials in many cases argued that Mexicans should be granted the 
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same legal status as detribalized American Indians, who were largely prohibited from 
becoming a U.S. citizen and therefore excluded from political and civil rights and 
protections.9 Extending this exclusion, states in the Southwest passed new legislation 
following the ratification of the treaty that further restricted citizenship based on race, 
affecting how the status of Mexicans was to be interpreted.10 That is, Mexicans of Indian 
ancestry, whether full or partial, faced the same fate as other American Indians—with 
infringements on rights ranging from voting and holding office to interracial marriage 
with white women, as well as more extreme discrimination such as being forced into debt 
peonage and residence on reservations.11  
In response, to assert their rights in the years that followed the U.S.-Mexican War, 
Mexicans in the United States instead argued that the treaty should have granted 
citizenship to all residents of the territory that was formerly Mexico, regardless of their 
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Joseph 1876, United States v. Lucero 1869, and United States v. Santistevan 1874. See 
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race, based on international principle.12 But as anti-Indian treatment became increasingly 
evident, Mexicans relied on a different argument in which they claimed whiteness. In the 
antebellum United States, whiteness was clearly distinguished as carrying privileges, 
especially the benefit of owning property rather than being property. After the Civil War, 
whiteness still connoted economic advantage, social status, and political access and 
protections in a highly apparent racial caste system. It made sense then that Mexicans 
would draw on their acknowledged partial European ancestry to pass as white.13 In this 
“ambiguous legal position,” Mexicans in the United States contemplated how their Indian 
heritage subjected them to legal discrimination, while their Spanish background entitled 
them to legal protections and potential social and economic upward mobility.14  
Even before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed, the controversy over 
rights of Mexicans within the boundaries of the United States came into question due to 
their presumed Indian ancestry. In 1845, delegates met for the Texas Convention to 
debate the tenets of the state constitution. The interpretation of Mexicans’ race became a 
significantly contested issue when the delegates discussed voting eligibility and 
legislature representation. These debates exemplified the conflict between popular and 
legal understandings of the race of Mexicans and the implications of their Indian 
ancestry.15 In terms of voting, the original proposed language for the constitution 
                                               
12 Menchaca, 584; Kansas. 
13 Martinez, 322-323; Also see Cheryl Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” Harvard Law Review 106 
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included the word “white” to describe individuals’ eligibility to vote. Some delegates 
insisted that “white” be stricken from the language, explaining that the word would be 
subject to discretion and would raise the question of whether Mexicans should be 
considered white. They posited that lawyers may have classified Mexicans as white for 
legal purposes, but that election judges—those with a common understanding of race—
would not see Mexicans as white.  
José Antonio Navarro, the only delegate of Mexican ancestry at the convention, 
took on the responsibility of protecting the civil and political rights of fellow Tejanos, 
also argued to remove “white,” suggesting that ineligibility applied to Africans and 
descendants of Africans, while Mexicans were entitled to the vote. While Navarro 
distinguished Mexicans from black Texans—at a time when slavery was being 
practiced—and instead situated them politically under the protections of white 
Americans, he evidently understood the precarity of specifying that rights belonged to 
“whites,” when his fellow Texans, politicians or otherwise, equated Mexicans with 
Indians.16  
Francis Moore of Harris County further expressed the perception of Mexicans 
primarily as Indians when the delegates raised the question of representation. Moore, a 
proponent of slavery, addressed Navarro specifically and explained that he welcomed the 
immigration of anyone of the “Caucasian race,” Spanish and Norwegians alike, as 
peoples able to “enjoy the blessings of our institutions.” On the other hand, Moore said 
                                               
16 Ibid. For more on Navarro, see “José Antonio Navarro,” Giants of Texas History, 
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/treasures/giants/navarro/navarro-01.html. 
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he feared “hordes of Mexican Indians,” who he saw as “the descendants of that degraded 
and despicable race which Cortez conquered” and ultimately unworthy of white 
institutions.17  
At the California Constitutional Convention in 1849, delegates engaged in similar 
debates regarding the rights of Mexicans living in the state prior to and following the war. 
The Committee on the Constitution proposed the language “every white male citizen of 
the United States, of the age of twenty-one years…” to describe those eligible for 
suffrage in the state. Edward Gilbert of San Francisco moved to adjust the text to “every 
white male citizen of the United States and every male citizen of Mexico, of the age of 
twenty-one years…” in order to include Mexicans who were eligible to become U.S. 
citizens by virtue of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In suggesting this change, Gilbert 
implied that not all Mexicans would be considered white. Gilbert’s fellow delegates then 
proceeded to question whether all Mexicans should be eligible for U.S. citizenship, 
entitling men over 21 years of age to suffrage.18  
Inevitably, the delegates debated the intentions of the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo and transferability of Mexican citizenship to U.S. citizenship, with the 
underlying issue being the general presumption that the vast majority of Mexicans 
consisted of people with Indian ancestry. Charles T. Botts of Monterey insisted that the 
wording should be “every white male citizen of Mexico” given that only white males 
                                               
17 Weeks, Debates, 235-236. For a summary of the debates, see Paul Schuster Taylor, An 
American-Mexican Frontier, Nueces County, Texas (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1934), 230-240. 
18 J. Ross Browne, Report of the debates of the Convention of California, on the formation of the 
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were eligible for suffrage in the United States. Myron Norton of San Francisco suggested 
that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo superseded the condition of whiteness for suffrage. 
José de la Guerra y Noriega, an immigrant from Spain to Mexico who used a translator at 
the convention and the father of Pablo de la Guerra who was serving as the delegate from 
Santa Barbara, at first suggested that Mexicans may have had dark skin, but that should 
not have disqualified them from suffrage for “white” citizens, clarifying that the 
provision for “whiteness” was only acceptable to him if meant to exclude African races, 
but not all dark-skinned individuals. Botts replied that “white” should exclude both 
African and Indian races.  
Other delegates then questioned what rights Indians had as Mexicans—that is, if 
they were considered citizens and could vote. They also questioned the possibility of 
there being “here and there a good Indian, capable of understanding our system of 
government.” Regardless, Botts continued to insist that Indians may have been citizens of 
Mexico, but he synonymized “citizen” with “subject,” which did not necessarily mean 
that citizens had political rights to vote and be fully enfranchised. Some delegates tried to 
distinguish between “wild” and “civilized” Indians, suggesting that the latter should be 
entitled to vote.19 Nonetheless, they did not question the prevalence of Indian heritage 
among Mexican Californians; they questioned their worthiness of protections and rights 
as citizens.  
Finally, Noriega commanded the floor, lamenting that he could only express his 
point through an interpreter, and told the delegates that the classes that would be 
                                               
19 Ibid. 
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excluded from the franchise was “a point of very great importance” to him and that “he 
should be doing a very great injustice to his constituents, did he not speak on the subject.” 
Noriega had known a great many Mexican Indians through his work with Spanish 
missionaries. He lauded the accomplishments and contributions of the native Indian race 
that he had come to know well since he immigrated to Mexico from Spain as a teenager. 
Noriega put into perspective the predicament of Indians for his peers at the convention, 
arguing, “If [Indians] were not cultivated and highly civilized, it was because they had 
been ground down and made slaves of. They were intelligent and capable of receiving 
instructions, and it was the duty of the citizens to endeavor to elevate them and better 
their condition in every way, instead of seeking to sink them lower still.” While some of 
the delegates were moved by his argument, others still thought of enfranchising any 
Indians as an act that “might produce most unfortunate results and incalculable evils,” 
and they were unwilling to place themselves “on a level with the Indian or the negro.”20  
In the end, Noriega was forced to settle for “white” acting as modifier for male 
citizens eligible to vote and simply adding a provision to the end of the article on 
suffrage, “that nothing herein contained, shall be construed to prevent the Legislature, by 
a two-thirds concurrent vote, from admitting to the right of suffrage, Indians or the 
descendants of Indians, in such special cases as such a proportion of the legislative body 
may deem just and proper.”21 As a result of this settlement, in which suffrage for any 
                                               
20 Ibid.; For more on the life of José de la Guerra y Noriega, see William Henry Phillips, “Don 
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Mexican perceived to be Indian relied on the overwhelming consensus of legislators to 
deem them exceptional in deserving enfranchisement, the claims to political and civil 
rights for non-white or racially ambiguous Mexicans were easily challenged.  
In 1850, California passed a law, An Act for the Government and Protection of 
Indians, which ironically allowed for “any white person” to indenture Indians convicted 
of a crime punishable by a fine, a common practice from the enactment of the law until 
1863.22 Surace noted that Californians expressed hope that the law would be extended to 
include “greasers,” or Mexicans.23 A vagrancy law in 1855, however, did target 
“‘Greasers,’ or the issue of Spanish and Indian blood.”24 In 1877, even the citizenship 
and political rights of Pablo de la Guerra, the Santa Barbara delegate at the California 
Constitutional Convention, came into question in the landmark case of People v. de la 
Guerra, when political opponents challenged de la Guerra’s candidacy for public office 
by questioning his claim to being a U.S. citizen. But as someone of full Spanish ancestry, 
de la Guerra had never suffered from the same disenfranchisement as those Mexicans of 
Indian ancestry; after all, Californians regarded him as “a highly-educated gentleman of 
the old Castillian stock, polished and refined in manner, and with those old notions of 
honor which belonged to the grandees of his country, when they followed… Cortez in his 
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Review 14, no. 2 (1926): 83-100.  
23 Humboldt Times, February 23, 1861. Robert F. Heizer and Alan J. Almquist, The Other 
Californians: Prejudice and Discrimination Under Spain, Mexico, and the United States to 1920 
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raid upon the pagan Aztecs.”25 Nevertheless, when the California Supreme Court ruled in 
de la Guerra’s favor, declaring him a citizen, the case had the power to set a precedent for 
recognizing former Mexican nationals as U.S. citizens, but perceptions of the majority of 
Mexicans as mostly Indian still existed.26 
In 1877, Colonel Nathaniel Alston Taylor published a book on his observations 
from traveling through Texas, 2000 Miles in Texas on Horseback. The text was regarded 
as “a work outstanding among the most valuable work on Texas,” as one of few 
“valuable books of travel within the boundaries of our country,” and “a masterpiece of 
permanent value.”27 As for his encounters with Mexicans, Taylor explained that, “They 
seem to me to take much more after the Indian than the Spaniard,” and although there 
were some Mexicans of “pure Castilian blood, who are quite as white as the Americans,” 
99 percent were “dark Mexicans” that the few white Mexicans regarded as “Peons and 
Indians.”28 With Master of English Literature, Master of Science, Doctor of Philosophy, 
and a Doctor of Laws on his resume, Taylor’s work purported to carry with it a “lofty 
intellectual” weight, and his book remained highly regarded even through the 1930s.29  
Likewise, the disenfranchisement of American Indians existed as a legal fact from 
the Elk v. Wilkins Supreme Court case in 1884, which established that Indians with 
allegiance to a tribe recognized by the U.S. government were not to recognized as U.S. 
                                               
25 “Don Pablo De La Guerra: Pleasant Reminiscences of a Californian of the Old Stock,” Los 
Angeles Times, March 26, 1888. 
26 See Richard Griswold del Castillo, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990). 
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citizens, to the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which reversed the decision. While 
various policies and pieces of legislation had made exceptions for granting U.S. 
citizenship to Indians during those four decades, Ethen Anderson, a Native American, 
brought suit in 1917, arguing that he was entitled to register to vote in Lake County, 
California, after the county clerk denied him of this right based on his race.30 Anderson 
tried to use the Treaty of Queretaro (part of the Treaty of Hidalgo Guadalupe) to claim 
his right to citizenship and therefore suffrage, given that he was born to a Native 
American family who had been living in the Mexican territory ceded to the United States 
at the time of treaty. The court disregarded this claim since he had not been born in the 
territory prior to the treaty, but did grant him citizenship based on the 14th Amendment 
and the Dawes Act of 1887, which offered U.S. citizenship to American Indians provided 
they did not reside with a tribe and “had adopted the habits of civilized life.”31 The 
discretion of the Lake County Clerk, however, demonstrated that Mexicans who were 
seen as Indian were vulnerable to subjective interpretations of the various laws and 
policies that stripped Native Americans of their civil and political rights in the United 
States. 
 By the 1930s, Los Angeles law enforcement agencies began to worry about a 
“Mexican problem” with the visibility of the zoot-suiter and pachuco culture of Latino 
                                               
30 Legislation included: 1867 Treaty Provision (15 Stat. 513, vol. 2, 960.); Allotment under the 
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youth. In 1943, the Foreign Relations Bureau of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department published a “Report on Mexicans,” which was used in the infamous Sleepy 
Lagoon case to charge, convict, and sentence a group of Mexican youths on what was 
later ruled to be insufficient evidence. The author of the report, Lieutenant Ed Duran 
Ayres, provided a “biological basis” as reason to believe that Mexicans were prone to 
violence: 
When the Spaniards conquered Mexico they found an organized society 
composed of many tribes of Indians ruled over by the Aztecs who were 
given over to human sacrifice. Historians record that as many 30,000 
Indians sacrificed… in one day, their bodies… opened by stone knives and 
their hearts torn out… This total disregard for human life has always been 
universal throughout the Americas among the Indian population, which of 
course is well known to everyone… This Mexican element… knows and 
feels… a desire to use a knife or some lethal weapon… His desire is to kill. 
Or at least let blood… 32 
 
 Indeed, when the Los Angeles Police Department categorized arrests by race from 
the 1920s to the 1940s, they classified Mexicans as “red.”33 This perception among Los 
Angeles police officers of Indian ancestry playing a role in Mexican criminality persisted 
through the 1960s. William Parker, who served as the Los Angeles Chief of Police from 
1950 to 1966 and who inserted his racial bigotry into the climate of the department, 
testified to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that “the Latin population” in East Los 
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American Youth, Los Angeles, 1942; Also see David G. Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican 
Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995).  
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Angeles was “not too far removed from the wild tribes of the district of the inner 
mountains of Mexico.”34  
Reappropriating Indigeneity to Reclaim Rights 
 While Latin American countries like Mexico and the Dominican Republic had 
grasped onto indigenous identity as a legitimization in their fight for independence from 
Spain, Latinos in the Unites States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had 
taken the strategy of claiming whiteness.35 The League of United Latin American 
Citizens (LULAC), founded in 1929, became a champion of Mexican American political 
and civil rights on the basis that the Mexican Americans they represented “insist they 
belong to the white race having descended from Spanish,” while conceding that Latin 
American immigrants should learn English and assimilate to Anglo-American society.36 
                                               
34 Hearings before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, San Francisco, California, 
January 27, 1960 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1960), quoted in Joan Moore and Alfredo Cuéllar, 
Mexican Americans (1970), 92-93. Moore, a sociology professor at UC Riverside who had just 
completed a multiyear university study of Mexicans, served as the principal expert in the defense 
of the East L.A. Thirteen, community leaders and college students faced with charges related to 
their parts in organizing the L.A. school protests in 1968. For more on the East L.A. Thirteen, 
William Parker, LAPD conflicts with Chicanos in the 1960s, also see Ian F. Haney López, “Law 
Enforcement and Legal Justice,” in Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 2003); Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity; Edward 
Escobar, “The Dialectics of Repression: The Los Angeles Police Department and the Chicano 
Movement, 1968-1971,” Journal of American History 79 (March 1993); Joseph Woods, “The 
Progressives and the Police: Urban Reform and the Professionalization of the Los Angeles 
Police” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1973); Armando Morales, Ando 
Sangrando: A Study of Mexican American-Police Conflict (La Puente, CA: Perspectiva 
Publications, 1972).  
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Essentially, they, along with other organizations that joined their campaigns, made it their 
token legal strategy to claim that Mexicans and Mexican Americans should not be 
discriminated against because Mexicans were white, or at least an “other white” worthy 
of inclusion in American society, as they recognized that nonwhite Americans could only 
aspire to second-class citizenship.37 In the second half of the twentieth century, however, 
the reclamation of indigenous heritage became a prominent mechanism used by Latino 
activists to assert a sense of peoplehood, solidarity, and resistance. By the 1960s, various 
actors in the fight for Latino civil rights—Cesar Chavez, Rudolfo “Corky” Gonzales, the 
Brown Berets, and the Young Lords, among others—experienced a cultural awakening 
that brought them to a similar intellectual space in which they looked to their Amerindian 
ancestry for inspiration to organize their communities in seeking social justice. 
In 1962, farm labor activist and Chicano rights icon Cesar Chavez, as president of 
the newly formed National Farm Workers Association, spoke of the black and red flag 
that the organization had adopted, “A symbol is an important thing. That is why we chose 
an Aztec eagle. It gives pride… When people see it, they know it means dignity.”38 His 
cousin, who Chávez had asked to draw the Aztec eagle for the flag, then adjusted the 
image, squaring off the edges of the eagle, so that the people it represented could easily 
                                               
37 See López, “The Mexican Race in East L.A.” in Racism on Trial; Neil Foley, “Becoming 
Hispanic: Mexican Americans and the Faustian Pact with Whiteness,” in Reflexiones 1997: New 
Directions in Mexican American Studies, ed. Neil Foley (Center for Mexican American Studies, 
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38 Blaine T. Browne and Robert C. Cottrell, Modern American Lives: Individuals and Issues in 
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imitate it in the posters they made for demonstrations.39 Chávez predicted correctly: 
many did imitate the flag from the time of its inception to present day, from labor 
organizers, to student groups, street artists, and even prison gangs.  
 While Chávez created a legacy in Latino civil rights by serving as a fierce 
advocate of labor and farmworker rights, securing policies to ensure better wages and 
protections for agricultural workers and their families, his work also translated to other 
aspects of social injustices facing Latinos, including police brutality and criminalization. 
Chavez spoke about the “plain harassment” and “terror tactics” that police used to arrest 
Latino protesters. As for courtroom discrimination, Chavez raised his concern about 
juries failing to include Chicanos for cases with Chicano defendants, a widespread issue 
that came to light in the Hernandez v. Texas case, in which Pedro Hernandez, a Mexican-
American man accused of murder, was immediately convicted and sentenced by an all-
white jury.40 
Before the founding of the National Farm Workers Association, Chávez started 
his organizing career with the Community Service Organization (CSO) in the 1950s. 
With fellow organizers, he “battled police brutality—the roughing up of young guys and 
the breaking and entering without warrants,” one of the main projects of the CSO while 
Chávez worked with the group in the San Jose area. Reflecting on this experience toward 
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the end of his life during a speech in San Jose in 1991, Chávez noted that Mexican 
Americans had nicknamed the eastside neighborhood of San Jose where his family had 
lived, “Sal Si Puedes,” which translated to “get out if you can,” because “the only way 
young men left Sal Si Puedes was to go off to jail, the military, or the cemetery,” 
insinuating the likelihood that poor Chicanos were vulnerable to the wrath of law 
enforcement and incarceration.41  
As Mexicans and Mexican Americans across Southwestern cities faced police 
brutality during arrests and in jail, other Chicano activists also answered the call to fight 
this discrimination in the criminal justice system and to organize their communities 
around a new sense of peoplehood and cultural pride. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw 
the height of Chicano activism, with educators and college and high school students 
collaborating in demonstrations to protest injustices facing Mexican communities. 
Chicano activist Rudolfo “Corky” Gonzales had been planning radical demonstrations 
against the violent practices of Denver’s police force in dealing with Mexican Americans 
in the lead up to his organization of the Chicano Youth Liberation Conference in March 
1969.  
More than 1,000 people attended the conference that was held in Gonzales’ 
hometown of Denver. From this pivotal gathering emerged El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán 
(The Spiritual Plan of Aztlán), a “call for cultural separatism” situated in nonwhite, 
Aztec-rooted racial identity. The poet Alberto Baltazar Urista, known as Alurista, recited 
                                               
41 Cesar Chavez, Address before the Building Industry Association of Northern California (San 
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the “Epic Poem of Aztlán,” which inspired the students both to take pride in their 
indigenous heritage and to feel a sense of agency in asserting a claim to their homes in 
the southwestern United States. Alurista’s story of Aztlán told of the Chichemec people 
who had lived in Aztlán but were compelled by the god Huitzilopochtli to relocate 
southward. The Chichimec would know where to stop when they saw an eagle with a 
serpent in its grasp perched on a cactus sprouted from a rock. They saw this occurrence in 
what became the central city of the Aztec empire, Tenochtitlan, and what is today Mexico 
City.42  
That part of Alurista’s version of the story has been a part of Mexico’s national 
narrative—the image of the eagle on the cactus appears on Mexico’s flag—and it is also a 
part of the consensus on Mexico’s indigenous history. The idea of Aztlán, however, has 
been debated by scholars in terms of whether it is “myth, history, or mythologized 
history.”43 Alurista also made further claims about Aztlán that have been unsubstantiated. 
For one, Alurista suggested that Aztlán was in the United States Southwest, while most 
scholars believed it would have been in northwestern Mexico. Alurista’s version, as 
corroborated by Mexican-American but not Mexican scholars, took one more step by 
suggesting that Huitzilopochtli had called upon the descendants of the Chichimec to 
return to Aztlán, and in doing so, they would be “reclaiming the land of their birth.”44 In 
other words, Chicanos living in the United States had simply answered Huitzilopochtli’s 
                                               
42 Menchaca, 23.  
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call by residing in southwestern states; that they would be unwelcome by non-Mexicans 
proved ironic, according to Alurista’s arguments. 
 Alurista’s philosophy about the ancestry of Chicanos had two significant 
implications that would influence the Chicano Rights Movement: (1) Latinos were a 
“bronze people with a bronze culture,” emphasizing Indian heritage and culture and 
relinquishing claims to whiteness, and (2) Chicanos, regardless of whether they had been 
both in the U.S. Southwest, Mexico, or elsewhere, had a historic claim to Aztlán—that is, 
the Southwest—where they had been treated as unwelcome foreigners. Alurista shared 
this philosophy as articulated in the poem on Aztlán at over forty colleges and 
universities. In the decades to follow, the Aztlán argument became an important 
component of the toolkit for Mexican American college students to employ when treated 
as foreigners who did not belong in the United States, let alone their college campuses. 
Furthermore, citing indigenous roots was a challenge to the “racial aesthetics” of the time 
that normalized whiteness and othered black and brown aesthetics as markers of cultural 
depravity and racial inferiority. Focusing on indigenous heritage allowed Mexican 
American students to celebrate a non-European culture, in light of the dispossession and 
discrimination that they had experienced at the hands of white Americans.45  
As a militant-styled group, the Brown Berets acted as the most radical of Chicano 
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activists, echoing the role that the Black Panthers played in the rhetorical shift from the 
Civil Rights Movement to the Black Power Movement for the African American 
community. The group adopted the Brown Beret as a name and symbol to reflect “the 
love and pride we have in our race and in the color of our skin,” declaring a “non-white 
identity” as “an unequivocal statement of Mexican racial difference.”46 With this racial 
identity came an agenda focused on police brutality. Members of the Brown Berets 
regularly faced mistreatment and physical abuse by police officers, not only because the 
Berets served as the security forces at demonstrations with Chicano students, but also 
because their membership evolved from being clean-cut college students themselves to 
increasingly consisting of youths who participated in street gangs, some of whom had 
been incarcerated.47  
Given this firsthand experience with the criminal justice system, the Brown 
Beret’s 10-point program, which called for reforms ranging from education to urban 
planning, allocated four points for concerns related to criminalization and punishment: 
they demanded that Mexican-American defendants be granted a jury of their peers, that a 
Civilian Police Review Board be established with members from the community in which 
the police operated, that police officers working in Mexican-American communities live 
in those communities and speak Spanish, and that they be granted the right to bear arms 
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in defense against racist police officers.48  
This married outlook of Chicanos’ race being couched in their Amerindian 
heritage and that racial otherness manifesting in unfair treatment in the criminal justice 
system took form in less militant groups as well. The most active Chicano organization in 
El Paso in the 1960s was the Mexican American Youth Association (MAYA), a program 
serving delinquent youth.49 The organization received grants to commission some of the 
first mural paintings in South El Paso, a neighborhood that housed some of the city’s 
most impoverished families, the newest immigrants, and youth readily recruitable to 
street gangs.50 While the acronym, MAYA, harkens images of the culturally rich Mayan 
civilization in Mexico, many of the murals that became cultural centerpieces of El Paso’s 
southside Segundo Barrio featured pre-Columbian Mexican imagery, such as “the use of 
geometric Aztec design, recalling the culture of origin with which many area residents 
strongly identify.”51 
In Houston, El Club Chapultepec of the local Y.W.C.A. consisted of Mexican 
American girls whose mission focused on upward mobility through education. The name 
they adopted, “Chapultepec,” came from the Nahuatl language, following the trend to 
find empowerment through Aztec lineage. El Club Chapultepec related their mission to 
their protesting of the killing of a Mexican man in a Houston jail. While they spoke out 
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against police brutality, they also took issue with the injustices that occurred during 
arrests and in jails as a result of language barriers.52 
From activism to literature and new histories, Latinos employed words like 
“occupation” and “conquest” to refer negatively to the history of peoples of the Americas 
and their interactions with the Spanish. And to be sure, Mexican American youth were 
not alone in their turn toward Indian roots and new understandings of their people’s 
history, and ultimately making use of it in their quest for justice in the United States. As 
one of the founders of the Young Lords, an organization made up of Puerto Ricans in the 
Northeast that mirrored the Brown Berets, Miguel “Mickey” Melendez discussed his 
back and forth between “El Barrio” (East Harlem) and Queens College, juxtaposed 
experiences which made him “politically aware of [his] pride in being Boricua,” a Taíno 
word for the Puerto Rican island.53 Along with fellow Puerto Rican students, Melendez 
used his college library to investigate his family’s homeland: 
We unraveled a history that had been purposefully denied to us as we grew 
up in “America.” At last, we had found a new story to be told. We started 
to formulate our truth. There once were Taínos and Arawak warriors, 
indigenous people who fought the Spanish invaders and committed mass 
suicide rather than submit to a cruel life as slaves to the King and Queen of 
Spain.54 
 
 For Puerto Ricans, “Taínos represent the culture of the island in its state of 
nature,” and the influence of this indigenous heritage can be seen “in the literary, musical 
                                               
52 Tom Kreneck, “The Letter from Chapultepec,” Houston Review 3 (Summer 1981): 268-269, in 
Rosales, Testimonio. 
53 Miguel Melendez, We Took the Streets: Fighting for Latino Rights with the Young Lords (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003), 74. 
54 Ibid., 80.  
 194 
and pictorial arts of the nineteenth and twentieth century,” as well as “in the naming of 
children, places and events.” According to scholar Juan Flores, the homages to Taíno 
roots and culture are often characterized by “romantic idealizations and distortions” and 
have been “invoked for opportunistic or escapist motives,” but that should not detract 
from the important ways that they symbolize “a culture of national resistance and 
affirmation.”55 
 Scholar Ginetta Candelario argued that Dominicans have also employed a racial 
identity based on indigeneity in order to assert sovereignty and autonomy in response to 
Spanish control, Haitian authority, and U.S. intervention. Using language like “Indio,” 
“Indio oscuro,” “Indio claro,” and “trigueño” to define their race, Dominicans have 
situated their peoplehood on the island, whereas “white/Spanish” and “black/African” 
would have placed their “roots elsewhere.”56 Emphasizing their Indian, or Taíno, heritage 
rather than reaching for power through claims to whiteness also served to explain dark 
skin colors, while avoiding the subjugation of African peoples. To be sure, this strategy 
has been led to charges that Dominicans reject or try to avoid their blackness, even 
though the documented history of the island showed the preponderance of African 
migration to the island and the disappearance or genocide of the Taíno people. However, 
when journalist and Dominican American Raquel Cepeda worked with geneticists in her 
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investigation of the racial heritage of the Dominican people, she argued that there had 
been a “genocide by paper.” That is, the Spanish wrote Taínos out of census records, but 
the DNA testing of the Dominican and other Caribbean populations was proving that 
Taíno heritage was in fact a prevalent part of their ancestry, reinforcing the public history 
that had been embraced by the nation-state and that had been transported to Dominicans’ 
daily life in the United States.57 Candelario explained that even in terms of beauty, “the 
India operates as an iconographic stand-in for contemporary Dominican women,” as a 
“representative of Dominican ‘in-betweenness.’”58 
Latino activism rooted in claims to indigeneity has persisted into the twenty-first 
century. In 2001, the news that Antonio Banderas, a Spanish actor, had been cast to play 
Emiliano Zapata, the Mexican revolutionary known to be of indigenous heritage, drew 
negative response from a group of Native-identifying individuals known as Mexica 
Movement. Mexica Movement protested Disney, the studio producing the film for 
months and the studio eventually dropped the project. While the group of protestors was 
small—20 or so—their efforts drew national attention as an example of a larger trend. In 
covering the Mexica Movement protest, the Chicago Tribune noted other cases in which 
Latinos sought to “reconnect to their native heritage while disavowing their Spanish 
roots.”59  
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A few years earlier, Chicano students at St. Cloud State University in Minnesota 
had launched a hunger strike to protest the catch-all label, “Hispanic,” while Native 
Americans of the Americas Inc., based in Hayward, California, launched a petition that 
emerged in northern California calling for federal laws to recognize Mexican Americans 
as native Americans. In Aurora, Illinois, a youth program called Kalpulli Yetlanezi-
Tolteca 13 employed native languages and spiritual practices as a means to deter Latinos 
from street gangs, while other activists had come together to create the Aztlanahuac 
Project to investigate native origins of Latinos in response to “go-back-to-where-you-
came-from,” anti-immigrant sentiment.60  
 Since the 1960s, various activist groups have crafted a narrative about their racial 
identity that fits their resistance. In a move to fight white power structures, namely law 
enforcement and the criminal justice system, Latino activists abandoned a claim to 
whiteness, and emphasized their cultural roots outside of Europe that were instead staked 
in the Americas. This moral claim to belonging in the lands where they were severely 
discriminated against acted as a political strategy for activists to motivate and empower 
the masses, while emerging as a mechanism of identity performance that functioned as 
self-preservation for the most marginalized Latino youth.  
Performing Indianism in Street Art and Street Life 
 In 1959, sociologist Erving Goffman used theater performance as a metaphor for 
social interactions, translating the “all the world’s a stage” idiom into a theory that would 
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influence his field for decades to come.61 Goffman’s proposed “dramaturgical analysis” 
called for the interpretation of a person’s expressions—verbal and nonverbal—as choices 
made to present the image of their identity that they wanted others to see in them. 
Notably, Judith Butler advanced the notion of identity performance in her 1990 work on 
gender identity.62 Even in the twenty-first century, scholars have revisited Goffman’s 
work, arguing that “the performative approach is enormously insightful… as a framework 
for exploring the ongoing, interactive, imitative processes by means of which the self, 
gender… and race as well… and their illusions of authenticity are constructed.”63 It is 
from this theoretical basis that I explore Latino street culture in terms of artistic 
expression that exhibits a presentation of self. This performance relies upon the social 
legitimization that indigeneity provides Latinos, especially those on the fringes of society 
in the United States.  
 As early as the eighteenth century, American cities have criminalized street 
culture, creating laws that put social constraints on the activities taking place in urban 
spaces believed to be governed by gangs and characterized by vice, violence, and 
participation in informal economies that supplemented residents’ meager incomes. More 
than illegal undertakings, street culture could more accurately be defined as “the public 
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activities of the working poor.”64  
 For Latinos across the country, street culture has included the presentation of 
cars, the playing of music, and the painting of street murals, with cultural elements that 
translated from gallery art to public and street art, and vice versa.65 For Mexican 
Americans this included imagery related to immigrants on the border, farmworkers, the 
Virgin of Guadalupe, lowriders, cholos, and pre-Hispanic indigenous civilizations in the 
Americas.66 When artist Luis Alfonso Jiménez Jr. spoke for the dedication of his 
sculpture at Arizona State University, Southwest Pieta, he explained the story that he 
portrayed with the sculpture: 
The archetypal image is based on the popular Mexican myth of the origin 
of the two volcanoes Popocatépetl and Iztaccíhautl in the Valley of Mexico. 
It’s a Romeo and Juliet story of two lovers turned into volcanoes by the 
gods: The active one is the grieving man, the dead woman is the dormant 
one. While the image has its origins in Mexico, it is the most common 
image, along with the Virgin of Guadalupe, and can be seen on low-rider 
vans and on restaurant and barrio murals. The elements that are usually 
depicted with it also have iconographic value in the Southwest and continue 
to be important to the native community: the woman as a mountain, the 
rattlesnake, the prickly pear, and the mescal or maguey cactus.67 
 
                                               
64 Jen Manion, Liberty’s Prisoners: Carceral Culture in Early America (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 85-86.  
65 For more on Chicano lowrider culture, see Ben Chappell, Aesthetics and Politics of Mexican 
American Custom Cars: Lowrider Space (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012). 
66 For more on these themes in gallery art, see Gary D. Keller et al., eds., Contemporary Chicana 
and Chicano Art: Artists, Works, Culture, and Education (Tempe, AZ: Bilingual Press, 2002).  
67 From the dedication of Southwest Pietá, Arizona State University, May 12, 1994, 
http://asuartmuseum.asu.edu/2006/jimenez/. Figure 4.1 image is available at 
http://mati.eas.asu.edu/chicanarte/unit2/luis/jimenez.html. The Pietà (the pity) is the Christian 
image of the Virgin Mary holding the dead body of Jesus Christ, often depicted in sculpture, such 
as Michelangelo’s statue at St. Peter’s Basilica in Vatican City. By naming his sculpture 
Southwest Pieta, Jiménez suggests that the Southwest has its own parallel story of love and 
sorrow that exists outside of Catholicism.  
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Figure 4.1: Southwest Pieta  
Jiménez’s description of the piece emphasized the extent to which this widely-
disseminated image, as seen in Figure 4.2, epitomized Latinos’ affiliations with Indian 
heritage.68 Some even thought of the image as the man, Popocatépetl, holding his love, 
Iztacchíhuatl, after she had been raped by a Spaniard.69 While some New Mexico 
residents opposed the placement of this sculpture in Albuquerque’s Old Town as a result 
of that interpretation, which they took as “an insult” to their prized Spanish ancestry, the 
image, as Jiménez suggested, has largely been embraced by Latino street culture as a 
symbol of Aztec heritage and history, as well as a shared Chicano experience of love, 
pain, yearning, and anguish.70   
                                               
68 Edgar Hoill, “Lowrider San Bernardino Car Show – Hotspot,” August 27, 2010, available at 
http://www.lowrider.com/events/1009-lras-lowrider-san-bernardino-car-show/. 
69 “Questions and Answers About Luis Jiménez’s Southwest Pieta,” Hispanic Research Center, 
Arizona State University, 2001; David A. Belcher, “Luis Jimenez, Sculptor, Dies in an Accident 
at 65,” New York Times, June 15, 2006. 
70 “Sticky sculpture to go elsewhere,” Alamogordo Daily News, February 3, 1983. Also see 
Estavan Arellano, “Se paremos arte y politica,” Taos News, February 17, 1983. 
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Figure 4.2: Lowrider airbrush mural featuring images of lowriders with Aztec imagery 
 
Similar imagery has been put on display in the murals found in Chicano Park in 
San Diego, California, and Lincoln Park in El Paso, Texas.71 While the parks provide a 
site of recreation for the Mexican American residents in the area, the cultural depictions 
in the murals present the collective identity of the surrounding community. With these 
two dynamics at play, these spaces also serve as a countercultural space for the gathering 
of individuals who identify as Chicanos, as well as with pachuco and cholo aesthetics, 
lifestyles which have been framed as Mexican American youth gang culture.  
                                               
71 While this study focuses on the murals in San Diego and El Paso, the murals in New York, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles, a city known for its mural art scene, as well as many other cities with 
large Latino communities, merit further attention as well. See Mary L. Gray, A Guide to 
Chicago’s Murals (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001); Chon A. Noriega, L.A. 
Xicano (Los Angeles: UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center Press, 2011); Carlos Francisco 




Figure 4.3: Chicano Park Logo and “Rage of La Raza” 
 
Chicano Park grew out of the displacement of Mexican American families from 
Barrio Logan with the construction of the Interstate 5 highway that took place in the 
1960s. The park, which was created in 1970, consists of over 40 murals, many of which 
depict pre-Columbian iconography, including Aztec gods and mythology, as well as the 
Mexican “search for the ‘indigenous self.’”72 In Figure 4.3, the Chicano Park Logo 
includes a map of Aztlán that locates the Aztec homeland in the southwestern part of 
present-day United States, where the city of San Diego sits.73 In Figure 4.4, the vertical 
member of the pylon includes the image of a Tarahumara Indian which represented the 
“ancient race” for Chicanos in the United States even as the Tarahumara people—or 
Rarámuri as they call themselves—have maintained their ways of life in the Copper 
Canyons of northwestern Mexico. In fact, the Rarámuri’s residence in the isolated regions 
                                               
72 Martin D. Rosen and James Fisher, “Chicano Park and the Chicano Park Murals: Barrio Logan, 
City of San Diego, California,” The Public Historian 23, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 91-111.  
73 Chicano Park Logo, designed by Rico Bueno and painted by Carlotta Hernandez, 1974; Photo 
by Kathleen L. Robles, 1997, http://www.chicanoparksandiego.com/murals/logo.html. 
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of the Sierra Madre is a testament to Mexican Indians’ retreat from Spanish colonization 
as a form of resistance.74  
 
Figure 4.4: “Chicano Park Takeover” 
 
 In El Paso, El Segundo Barrio had been home to predominantly Mexican and low-
income residents since the early twentieth century. It housed Mexican immigrants as their 
first stop before heading west to Los Angeles or north to Chicago, as well as the youth 
who became the first pachucos, joining gangs to fill their time after dropping out “due to 
language problems, racism in the schools, and a pattern of sending Mexican kids to 
continuation schools which were like detention centers.”75 In the 1960s, the construction 
                                               
74 Roger Lucero Casteneda, “Chicano Park Takeover,” 1978; renovated in 1991 by Guillermo 
Rosete, Felipe Adame, Octavio Gonzalez, and Vidal Aguirre. Photo available at 
http://www.chicanoparksandiego.com/murals/takeover.html; Christopher McDougall, “Secrets of 
the Tarahumara,” Runner’s World, December 2004; Jane H. Kelley, David A. Phillips, A. C. 
MacWilliams, and Rafael Cruz Antillón. “Land Use, Looting, and Archaeology in Chihuahua, 
Mexico: A Speculative History,” Journal of the Southwest 53, no. 2 (2011): 177-224. For more 
on the Rarámuri, see Thomas E. Sheridan and Thomas H. Naylor, Rarámuri: A Tarahumara 
Colonial Chronicle (Flagstaff, AZ: Northland Press, 1979). 
75 Mario T. García, “Working for the Union,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 9, no. 2 
(1993): 241-57. 
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of Interstate 10 ran through the neighborhood, displacing many of the residents from the 
already-vulnerable community. Following suit with San Diego’s Chicano Park, the City 
of El Paso requested the area underneath the Interstate 10 highway overpass to be used as 
a public space in 1973; it became Lincoln Park.76 In 1983, the Lincoln Cultural Center 
commissioned Chicano muralist Felipe Adame, who had worked on some of the murals 
in San Diego’s Chicano Park, to begin painting similarly-themed murals on the highway 
pillars at Lincoln Park. Sporadically from the 1980s to the early 2000s, the El Paso Parks 
and Recreation Department and the Private Industry Council (PIC) funded additional 
murals, consulting the residents from the surrounding neighborhood for approval of the 
themes depicted.77 As in Figure 4.5, the pylons in Lincoln Park feature various 
Amerindian images such as the pre-Columbian pyramids that appear toward the top of 
the pillar.78  
                                               
76 For more on the displacement of Chicano communities by the construction of highways and 
those communities’ responses, see Eric Avila, “Taking Back the Freeway: Strategies of 
Adaptation and Improvisation,” in The Folklore of the Freeway: Race and Revolt in the 
Modernist City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 149-80. 
77 Miguel Juarez, “The rich history of an El Paso landmark,” available at 
http://lincolnparkcc.org/history/. 
78 Photo available at “Murals,” http://lincolnparkcc.org/chicano-art/murals/. 
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Figure 4.5: Pylon at Lincoln Park, El Paso, Texas 
 
Lincoln Park and Chicano Park exemplify Mexican American cultural pride 
within a unique site for community gathering—underneath an overpass. The setting 
embodies the sense that displaced Chicano communities have become part of a 
permanent underclass in, rather than a part of, American mainstream society. As a result, 
the individuals who participate in the events that take place at these parks put their 
affiliation with the pachuco and cholo figure on display as a testament to the shared 
intergenerational experience of criminalization that they have endured and resilience they 
have found through a collective, anti-establishment Chicano identity, that is purposefully 
not white, but brown and Indian.  
With the scenery that the murals provide setting a tone of Chicano pride, Lincoln 
Park has been used for various events that celebrate the unique aspects of Mexican 
American culture that have taken root in the city nicknamed, “El Chuco,” as reference to 
being home to original pachucos. “El Chuco” and “Pachuco” have a “which-came-first” 
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origins story surrounding them—either the term pachuco developed from the expression 
“pa’ El Chuco,” which translated to “going to El Paso,” or Mexican Americans adopted 
“El Chuco” as a nickname for the city of El Paso given its reputation for being home to 
quintessential pachucos.79 As Luis Valdez’s acclaimed Zoot Suit play showcased, the 
character of El Pachuco is criminalized by U.S. society—wrongly accused and violently 
attacked. In response to an attack in which he was stripped of his clothes, El Pachuco 
finds both refuge and resilience in the sound from an Aztec conch.80  
By embracing the pachuco as a cultural figure, Mexican Americans 
simultaneously take ownership of the “violence, drinking, premarital sex, and other 
immoral behavior” that has been attributed to them, along with the cultural separatism 
that places the pachuco outside of white society as an autonomous agent akin to Indian 
ancestors who resisted colonization.81 As seen in Figure 4.6, the Lincoln Park logo has 
been updated from the one that appears in the mural in Figure 4.5. While the Aztec 
pyramids remain, the new epithet reads, “El Corazón de El Chuco,” a fitting phrase for 
the park that hosts lowrider car shows alongside performances of Matachines and 
traditional Aztec ceremonial dances. Indeed, the backdrop of the highway infrastructure 
                                               
79 Juárez, “The rich history of an El Paso landmark.” Will Wauters, “The Borderland Cultures 
Encounter the Church and a Church Gave Birth to a New Chicano Culture,” Anglican and 
Episcopal History 82, no. 4 (December 2013): 395. 
80 Ashley Lucas, “Reinventing the ‘Pachuco’: The Radical Transformation from the Criminalized 
to the Heroic in Luis Valdez's Play ‘Zoot Suit;,” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 3, no. 1 
(Spring 2009): 80; Jesse A. Goldberg, “Theorizing and Resisting the Violence of Stop and Frisk-
Style Profiling,” CLA Journal 58, no. 3/4 (2015): 270. 
81 Arturo Madrid, “In Search of the Authentic Pachuco: An Interpretive Essay,” in Velvet Barrios: 
Popular Culture and Chicano/a Sexualities, ed. Alicia Gaspar de Alba (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 17.  
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has complemented the automobile culture embraced by the park’s visitors.82 Likewise, 
the events and vendors at Lincoln Park, like those at Chicano Park in San Diego, cater to 
those who identify with the pachuco culture of the first half of the twentieth century, 
which evolved into a cholo culture that developed in the second half of the twentieth 
century.  
 
Figure 4.6: Logo for Lincoln Park in El Paso, TX 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Logo for Bomb Beauty Products 
 
                                               
82 See Chappell, Aesthetics and Politics of Mexican American Custom Cars. 
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Like the pachuco, the cholo—or chola, as seen in Figure 4.7—has an underlying 
persona embedded with Indian characteristics. As a result, Lincoln Park has drawn an 
audience that inspires vendors to formulate advertisements that empower potential buyers 
by paralleling the chola with la India.83 However, even as Latinas have adopted their own 
outlaw style and participated in gang activities, young men of color have experienced 
punishment as a “gendered [phenomenon],” which has resulted in the development of 
hypermasculine practices—which includes committing crimes and engaging in violence, 
as well as “contempt for the law.”84 
The 1990 hip-hop classic “La Raza,” by Kid Frost employs these themes, as Kid 
Frost explained that his sound was made for “Chicano low riders and gangstas,” while the 
song’s lyrics take a defensive-turned-offensive posture: “Vatos, cholos, you call us what 
you will/You say we are assassins and we are sent to kill/It’s in my blood to be an Aztec 
warrior.”85  With these lyrics, Kid Frost “contest[s] the dominant culture’s 
criminalization of his oppositional stance, identifying himself as an Aztec warrior (a 
reference clearly grounded in the Aztlán myth).”86 Kid Frost, hoping to speak on behalf 
of all Chicanos, condemned the stereotype of Latinos as criminals, yet also embraced a 
                                               
83 The vendor plays on multiple layers of Latina cultural identity: make-up products also 
represent a key element of Latina identity as “Hispanic consumers are the ‘foundation’ for beauty 
product sales” in the U.S., according to Nielsen consumer reports, February 23, 2015, available at 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/hispanic-consumers-are-the-foundation-for-
beauty-category-sales.html.  
84 Victor M. Rios, “The Consequences of the Criminal Justice Pipeline on Black and Latino 
Masculinity,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 623 (2009): 
150-62. Also see Philippe Bourgois, “In Search Of Masculinity: Violence, Respect and Sexuality 
among Puerto Rican Crack Dealers in East Harlem,” The British Journal of Criminology 36, no. 3 
(1996): 412-427. 
85 Roberto Santiago, “Kid Frost,” Rolling Stone, May 28, 1992.  
86 Daniel Belgrad, “Performing Lo Chicano,” MELUS 29, no. 2 (Summer 2004), 257.  
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gang lifestyle, “con mi ganga… like Al Capone ese… Got my finger on a trigger, I’m not 
afraid to pull it.” Indeed, the song did act as “an anthem of Chicano youth pride,” 
reflecting young Mexican Americans’ perspectives and lived experiences, particularly in 
urban areas.87 
As Chicano youth have been “publicly racialized as criminal others,” many have 
found solace in gang culture, which has been performed through the cholo aesthetic that 
characterizes la raza as Indian.88 This characterization often disregards any heritage 
emanating from Spain despite use of the Spanish language. Even the word “cholo,” as 
used to describe “tough-looking, rebel adolescents,” is believed to derive from the Aztec 
word xolo which means “servant.”89 In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
term “cholo” acted as a derogatory stand-in for lower-class Mexicans, unwelcome in the 
United States.90 Hence, the cholo style that developed in the 1970s grew out of the 
pachuco, or zoot suit, culture of the 1940s in California and Texas cities like Los 
Angeles, San Diego, San Antonio, and El Paso. Whereas pachucos had their zoot suits, 
typical cholo style consisted of: “baggy Ben Davis or Dickies pants, shaved heads (for 
males), and tattoos that represent neighborhoods.”91 A closer look would also reveal 
                                               
87 Santiago, “Kid Frost.” 
88 Victor M. Rios and Patrick Lopez-Aguado, “‘Pelones y Metones’: Chicano Cholos Perform for 
a Punitive Audience,” in Performing the U.S. Latina and Latino Borderlands, eds. Arturo J. 
Aldama, Chela Sandoval, and Peter J. García (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 
383.  
89 Majorie Miller, “Cholos Return to Their Roots, and Find They Bloom,” Los Angeles Times, 
September 9, 1984.  
90 “Slashed by a Cholo,” Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1905; Los Angeles Star, March 3, 
1860; New York Evening Post, January 19, 1909. Coincidentally, cholo/a operates as a noun to 
represent Amerindians from the Andes and Amazon. 
91 Rios and Lopez-Aguado, 384.  
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depictions of Aztec pride.  
Although some cholo-fitted Mexican youth did engage in illicit activities, others 
complained, “police do not distinguish troublemakers from those who simply enjoy 
dressing in the cholo style.” Regardless of which side of the law a cholo-styled Chicano 
fell, they reflected a sense of being “relegated to the fringes of society.”92 This 
marginalization took place in school when Chicano students experienced expectations of 
academic and intellectual inferiority by white peers and teachers alike. In the workplace, 
white residents expressed an expectation of working class servitude from Mexican 
American youth. The treatment of Mexican Americans as second-class citizens pushed 
some toward the cholo style as a subculture that was “intentionally oppositional to the 
mainstream” and a demonstration of resistance to white power structures. As a result, 
Chicano youth made efforts to be seen as dangerous and threatening, and in turn, 
expected their neighborhoods to be overpoliced. Inevitably, opposition and resistance 
sometimes translated to actual criminal deviance.93 In other words, resistance to 
whiteness meant identifying with Indian heritage, and opposition to authority meant 
criminalization and punishment.   
Performing Indigeneity in Prison 
 While the Aztec and other Amerindian imagery in street art reflected the pre-
Colombian themes of gallery art, street life and street style reflected prison life and prison 
style. Prisoners have presented their personal identities as well as their community 
                                               
92 Miller, “Cholos Return to Their Roots.” 
93 Rios and Lopez-Aguado, 384-388; James Diego Vigil, Barrio Gangs: Street Life and Identity 
in Southern California (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988).  
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allegiances through the canvas of their bodies and the artistic work of tattoos. Through 
tattoos, incarcerated and criminalized Latinos have expressed their personal experiences 
and perspectives, which contribute to a larger narrative on the racial othering of Latinos. 
Tattoos have acted as physical markers to perform identity and provide a sense of 
belonging; they have also alienated convicts from mainstream society by working as 
visual cues that trigger stigmas. As gallery art and street art have represented cultural 
affiliations and experiences of racial othering, the tattoos on convicts’ bodies have 
demonstrated a deep commitment to a cultural identity as well as an acceptance of 
permanent othering. In using tattoos, Latino prisoners have devoted themselves to the 
outsider identities they present, racial and otherwise.  
Latino gang members have engaged in “visual politics,” in which they use 
physical markers of identity—namely tattoos, but also hand signals or graffiti—to 
formulate a “a distinctive collective sensibility of agency.”94 In essence, tattoos indicate 
“identity work” as images of self which act as dramaturgical presentations and symbolic 
interactionism—“an  ongoing process that emerges from individuals’ interpretive and 
communicative efforts.”95 And while scholars on gangs and tattoos have noted that 
tattoos represent loyalty to particular neighborhoods, I argue that Latino gang member 
                                               
94 Susan A. Phillips, “Gallo’s Body: Decoration and Damnation in the Life of a Chicano Gang 
Member,” Ethnography 2, no. 3 (September 2001): 361. 
95 Michael P. Phelan and Scott A. Hunt, “Prison Gang Members’ Tattoos as Identity Work: The 
Visual Communication of Moral Careers,” Symbolic Interaction 21, no. 3 (August 1998): 278-
279; Gregory P. Stone, “Appearance and the Self,” in Human Behavior and the Social Processes: 
An Interactionist Approach, ed. A.M. Rose (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 86-116; 
Goffman. 
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and inmate tattoos have also signified loyalties to racial identity.96 Certainly, 
neighborhoods inevitably have had racial connotations by virtue of the ethnic enclaves 
and racial segregation that have persisted throughout the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first century.97 However, Chicano tattoos have had an iconic style and have 
employed certain themes that reference an ethno-racial identity that extends beyond the 
neighborhoods where these men came of age.  
Tattoo historian Margo DeMello described “Chicano-style tattooing” as a distinct 
form that has been popular with “gang members and convicts since at least the 1950s.”98 
Chicano prisoners have chosen particular images to place on their bodies to represent 
various aspects of their lives. Common tattoos have referenced a particular area where the 
individual resided prior to being incarcerated—neighborhood names, area codes, etc. 
Other tattoos have referenced their criminal history, such as the crime they committed or 
a reference to a lifestyle that involves crime, such as three dots in triangular formation to 
symbolize the words “mi vida loca” (my crazy life) and the three-part life journey from 
prison, to the hospital, and finally to the cemetery.99 Many Chicanos, in and out of prison, 
have chosen the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe for a tattoo, which not only alludes to 
                                               
96 Phillips, 361. Also see Phelan and Hunt, and Margo DeMello, Bodies of Inscription: A Cultural 
History of Modern Tattoo Community (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000). 
97 Emily Badger, “How Redlining’s Racist Effects Last for Decades,” New York Times, August 
24, 2017; Raijini Vaidyanathan, “Why don’t black and white Americans live together?” BBC 
News (January 8, 2016); Anne M. Santiago and Margaret G. Wilder, “Residential Segregation 
and Links to Minority Poverty: The Case of Latinos in the United States,” Social Problems 38, 
no. 4 (1991): 492-515.  
98 DeMello, 84. 
99 For more on popular prison tattoos, see “A statistical analysis of the art on convicts’ bodies,” 
The Economist, December 24, 2016; Canada Border Services Agency, Tattoos and Their 
Meanings (2008). 
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Catholic identity, but also has long been thought of as a symbol of freedom for Mexican 
Indians. As contradictory as it may seem, given the oppressive nature of Spanish 
missions in native populations, the “Indian Virgin” has been invoked by Mexican leaders 
from Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata to Cesar Chavez in their respective 
revolutions.100 Still, more explicit Amerindian imagery has been another common thread 
in Chicano prisoners’ tattoos, most notably in the branding that prison gangs espouse.  
In the prison setting, gangs have provided organization, order, structure, and 
governance in a place where inhabitants have often otherwise been neglected.101 
California has served as the origin of some of the most powerful prison gangs in the 
country, with one of the most notorious being the Mexican Mafia, or La Eme. The group 
formed in the youth correctional facilities of California in 1957, when the founders saw 
the need and the potential for bringing together members from feuding Mexican-
American street gangs into an umbrella prison gang to serve all Mexican-American 
inmates against the white and black contingencies that existed in prison blocks.102 Behind 
bars, their common heritage transcended any neighborhood or regional divides that 
existed outside of prison; the context of incarceration brought ethno-racial solidarity to 
the forefront of social organization schemas. 
                                               
100 Ibid., 86. For more on the Virgin of Guadalupe as a controversial “symbol of freedom for the 
oppressed native populations” of Mexico, see Jeanette Favrot Peterson, “The Virgin of 
Guadalupe: Symbol of Conquest or Liberation?” Art Journal 51, no. 4, Latin American Art 
(Winter 1992): 39-47. 
101 See David Skarbek, The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the 
American Penal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Graeme Wood, “How Gangs 
Took Over Prisons,” The Atlantic, October 2014.  
102 Mexican Mafia, however, predates the major white-serving gang, Aryan Brotherhood, and the 
major black-member prison gang, Black Guerilla Family. See Skarbek, 52-55.  
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 While the gang name explicitly alluded to the well-known Italian crime 
organizations that had made their mark in the United States, the group assumed “La 
Eme,” for the letter “M,” as a name to more accurately reflect their Latin American 
heritage, while gang members, “in honor of their ancient Aztec or Toltec roots, or even 
the more recent Apache and Yaquis tribes, took on Indian warrior names such as Caballo, 
Chato, Crazy Horse, Crow, Cuchillo, Geronimo, and Indio.”103 Mexican Mafia associates 
have displayed other references to Aztec heritage through tattoos. They have used Aztec 
numerals to symbolize “13” for the thirteenth letter of the alphabet, “M.” As seen in 
Figure 4.8, thirteen is represented by two lines, each equaling five, and three dots with a 
value of one. La Eme “soldiers” have also demonstrated their allegiance with 




Figure 4.8: La Eme tattoo—Aztec numerals for 13 
 
                                               
103 Chris Blatchford, The Black Hand (New York: Harper, 2008), 5.  
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Figure 4.9: La Eme tattoo—hummingbird symbol for Huitzilopochtli 
 
In Figure 4.10, a La Eme associate’s tattoo reads “Kanpol,” a Nahuatl word which 
translates to “south great” or “southerner” to allude to the Sureño gang, allies of La Eme. 
Norteños and Sureños are named for their residence in either Northern or Southern 
California respectively. Members of the Norteños (northerners) gang operate as allies for 
La Eme as well, and members of both gangs have exhibited an Aztec warrior shield to 
indicate that they serve as foot soldiers to the Mexican Mafia. This symbol, as depicted in 
Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12, has symbolized the honor and respect given to a warrior. In 
other words, Norteño and Sureño members exhibiting this tattoo have professed an 
“ideology” that “rather than criminals, [they are] participating in a worthy cause for their 
race and culture.”104 As seen in Figure 4.13, this type of imagery can be found in many 
variations. 
                                               
104 Identifying Mexican Mafia Members and Associates (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, 
2014). Also see, Canada Border Services Agency, Tattoos and Their Meanings. 
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Figure 4.10: Sureño tattoo—Kanpol, Nahuatl for “southerner” 
 
 
Figure 4.11: La Eme soldier tattoo—Aztec warrior shield 
 
 




Figure 4.13: La Eme soldier tattoo—Aztec warrior imagery 
 
While La Eme has been in power for many decades since its founding, La Eme 
could not maintain control over the entire Latino population that had entered the 
California prison system as incarcerated populations began to swell in the 1960s in the 
turn toward mass incarceration. By 1965, La Nuestra Familia was formed to represent 
those Mexican inmates who had lived in rural areas prior to incarceration. Nuestra 
Familia tattoos have featured Mexican revolutionary symbols, including huaraches, 
which are a nod toward the indigenous roots of Mexican peasantry.105 Furthermore, as 
Nuestra Familia members came from farming backgrounds, they adopted the same Aztec 
eagle image used by Cesar Chavez’s National Farm Workers Association.106 
Other Mexican gangs have also used indigenous imagery as a form of expression. 
The Mexikanemi (EMI) gang have employed Aztec symbols to depict their gang 
                                               
105 Phelan and Hunt, 288. The word “huaraches” is of Nahuatl origin and Purépecha etymology. 
106 Skarbek, 54; George Camp and Camille Camp, Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature, and 
Impact on Prisons (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Justice Research Program, 1985), 93; 
Nina Fuentes, The Rise and Fall of the Nuestra Familia (Jefferson, WI: Know Gangs Publishing, 
2006), 1-11.  
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loyalties, as seen in Figure 4.14.107 The eagle perched on a cactus with a grasp on a 
snake, as seen on the Mexican flag, specifically alludes to Aztec history and the founding 
of the city of Tenochtitlan, the center of the empire and now Mexico City. The EMI 
tattoo also depicts a Mexican pyramid. In doing so, the EMI gang has cited their cultural 
pride and identity in pre-Columbian, indigenous civilizations rather than acknowledging 
European strands and influences in their ancestry. 
 
 Figure 4.14: Sketch of Mexikanemi tattoo 
 
Perhaps the most conspicuous use of Amerindian symbols by a Latino prison 
gang can be seen in the Barrio Aztecas. The Barrio Azteca gang began in the Texas 
prison system in 1986 when El Pasoans—Mexican and Mexican-American inmates—
banded together for protection from other groups behind bars. Today, there are a 
purported 3,000 members, with central operations in Texas, and some members 
                                               
107 Federal Bureau of Prisons, March 2008, presented in Canada Border Services, Tattoos and 
Their Meanings (2008). 
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imprisoned as far as Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Mexican officials have claimed 
that the group has been a key factor in the cartel wars of the past decade.108  
While “barrio” refers to the impoverished neighborhoods where members of the 
gang grew up, “Azteca” harkens the group members’ heritage going back to their pre-
Columbian ancestors.109 The Barrio Azteca gang also uses “Aztlán” to refer to their 
organization.110 Meanwhile, other prison gangs refer to Barrio Azteca members with 
names such as “Apache” or “Cleveland Indians,” as if synonymous with the concept of 
Native American tribes in the United States.111 And, like other prison gangs, Barrio 
Azteca members perform their Aztec pride most visibly through tattoos as seen in Figures 
4.15, 4.16, 4.17.112   
 
Figure 4.15: Barrio Azteca tattoo 
                                               
108 Steven Dudley, “Barrio Azteca Gang Poised for Leap into International Drug Trade,” Insight 
Crime, February 13, 2013, available at https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/barrio-azteca-
gang-poised-leap/; 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging Trends (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011).  
109 “Vicious Gang, Barrio Azteca, Gets Its Start In El Paso,” 
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110 Woodland State Jail, Security Threat Group Office, “The Dictionary,” August 25, 2004, 10.  
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Figure 4.16: Barrio Azteca tattoo 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Barrio Azteca tattoo 
 
Tattoos, however, are not the only form of prison art that has showcased Chicano 
Indianism. Another art form, paños, a take on pañuelos which translates to 
“handkerchiefs,” has a history dating back to French rule over colonial Mexico. Mexican 
inmates in the Southwest have been using handkerchiefs as their canvases to 
communicate with their loved ones on the outside since at least the 1940s, though the 
practice is thought to have originated in French prisons in Mexico when illiterate inmates 
would make use of standardly distributed handkerchiefs by drawing on them with any 
ink, wax, or coffee they could access. In 2010, Reno Leplat-Torti, an artist and art 
collector, acquired hundreds of paños after his exploration through prison artifacts. His 
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touring exhibition has showcased handkerchief drawings by Chicano inmates with 
several overarching themes: animal characters such as teddy bears and Mickey Mouse 
meant to appeal to inmates’ children on the outside, voluptuous and scantily-clad women, 
skulls, timepieces, clowns, Catholic iconography, and Amerindian imagery as seen in 
Figures 4.18 and 4.19, paños from Reno Leplat-Torti’s collection.113 
 
Figure 4.18: Paño from Reno Leplat-Torti Collection 
 
                                               
113 Reno Leplat-Torti, Paños Chicanos Collection, http://theartofgettingout.tumblr.com/.  
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Figure 4.19: Paño from Reno Leplat-Torti Collection 
 
In response to this appropriation of Chicano Indianism to serve the activities of 
prison gangs, correctional officers and law enforcement agencies have attempted to keep 
records of the language that gangs employ in their operations, forcing officers to interpret 
the Nahuatl words that Barrio Azteca, Nuestra Familia, and the Mexican Mafia use in 
their communications. Richard Valdemar, a retired sergeant from the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department, attempted to compile a Nahuatl dictionary for the purposes 
of translating messages between Chicano gang members, commenting, “Mexicans and 
Mexican Americans who can barely say taco are being taught dialects of the ancient 
Aztec language Nahuatl.” Although, pre-Colombian Aztecs spoke the Nahuatl language, 
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variations of the language are spoken today by 1.5 million Nahua peoples.114 Valdemar’s 
disregard for both the intelligence of Mexican inmates and the still-active language of 
indigenous peoples brings full circle the duality of criminalized Latinos and the 
resonance of indigeneity as an experience of dispossession.   
This duality emerged in prison gangs in other regions and among other ethnic 
groups as well. Through their manifesto, which reads both like a constitution and a Bible, 
the pan-Latino and notorious Almighty Latin Kings and Queens Nation (ALKQN) have 
established that the highest rank to achieve is “Inca,” otherwise known as “First 
Crown.”115 The vice president or second in command is called “Cacique,” which is the 
word for pre-Columbian, Taíno tribal chiefs.116 The Latin Kings, like the Mexican 
American gangs that originated in prison systems in the Southwest, “functioned as an 
assertive self-defense organization, providing its Latino/a members with a collective 
identity in an increasingly racialized inmate population” in the Illinois prison system in 
the 1950s. Being that the original ALKQN members came from Chicago, the group 
embraced both Mexicans and Puerto Ricans who made up significant contingents in the 
city, and when the ALKQN established branches of the organization in New York and 
other northeastern states, Puerto Ricans and other Latinos/as filled the ranks of the 
organization given the area’s unique demographics. In New York City, sub-branches 
were referred to as tribes, such as the Arawak, Aztec, Taíno, Mayan, Cacíque, and Toltec. 
                                               
114 Based on Mexico’s 2000 Census. 
115 Jeff Weiner, “The Inca: Gang leader’s trial revealed Latin Kings’ culture,” Orlando Sentinel 
, November 29, 2014.  
116 Woodland State Jail, 23; José R. Oliver, Caciques and Cemi Idols: The Web Spun by Taíno 
Rulers Between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009).  
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As sociologists David Brotherton and Luis Barrios highlight in ethnographic observations 
of the ALKQN, “because of the history of the colonization experienced by most of the 
ethnic groups represented in the Nations, members are in a constant search for cultural 
identity and reaffirmation.”117 Brotherton and Barrios also rightfully point to the irony in 
relying on historical roots for contemporary cultural identity, when that past inevitably 
includes the colonial oppressor.  
Conclusion 
The 2010 U.S. Census showed a nationwide pattern of more Hispanic-identified 
individuals choosing “American Indian” as their race. Between 2000 and 2010, the 
number of Americans identifying as both “Hispanic” and “American Indian” tripled, 
from 400,000 to 1.2 million people. In part, this could be attributed to the changing face 
of immigration from Latin America, with more people coming from regions with higher 
concentrations of indigenous populations, like southern Mexico and Central America. 
While the choice to identify as “American Indian” among census respondents only 
represented two percent of Hispanics, the trend also reflected the thought processes of 
those Latinos who were not recent immigrants. As one such respondent put it, “if you go 
back far enough, we are indigenous.” Furthermore, some people from Latin America 
chose “American Indian” as their race and rejected “Hispanic” as “an invention by some 
people who wanted to erase the identity of indigenous communities in America.”118 
                                               
117 David C. Brotherton and Luis Barrios, “The Level of Organization and Structure of the Latin 
Kings,” in The Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation: Street Politics and the Transformation of 
a New York City Gang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 181-213. 
118 Geoffrey Decker, “Hispanics Identifying Themselves as Indians,” New York Times, July 3, 
2011.  
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The use of Latino indigeneity has been reimagined by different groups since the 
mid-nineteenth century. In the aftermath of the U.S.-Mexican War, white legislators used 
Mexicans’ indigenous heritage as cause for disenfranchisement. In the decades to follow, 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans often responded to this discrimination by emphasizing 
their European—that is, white—ancestry. Nevertheless, white authority figures validated 
the criminalization of Latinos by citing their indigenous roots. The Latino response 
changed its tune with the many iterations of civil rights protest that took place in the 
1960s and 1970s. Since then, Latino activists have drawn on indigeneity as a source of 
empowerment to inspire a movement as well as a narrative that served their political 
agenda. Meanwhile Latinos on the fringes of society—street gangs or prison inmates—
have found solace in an Indian cultural identity, using self-presentations as Indian as a 
form of self-preservation in a white society viewed as oppressive.  
 This performance of Indianism, however, has hardly correlated with any tribal 
affiliations. Kim Tallbear, a Native Studies scholar, has argued, “Being Native American 
isn’t just about having an ancestor among those founding populations. It’s not just a 
matter of what you claim, but… who claims you… it’s another kind of claim to own 
indigeneity, to try to have a moral claim or sense of belonging on the North American 
continent.” While indigenous tribes in the Americas may not claim all Latinos who see 
their identities reflected in the pre-Columbian ancestors they share, the present-day 
hypercriminalization of Native Americans—who have been vastly overrepresented in 
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arrests and prison admissions and killed by police at dramatically high rates—does 











                                               
119 Christopher Hartney and Linh Vuong, Created Equal: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the 
U.S. Criminal Justice System (National Council on Crime Delinquency, March 2009); Mike 
Males, Who Are Police Killing? (Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 2014).  
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Chapter Five – Changing Racial Identities of Incarcerated Latinos since 1979 
 
In 1979, Ronald Reagan announced his candidacy for president of the United 
States. In his campaign, he capitalized on the culmination of the conservative revolution, 
using racially coded language to attack welfare recipients and drum up a fear of street 
crime. Even though street crime typically fell within state and local jurisdictions, under 
Reagan’s administration, the Justice Department reallocated its efforts away from white-
collar crime and toward street crime—namely drug offenses. In 1982, Reagan declared 
his War on Drugs, and within his first term as president, drug law enforcement budgets 
for the FBI, DEA, and Department of Defense grew exponentially, all in the wake of a 
major turn toward deindustrialization and rising unemployment, especially among men of 
color living in urban areas.1 
 The year 1979 also marked the beginning of the ongoing National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which tracks a cohort of individuals born between 1957 and 
1964—the younger half of the baby boomer generation. The study, which has been 
primarily funded by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), aimed to collect data on 
“labor market experiences, human capital investments such as education and training, and 
information that affects or is affected by labor market behaviors” from a nationally 
representative sample of over 12,000 individuals, who were between 14 and 22 years of 
                                               
1 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 
(New York: The New Press, 2010), 47-51; William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The 
World of the New Urban Poor (New York: Vintage, 1997).  
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age for the first survey year.2 The Bureau of Labor Statistics conducted the survey 
annually from 1979 to 1994, and the agency has administered the survey biennially since 
1994. In that time, this dataset has grown to include a wide range of variables, adding 
measures with each new survey year.  
In 1979, survey interviewers asked respondents about the ethnicities with which 
they identified, and in 2002, the races with which they identified. Each year, from 1978 
to 1998, the interviewer recorded the race which they believed the respondent to be.3 In 
1980, respondents answered a host of questions about their level of interaction with the 
law, and in each survey year, the survey administrator recorded the location of the 
interview, with one coding for jail. Therefore, this dataset serves as a tool to follow the 
population who came of age during the rise of mass incarceration, with snapshots of their 
changing ethno-racial identities.  
This chapter explores how Latino survey respondents have self-identified and 
been identified by outside observers ethnically and racially, considering whether and how 
incarceration has played a role in those identification processes. Sociologist Loïc 
Wacquant has already proposed that prisons act as race-making institutions, arguing that 
the criminal justice system not only exemplifies racial inequalities in society at large, it 
defines race, perpetuating racial disparities in other spaces. Focusing primarily on 
African Americans, Wacquant claims that, by disproportionately caging black 
                                               
2 National Longitudinal Surveys, “The NLSY79 Sample: An Introduction,” Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2016, available at https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/intro-to-the-
sample/nlsy79-sample-introduction. 
3 This is with the exception of 1987 and 1995, for which there is no such data recorded.  
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Americans, prisons allow society to use race as a signifier of criminality and crime as a 
racial boundary.4 Furthermore, studies in the field of psychology have long shown that 
white subjects associate negative attributes such as criminality with black people. And, in 
turn, sociological research has also demonstrated that the association is bidirectional, and 
criminality can signify race: “just as Black faces and Black bodies can trigger thoughts of 
crime, thinking of crime can trigger thoughts of Black people.”5  
Reviewing NLSY79 data, sociologists Aliya Saperstein and Andrew W. Penner 
tested the extent of this bidirectional process, going beyond the subliminal priming 
experiments that only reveal cultural associations, questioning whether incarceration 
impacts the racial perception of an individual. In 2010, they published their results in an 
article, “The Race of a Criminal Record: How Incarceration Colors Racial Perceptions.”6 
By tracking how people have been racially categorized differently across time, they 
argued that incarceration has a darkening effect on a person’s self-perception of race, as 
well as an observer’s perception of another’s race. For Saperstein and Penner, the results 
“challenged the idea that the race of an individual is fixed,” and it demonstrated that “it’s 
not just our perceptions of race that drive stereotypes, but our stereotypes that drive our 
perceptions of race.”7 This finding reached a wide audience, not only was it discussed in 
                                               
4 Loïc Wacquant, “From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the ‘Race Question’ in the 
U.S.,” New Left Review 13 (2002): 41-60. 
5 Jennifer Eberhardt et al., “Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 87, no. 6 (2004): 876-93.  
6 Aliya Saperstein and Andrew M. Penner, “The Race of a Criminal Record: How Incarceration 
Colors Racial Perceptions,” Social Problems 57, no. 1 (2010): 92-113. 




the field of sociology, but it also landed Saperstein an NPR interview, which was then 
cited in an episode of The Colbert Report in 2014.8 Stephen Colbert, however, mocked 
the findings in his satirical style, recommending that historically marginalized people 
simply had to imitate the racial stereotypes of white Americans in order to avoid 
discrimination.9 In 2016, sociologists Lance Hannon and Robert DeFina offered a more 
serious criticism of the “Race of a Criminal Record” article, suggesting that Saperstein 
and Penner had misrepresented their findings. Hannon and DeFina argued that Saperstein 
and Penner’s work actually demonstrated the limitations of the racial categories that 
interviewers were instructed to use, as well as the reality that black and ethnic minorities 
typically thought of as racially ambiguous people—Latinos, Asians, Native Americans, 
and Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders—are more likely to be incarcerated in the first 
place, not that incarcerated populations are more likely to undergo a racial change nor 
that the change is likely to be from white to black.10 Hannon and DeFina do, however, 
                                               
8Andrew Gelman, “Social problems with a paper in Social Problems,” Statistical Modeling, 
Casual Inference, and Social Science, June 2016. Available at 
http://andrewgelman.com/2016/06/07/social-problems-with-a-paper-in-social-problems/; Claire 
Renzetti, “The ‘Darkening’ Effects of Incarceration,” Racism Review, March 2010, available at 
http://www.racismreview.com/blog/2010/03/11/the-darkening-effects-of-incarceration/. 
9 The Colbert Report, “Black History Month – Stereotypes & Racial Identity,” Season 10, 
Episode 70, Comedy Central, February 24, 2014. Available at http://www.cc.com/video-
clips/p8fj8f/the-colbert-report-black-history-month---stereotypes---racial-identity. 
10 Lance Hannon and Robert DeFina, “Can Incarceration Really Strip People of Racial 
Privilege?” Sociological Science 3 (2015): 190-201. In response to the Hannon and DeFina’s 
critique, Saperstein argued, “We would not be comfortable discussing ‘racially ambiguous’ and 
‘unambiguous’ people without establishing the criteria for categorization that might justify these 
statements, and we maintain that future research would be better served by examining directly 
(rather than assuming) what information or which characteristics are influential when people 
make racial categorizations. Our research suggests that, in addition to using physical appearance 
or known ancestry, Americans also consider markers of social status when deciding who ‘fits’ 
best in which racial category.” See full response at: https://www.sociologicalscience.com/v3-10-
190/#comments. In another critique, Rory Kramer, along with Hannon and DeFina, argues that 
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concede that “it is possible that [Saperstein and Penner’s] hypothesis could be supported 
for certain subgroups that are phenotypically or categorically ambiguous,” noting that 
Latinos represented a majority of the changes in racial classifications—a fact which 
Saperstein and Penner curiously overlook in their study.11 
In their analysis, Saperstein and Penner tracked racial categorization changes in 
several ways. First, they considered racial self-identity, looking at how people who 
identified as European/not European and black/not black in 1979 identified racially in 
2002—white, black, or other—comparing the changes among the never-incarcerated 
population to the ever-incarcerated population. The authors then turned to their study of 
changes in observed race, tracking how survey interviewers classified an individual one 
year, compared to a following year in which they were incarcerated. Interviewers 
recorded race from 1979 to 1998, with categories of white, black, or other. Essentially, 
Saperstein and Penner’s study design limited their understandings of racial change, only 
considering shifts (1) from white to black or other, (2) from black to white or other, (3) 
from other to black or white, even though the 1979 ethnic categories provided the 
opportunity for them to consider Latinos, Asians, Native Americans, and Native 
Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders. Ultimately, their statistical analysis showed that 
incarceration’s most significant impacts on racial perception either led interviewers who 
classified a respondent as white pre-incarceration to identify that same individual as 
                                               
Saperstein and Penner failed to “disentangle the well-documented effect of race on social status 
from their newly proposed effect of social status on racial categorization,” Rory Kramer et al., 
“Racial Rigidity in the United States: Comment on Saperstein and Penner,” American Journal of 
Sociology 122, no. 1 (2016): 233-246.  
11 Hannon and DeFina, 198.  
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“Other” post-incarceration, or interviewers to classify people who have been incarcerated 
as black, even though they were previously classified as “Other.”   
 With these findings, Saperstein and Penner concluded “convicted criminals are 
less likely to match the image Americans have of whites than the image Americans have 
of blacks—even when the individual in question previously identified as European or was 
perceived to be white the previous year.”12 They suggest that the criminal justice system 
is responsible for conditioning the American imagination to conceptualize black people 
as criminals, and criminals as black, perpetuating the racial divisions that cast white 
Americans as safe, suitable neighbors and black Americans as dangerous and 
undesirable. Saperstein and Penner further posit that such perceptions can have the 
negative consequence of employers denying work to black men who they assume are 
likely to have criminal backgrounds.13 
 Although Saperstein and Penner note that their findings hold even after 
accounting for the complexities of racial categorization for people of Hispanic origin and 
people of mixed-race backgrounds, they oversimplify their conclusions by organizing 
their study according to a linear black-white spectrum. They state, for example, that “it is 
not the case that people who have been incarcerated are no longer seen as white and are 
always seen as black; rather, we suggest that incarceration affects the probability that an 
individual will be classified one way or the other, such that previously incarcerated 
respondents are less likely to be viewed as white and more likely to be viewed as black in 
                                               
12 Saperstein and Penner, 110. 
13 Saperstein and Penner, 109, citing Devah Pager, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an 
Era of Mass Incarceration (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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any given encounter.”14 By articulating their findings in this way, they situate the “Other” 
category in the middle of a linear black-white spectrum, conflating changes from “white” 
to “other” and from “other” to “black” as synonymous with changes from white to black 
and vice versa, instead of considering how the people who were placed under the “Other” 
category may be outside of that spectrum all together.  
This framing of the analysis leaves important questions to be answered. For one, 
Saperstein and Penner control for self-identification as a Hispanic ethnicity in 1979, 
failing to recognize that over 60 percent of the population who underwent a change in 
racial classification indicated that they self-identified as one of the Hispanic ethnic 
categories in 1979. In fact, nearly 90 percent of respondents identifying as a Hispanic 
ethnicity in 1979 experienced a change in racial classification from 1979 to 1998, as 
opposed to just 20 percent of all respondents. Indeed, 96 percent of respondents classified 
as white and 88 percent classified as black in 1979 never experienced a change in 
observed race from the first survey year through the last year that interviewers recorded 
race. Therefore, it is more logical to look at the Latino sample for considering the impact 
of incarceration on racial changes than relying on the limited sample of changes that 
respondents initially classified as black or white provide.  
Furthermore, framing data in black and white terms undermines the significant 
and disproportionate number of incarcerated Latinos. This directly contrasts prison 
records, both before and after 1979, which have identified Hispanics as a unique 
                                               
14 Saperstein and Penner, 106. 
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population, separate from black and white inmates.15 Thus, this chapter departs from 
controlling for Hispanic ethnic identification, and instead explores the trajectory of racial 
affiliations for Latino individuals pre- and post-incarceration. Saperstein and Penner 
mischaracterize their findings by concluding that what they discovered represented the 
bidirectional process of criminalizing black people in the United States, which in turn had 
a “darkening” effect on criminals. In reality, if respondents experienced a change in racial 
perception there was more of an “othering” effect than either a whitening or darkening 
effect.16 Saperstein and Penner did not, however, venture into what this “othering” could 
imply. For that reason, this chapter returns to the NLSY79 and intentionally tracks the 
racial identities of Latinos who have experienced incarceration. By focusing on the 
changes for incarcerated respondents classified as “Other,” the category which was often 
used to categorize Latinos, the changes in racial perceptions reveal different patterns than 
what Saperstein and Penner present for the entire 1979 cohort.  
                                               
15 See state Department of Corrections prison population records, such as Massachusetts 
Department of Corrections records: http://www.mass.gov/eopss/law-enforce-and-cj/prisons/rsch-
data/january-1-population-statistics.html; and Pennsylvania Department of Corrections: 
http://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Statistics/Pages/Old-Statistical-
Reports.aspx#.WLNW3BIrJE5.  
16 In their 2010 article, Saperstein and Penner suggest that racial changes demonstrate one of 
three effects: whitening, othering, and darkening/blackening. In their discussion, however, they 
treat changes from white to other as a change on the linear spectrum from white to black, as do 
they treat changes from other to black, as opposed to conceiving as “Other” as potentially outside 
of the black-white spectrum on which their findings rely. Furthermore, Saperstein and Penner 
exclude an analysis of observed changes for respondents initially classified as “Other” in 1979. 
Instead, Saperstein and Penner compare the racial changes among the initially-white, never-
incarcerated population versus the racial changes among the initially-white, ever-incarcerated 
population, with similar comparisons for the initially-black never-incarcerated and ever-
incarcerated populations. Hannon and DeFina argue that this framing of the data does not 
characterize the effect of incarceration on racial changes, as Saperstein and Penner propose; 
instead, Hannon and DeFina suggest focusing on just the character of the changes among the 
incarcerated population. Hannon and DeFina, 2016.  
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 Identifying Ethnicity and Race, 1979 and 2002 
 The analysis herein considers several variables from the NLSY79 dataset on race 
and ethnicity, geography, migration, citizenship, and encounters with the criminal justice 
system. The race and ethnicity variables demonstrate the complicated nature of coding 
race, the discrepancies between self-identity and the eye of the observer, as well as the 
changing understandings of race. Chronologically, the first variable on race and ethnicity 
came from the 1978 screening of respondents, in which an interviewer assigned race to 
respondents—either Hispanic, Black, or non-black, non-Hispanic. From 1979 to 1998, 
among the various observations interviewers recorded to provide context to the interview 
and interviewee, they assigned the respondent’s race as either “White,” “Black,” or 
“Other.” 
 In 1979, respondents selected their primary ethnic origin, and then selected up to 
five more ethnic backgrounds with which they identified with choices of black, Asian 
Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, English, French, German, 
Greek, Irish, Italian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Scottish, Welsh, Cuban, Chicano, 
Mexican, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican, Other Hispanic, Other Spanish, 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Indian-American or Native American, American, Other, or 
None. Of the 12,576 respondents who selected a primary ethnic origin, 36 percent 
selected a second ethnic origin, 17 percent selected a third ethnicity, seven percent 
selected a fourth ethnicity, two percent selected a fifth ethnicity, and less than one percent 
selected a sixth ethnicity. Those respondents who selected more than one ethnicity also 
indicated with which ethnic origin they most identified, and of those, over two thirds  
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Table 5.1: Ethnic Self-Identity vs. Interviewer Observation 
 
1978 Household Observed 
Race 
1979 Race Recorded  




Hispanic Hispanic Black White Black Other 
         
Black 19 13 3017 24 3004 9 
Total Hispanic or Latino 46 1783 5 1302 20 502 
Cuban 1 115 0 87 1 28 
Chicano 0 59 0 43 0 16 
Mexican 5 378 0 292 0 89 
Mexican-American 15 718 1 536 1 192 
Puerto Rican 7 320 1 201 10 117 
Other Hispanic 7 111 0 78 5 33 
Other Spanish 11 82 3 65 3 27 
Total European 5100 99 82 5147 78 26 
English 1476 34 51 1493 48 9 
French 290 11 10 300 9 1 
German 1376 14 5 1379 3 1 
Greek 29 2 0 31 0 0 
Irish 933 13 3 943 3 2 
Italian 474 16 7 489 4 2 
Polish 234 1 3 236 1 0 
Portuguese 88 6 3 75 10 11 
Russian 45 0 0 45 0 0 
Scottish 120 2 0 121 0 0 
Welsh 35 0 0 35 0 0 
Total Asian 93 13 11 40 6 71 
Asian Indian 20 0 2 8 3 11 
Chinese 22 0 4 7 1 18 
Filipino 33 6 4 14 1 28 
Japanese 14 5 0 9 0 10 
Korean 3 2 1 1 1 4 
Vietnamese 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Hawaiian, Pacific 
Islander 17 3 0 8 0 12 
Indian-American Or 
Native American 585 20 17 533 18 64 
Other 736 22 21 740 20 14 
American 692 41 10 714 7 10 
None 117 7 8 122 7 3 
Source: NLSY79 
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selected a European ethnicity. In fact, most respondents who selected a European 
background as their first ethnicity chose other European ethnic origins as their second, 
third, fourth, and fifth ethnic backgrounds, so those respondents with more than one 
ethnic origin selection were not necessarily identifying as mixed-race.  
Interestingly, the Bureau of Labor Statistics deemed the 5 percent of respondents 
that selected “Indian-American or Native American” as “unusually high” compared to the 
census estimate of 0.5 percent at the time, suggesting that respondents probably 
misunderstood the term “Native American.”17 Yet, other ethnic categories were 
potentially as problematic, including “Other Spanish.” Although the Bureau of Labor, 
like other government agencies, included all Spanish-speaking countries and regions 
under their classification of Hispanic, the “Other Spanish” subcategory conflated the 
European country, Spain, with other Spanish-speaking Latin American countries. In fact, 
nearly 15 percent of “Other Spanish” respondents were not coded as “Hispanic” by 
interviewers. And, with nearly 10 percent of “Portuguese” respondents being categorized 
by interviewers as “Black” or “Hispanic,” the “Portuguese” category potentially 
incorporated people with Brazilian or Cape Verdean backgrounds. Furthermore, the 
“Black” category hardly offered the nuance afforded to respondents with European, 
Asian, or Latin American backgrounds, disregarding potential national or regional 
distinctions that black respondents may have made.  
                                               
17 NORC, 1978 Household Screener and Interviewer's Reference Manual (Chicago, IL:  National 
Opinion Research Center - University of Chicago, 1978). See 
http://nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/topical-guide/household/race-ethnicity-immigration-data 
(accessed March 20, 2016).  
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In 2002, when respondents responded about their ethno-racial affiliations again, 
they first indicated whether they were of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin. For race, 
they had the option to select white, black, Asian, American Indian or Alaska Native, 
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and/or some other race. If the respondent did not 
select a race, but identified themselves as Hispanic/Latino, they were coded as 
“respondent refuses to classify race except as Hispanic/Latino.” This evolution of 
categorizing race and ethnicity reflects the evolution of U.S. Census questions and 
records. In fact, the way the U.S. Census has asked respondents to indicate 
Hispanic/Latino heritage has changed every decade since 1970, and before that, 
“Mexican” only appeared once as an official category in 1930 and then disappeared for 
40 years. Once incorporated, “Hispanic or Latino” was separated from the other racial 
categories and into its own ethnicity question on the census form, suggesting that 
Hispanic identity was mutually exclusive from being white, black, Asian, American 
Indian, or Pacific Islander, origins rooted in particular continents or world regions, even 
though Hispanicity and Latinidad are similarly rooted in a certain part of the globe—
Latin America.18 
Given the social realities of many Latinos feeling and being treated as a group 
distinct from their white and black neighbors, the NLSY79 2002 racial categories, like 
                                               
18 Beverly Pratt, Lindsay Hixson, and Nicholas A. Jones, Measuring Race and Ethnicity Across 
the Decades, 1790-2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, 2015). Also see Myron P. 
Gutmann, “Hispanics in the United States, 1850-1990: Estimates of Population Size and National 
Origin,” Historical Methods 33, no. 3 (2000); Arthur R. Cresce, et al., “Identification of Hispanic 
Ethnicity in Census 2000: Analysis of Data Quality for the Question on Hispanic Origin” 
(working paper no. 75, U.S. Census Bureau, 2004).  
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the U.S. Census, outlined the boundaries of race that defied social constructions and lived 
experiences of racial groupings and distinctions. Latinos may have chosen a provided 
racial category because the survey design compelled them to, as opposed to the choice 
being a natural or organic affiliation for the individual. The NLSY79 question in 2002, 
like the census, did provide a “some other race” option. Even though less than three 
percent of all 2002 respondents selected that option, of those who did classify themselves 
as “some other race,” 79 percent were individuals who had self-identified as a Latino 
ethnicity in 1979. Among those participants who identified with a Latino ethnic 
background in 1979, 19 percent indicated that they were “some other race” in 2002. 
Among all 1979 ethnic origin categories, the highest proportions of respondents who 
identified as “some other race” were those who self-identified as Puerto Rican (36 
percent), Chicano (26 percent), Other Hispanic (23 percent), Other Spanish (20 percent) 
and Asian Indian (19 percent), followed by the rest of the Hispanic or Latino categories 
and a couple of the Asian categories, while only one percent, on average, of other groups 
identified as “Some Other Race.”19 The significant portion of respondents among these 
ethnic groups who chose “Some Other Race” suggests that the racial categories presented 
in 2002 proved problematic for people with Latin American backgrounds, as well as 
some Asian backgrounds. 
 
                                               
19 While respondents could choose all races with which they identified in 2002, the calculations 
presented herein are based on recoding the 2002 racial categories to have the mutually exclusive 
categories of: White, Black, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, American Indian or 
Alaska Native, Some Other Race, Respondent Refused to Provide Race Other than Latino, and 
Two or More Races. Respondents from the original 1979 cohort who did not provide race 
information in 2002 are not included in the calculation.  
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Table 5.2: Respondents Who Self-Identified as “Some other race” by Ethnic Origin 
1979 Ethnic Origin Some other race (2002) 
Puerto Rican 36% 
Chicano 26% 
Other Hispanic 23% 
Other Spanish 20% 






Average Among All Other Groups 1% 
Source: NLSY79 
 
Of course, naming the alternative category “respondent refuses to provide race 
except as Hispanic/Latino” also signifies the resistance to the provided racial categories. 
Although none of the 1979 Hispanic or Latino groups showed a majority “refusal” to 
classify race except as Hispanic/Latino in 2002, more Chicanos and “Other Hispanics” 
refused to classify their race except as Hispanic/Latino than chose any of the provided 
racial categories in 2002, 42 and 37 percent respectively. In fact, the combination of 
“some other race” and “refuses to classify race except as Hispanic/Latino” categories in 
2002 formed a majority among respondents who self-identified as Chicano (68 percent), 
Puerto Rican (65 percent), Other Hispanic (60 percent), Mexican (57 percent), and 
Mexican-American (51 percent) in 1979. This trend did not hold only for those who 
identified as Cuban or “Other Spanish” in 1979; instead those groups had a majority of 
respondents identify as white, 64 percent and 59 percent respectively. The self-
identification as white among Cuban and “Other Spanish” respondents reflects the known 
history of Cubans in the United States and the convoluted nature of the “Other Spanish” 
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category. As mentioned earlier, the “Other Spanish” category necessarily includes 
respondents with ethnic origins from Spain but not Latin America, and given that the 
survey began in 1979 the cohort of Cubans in the sample does not include Mariel exiles, 
the 1980 wave of Cubans that consisted of the largest proportion of non-white 
individuals, even at only 20 percent of the group.20 These differences in racial 
identification demonstrate that each Latino group has distinct characteristics and 
experiences that have shaped their self-identification processes.  
For example, identifying as “Chicano” as opposed to “Mexican-American” or 
“Mexican” signifies a political consciousness among people with Mexican heritage 
within the United States. Indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary defines Chicano as “A 
person of Mexican birth or descent resident in the U.S. (particularly in those areas 
annexed in 1848), esp. one who is proud of his Mexican origins and concerned to 
improve the position of Mexicans in the U.S.”21 Furthermore, the Chicano Movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s solidified the connotation of “Chicano” with activism and hyper-
conscious group identity and recognition. It is not surprising then that this group would 
deliberately reject all of the racial categories and identify as “some other race” or refuse 
to classify as anything except Hispanic/Latino. On the other hand, identifying as 
“Mexican-American” instead of “Mexican” may indicate a sense of assimilation.22  
                                               
20 Emily H. Skop, “Race and Place in the Adaptation of Mariel Exiles,” The International 
Migration Review 35, no. 2 (2001): 449-471.  
21 Oxford English Dictionary, entry for “Chicano.” 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/31526?redirectedFrom=chicano#eid (accessed March 20, 2016). 
22 Nestor P. Rodriguez and Cecilia Menjívar, “Central American Immigrants and Racialization in 
a Post-Civil Rights Era,” in How the United States Racializes Latinos: White Hegemony & Its 
Consequences, eds. José A. Cobas, Jorge Duany, and Jorge R. Feagin (Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2009), 192; Joe Feagin and Clairece Feagin, Racial and Ethnic Relations, 4th ed. 
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Table 5.3: Racial Identification by Ethnicity 
 Race 
2002     
1979 Ethnic 




Refused to Provide 
Race Except as 
Hispanic/Latino 
Two or More 
Races 
Cuban 64% 1% 19% 12% 3% 
Chicano 26% 0% 26% 42% 2% 
Mexican 41% 0% 16% 41% 1% 
Mexican-
American 45% 1% 14% 37% 3% 
Puerto Rican 30% 3% 36% 29% 2% 
Other Hispanic 35% 1% 23% 37% 4% 
Other Spanish 59% 2% 16% 16% 6% 
All Hispanic or 
Latino 42% 1% 19% 34% 3% 
Note: The percent of any group identifying as Asian, Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or American 
Indian or Alaska Native in 2002 was 2 percent or less, and therefore not included in this table. 
Source: NLSY79 
 
Identifying as “Other Spanish” may have several different implications. For one, 
the other categories may not have reflected the Spanish-speaking country of origin for the 
respondent. And, of course, “Other Spanish” would have been the most accurate option 
for respondents with backgrounds from Spain. But “Spanish,” like Hispanic, can also 
signify an all-encompassing category. In nineteenth-century California, Mexicans and 
Chileans adopted the term “Spanish race” or raza Española to assert a panethnic identity 
and solidarity as they faced discrimination and even violence from their Anglo American 
neighbors.23 The term “Spanish” also serves as a stand-in term for Hispanic or Latino for 
                                               
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993); Benjamin Marquez, “The Politics of Race and 
Assimilation: The League of United Latin American Citizens 1929-40,” The Western Political 
Quarterly 42, no. 2 (1989): 355-375.  
23 Fernando Purcell, “Becoming Dark: The Chilean Experience in California, 1848-1870,” in How 
the United States Racializes Latinos: White Hegemony & Its Consequences, eds. José A. Cobas, 
Jorge Duany, and Jorge R. Feagin (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009). 
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some when self-describing. While it may be another term to refer to a Spanish-speaking 
culture for some, others with Latin American heritage may have purposefully chosen to 
refer to themselves as Spanish as a claim to Spain, Europe, and ultimately whiteness and 
the mobility, respect, and power with which it comes.24  
NLSY79 Latinos in Jail 
 A 2003 report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) estimated that 16.6 percent 
of black males, 7.7 percent of Hispanic males, and 2.6 percent of white males had ever 
served time in a state or federal prison as of 2001. The report also estimated that 1.7 
percent of black females, 0.7 percent of Hispanic females, and 0.3 percent of white 
females had ever been incarcerated in a state or federal prison.25 The figures in Table 5.4 
represent the prevalence of incarceration among the NLSY79 population. They are 
somewhat higher than the estimates from the BJS report for several potential reasons. For 
one, the NLSY79 prevalence of incarceration includes jail time, not just time served in 
state or federal prisons, the former being the more holistic measure of incarceration. 
These figures may also diverge because the BJS estimates were based on statistical 






                                               
24 G. Cristina Mora, Making Hispanics: How Activists, Bureaucrats, and Media Constructed a 
New American (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), 7.  
25 Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001 (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003). 
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Table 5.4: Percent Ever Incarcerated by 1979 Ethnicity and 2002 Race Affiliations26 
    Men -  
Ever Incarcerated 










Black 17.0% 1.7% 
  Hispanic 8.0% 0.7% 
1979 White* 4.5% 0.5%  
Black 19.9% 1.8%  
Asian 3.4% 0.0%  
Hispanic/Latino 11.9% 1.6%  
Cuban 9.4% 0.0%  
Chicano 13.3% 3.4%  
Mexican 10.9% 0.5%  
Mexican-American 12.0% 1.3%  
Puerto Rican 13.9% 4.3%  
Other Hispanic 14.1% 0.0% 
  Other Spanish 5.7% 1.6% 
2002 White 5.1% 0.9%  




Some Other Race 13.2% 1.9%  
Respondent Refused to 




Two or More Races 3.7% 0.0%  
Not Hispanic/Latino 11.0% 1.2% 
  Hispanic/Latino 11.9% 1.8% 
Note: The 1979 “White” category excludes data for a supplemental sample of “poor 
white” respondents the NLSY79 dropped from the study. Given the well-documented 
correlation between poverty and incarceration and the large proportion of this 
supplemental sample (20 percent of white respondents), their data skewed the 
incarceration rate in a way that is not representative of trends outside of the NLSY79 
                                               
26 The following tables show rates of ever having been incarcerated as of 2014. The 2014 rates 
are to present the most recent data and demonstrate the trajectory of likelihood of incarceration 
with time even after incarceration rates began to go down after peaking in 2009. These figures 
account for higher rates of incarceration than what Saperstein and Penner, Hannon and DeFina, 
and other researchers have calculated using NLSY79 data due to this table using a longer 
timeline, as well as a sample that includes respondents with missing data for “Type of Residence” 
in each year that question was asked from 1979 to 1998. 
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study. The table does not include the 1979 "Indian-American or Native American" 
category since that population was marked as "unusually high." The "Native Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander" was not included among either set of ethno-racial categories due to low 
Ns, as were the 2002 “Asian” and “American Indian or Alaska Native” groups. Source: 
NLSY79  
 
factors in mortality to account for prevalence among the current U.S. population, while 
the rates in Table 5.4 track the prevalence among a particular cohort, regardless of 
mortality. Still, the NLSY79 rates may underestimate the actual prevalence of 
incarceration as data was not collected for 1995 and all following odd-numbered years 
since the annual study transitioned to a biennial survey between 1994 and 1996.  
 Looking at the breakdowns for NLSY79 respondents by their 2002 racial 
affiliations, the frequency of respondents who had ever been incarcerated grows even 
higher for all groups. In part, this may be a result of having a smaller sample for those 
who answered the 2002 race question as opposed to the 1979 ethnicity question. 
Additionally, those respondents who answered the 2002 race question also had more 
complete data for time spent in jail given that the 2002 respondents provided more recent 
data than the full 1979 cohort, the majority of whom answered the 1979 ethnic origins 
question in the initial survey year, but may have been unavailable for questioning in later 
years. In a sense, the 2002 figures provide more parallel data to the BJS statistical 
modeling than the data with 1979 ethnic origin breakdowns, given that mortality factors 
into the population statistics. In which case, the prevalence of incarceration, according to 
this analysis, is even higher than commonly discussed, while the racial disparities 
between groups are slightly reduced by this calculation.  
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 Like most studies, the frequencies of incarceration drawn from the NLSY79 
reflect the common statistics that find the highest rates of incarceration among African 
Americans, followed by Latinos, with the lowest rates among the white population. This 
dataset, however, allows for an analysis of Latino subgroups, by ethnicity, geography, 
and citizenship. As discussed in the previous chapters, all of these factors have had a 
potential impact on the criminalization and criminality of Latinos in the United States.   
 On one hand, the figures in Table 5.5 support the numerous studies that have 
found that immigrants are not more likely to commit crimes or be incarcerated.27 Puerto 
Ricans and Chicanos, who had the lowest proportions of members not born in the United 
States, show the highest rates of incarceration. On the other end, the groups with 
incarceration rates below the overall Latino rate are respondents who identified as Cuban, 
Mexican, and Other Spanish—all groups with higher proportions of members born in a 
country other than the United States. The one group that does not fit this trend are those 
who identified as Other Hispanic—this group had the highest proportion of respondents 
who were born outside of the United States at 72 percent, as well as an incarceration rate 
above the overall Latino rate. This case exemplifies that many dynamics shape the 
likelihood of incarceration for Latinos. However, it is important to note that the 
proportion of group members not born in the United States is higher for the ever-
incarcerated population than the overall sample of Cubans, Chicanos, Mexicans, and 
Mexican-Americans, as seen in the last column of Table 5.5.  
 
                                               
27 See Jason L. Riley, “The Mythical Connection Between Immigrants and Crime,” The Wall 
Street Journal, July 14, 2015.  
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Table 5.5: Latinos Ever Incarcerated by Ethnicity and Country of Birth (Men Only) 
   





% of Ever 
Incarcerated -  
Not U.S. Born 
Cuban 61% 9% 67% 
Chicano 3% 13% 25% 
Mexican 71% 11% 86% 
Mexican-American 10% 12% 12% 
Puerto Rican 0% 14% 0% 
Other Hispanic 77% 14% 67% 
Other Spanish 29% 6% 0% 
Total 30% 12% 30% 
Source: NLSY79 
 
The figures in Table 5.5 demonstrate that country of birth plays a different role in 
the likelihood of incarceration depending on the Latino subgroup. Even though the rates 
of incarceration for Cubans and Mexicans fell below the overall Latino rate, immigrants 
make up a larger share of their incarcerated population than their general population. 
Meanwhile, respondents who identified as Other Hispanic had higher incarceration rates 
and immigration levels than other Latino groups, but immigrants made up a smaller 
proportion of their incarcerated population than their general population. This, in part, 
explains why the Other Hispanic group showed incarceration rates closer to groups with 
higher majority U.S. born respondents.  
Because the vast majority of Latinos surveyed lived in urban spaces in 1979, the 
ever-incarcerated Latino population consists primarily of urban residents. However, 
urban residents do account for a slightly higher percentage of the incarcerated population 
than they do for the general population. And while those proportions differ more for the 
entire 1979 cohort (see bottom row of Table 5.6), the Latino population has a higher level 
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Table 5.6: Ever Incarcerated and Urban Residence by Ethnicity 
1979 Ethnic Origins 
% 
Urban 
% of Urban 
Population –  
Ever 
Incarcerated 




Cuban 97% 10% 100% 
Chicano 96% 15% 100% 
Mexican 95% 11% 95% 
Mexican-American 90% 13% 91% 
Puerto Rican 99% 16% 100% 
Other Hispanic 97% 15% 100% 
Other Spanish 100% 6% 100% 
Total Hispanic/Latino 94% 13% 95% 
All Respondents 78% 11% 83% 
 Note: This tables uses urban residence data from 1979. Source: NLSY79 
of urban residency compared to the general sample. Furthermore, because urban residents 
have higher rates of incarceration than the overall population—11.4 percent incarceration 
rate for urban male residents, as opposed to 9.7 percent among all males in the entire 
NLSY79 sample and 8.2 percent for males living in rural areas—the Latino population 
sits at a higher risk of incarceration by virtue of being a predominantly urban population. 
Even so, the Latino urban population has a higher rate of incarceration than the overall 
urban population. And for each Latino subgroup, the rate of incarceration for male urban 
residents is also higher than each group’s general male population, demonstrating the 
compounding effect of living in an urban area and being an ethno-racial minority.28  
In fact, residents of central cities of standard metropolitan statistical areas have 
even higher rates than the overall urban population at 14 percent. Among the Puerto 
Rican male sample, 67 percent lived in a central city in 1979, compared to 30 percent of 
                                               
28 Calculation for how much the proportion of urban vs. rural changes over the course of the 
study. 
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all Latino males and 20 percent of all males from the 1979 sample. In turn, Puerto Rican 
males living in a central city had a 17 percent incarceration rate. Similarly, 51 percent of 
“Other Hispanic” males lived in a central city in 1979, and 19 percent of male, central 
city “Other Hispanic” residents have been incarcerated. However, Mexican Americans 
living in undefined areas of the metropolitan area (ambiguous addresses, difficult to 
classify as central city or not central city) also had a high group incarceration rate at 20 
percent having been incarcerated.29 This statistic hints at different residential patterns 
between Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, in which the former group may have 
been pushed to the outskirts of cities and the latter has concentrated in inner cities, with 
both types of neighborhoods being easier to patrol than rural areas.30 
Region also distinguishes Latino groups by their varying incarceration rates. As 
an overall trend, a smaller proportion of respondents reported living in the Northeast in 
2014 than they did in 1979, and a larger proportion reported living in the South in 2014.  
Furthermore, considering incarceration rates illuminates the significance of region. For 
both time periods, Western residents made up an even greater proportion of the Mexican 
incarcerated population than they did of the overall Mexican sample and Northeastern 
residents made up a larger proportion of the Puerto Rican incarcerated population than 
                                               
29 For more on how the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area variable was coded, see “NLSY79 
Appendix 6: Urban-Rural and SMSA-Central City Variables,” National Longitudinal Survey, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Available at https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/other-
documentation/codebook-supplement/nlsy79-appendix-6-urban-rural-and. 
30 J.R. Birge and S.M. Pollock note the role that travel time plays in the efficiency of urban police 
patrolling. Furthermore, they note that the primary models for patrolling as of 1989 (twenty years 
into the NLSY79) are based on optimizing systems for urban areas. See Birge and Pollock, 
“Modelling Rural Police Patrol,” The Journal of the Operational Research Society 40, no. 1 
(January 1989): 41.  
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they did of the entire Puerto Rican sample. Looking at the incarceration rates of male 
Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in each region and in each time period, the data reveal that 
those Puerto Ricans who moved to the South faced lower incarceration rates than the 
Puerto Ricans who stayed in the Northeast. Due to the lack of geographic mobility among 
Mexican respondents, the incarceration rates remained stable between both time periods 
and among different regions. This analysis shows that the overall Latino rate of ever 
having been incarcerated conceals a great range of incarcerability depending on the group 
and the regions in which they have resided. That is, the incarceration of Mexicans takes a 
disproportionate toll on residents in the West, while the same is true for Puerto Ricans in 
the Northeast.  
 While residential patterns certainly seem to have an impact on rates of 
incarceration, many studies have also documented the correlation between education and 
the likelihood of incarceration.31 That is, those with lower levels of education are more 
likely to face incarceration, while people who are incarcerated tend to have lower levels 
of education than those in the general population. For instance, a 2009 study found that 
“the incidence of institutionalization problems among young high school dropouts was 
more than 63 times higher than among young four year college graduates.”32 In 2003, the 
 
 
                                               
31 See G. LaVerne Willamson, “Education and Incarceration: An Examination of the Relationship 
Between Educational Achievement and Criminal Behavior,” Journal of Correctional Education 
43, no. 1 (March 1992): 14-22; Richard Arum and Gary LaFree, “Educational Attainment, 
Teacher-Student Ratios, and the Risk of Adult Incarceration among U.S. Birth Cohorts since 
1910,” Sociology of Education 81, no. 4 (October 2008): 397-421.  
32 Andrew Sum et al., The Consequence of Dropping Out of High School (Boston, MA: Center for 
Labor Markets Studies, Northeastern University, 2009), available at 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/The_Consequences_of_Dropping_Out_of_High_School.pdf. 
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Table 5.7: Latinos Ever Incarcerated by Ethnicity and Region of Residence 









    
% Northeast 1979 1% 77% 21% 21% 
% Northeast 2014 0% 56% 14% 15% 
% South 1979 29% 11% 26% 37% 
% South 2014 32% 31% 34% 43% 
% West 1979 62% 5% 45% 19% 
% West 2014 60% 6% 45% 20% 
Ever Incarcerated 
    
% Northeast 1979 0% 87% 28% 19% 
% Northeast 2014 0% 72% 19% 13% 
% South 1979 19% 3% 17% 41% 
% South 2014 25% 11% 25% 49% 
% West 1979 81% 7% 54% 24% 
% West 2014 76% 11% 55% 22%      
1979 Northeast male residents- 
% Ever Incarcerated  
- 16% 14% 9% 
2014 Northeast male residents - 
% Ever Incarcerated  
- 19% 13% 9% 
1979 South male residents -  
% Ever Incarcerated 
9% 6% 9% 11% 
2014 South male residents -  
% Ever Incarcerated 
9% 4% 9% 13% 
1979 West male residents -  
% Ever Incarcerated 
15% - 14% 11% 
1979 West male residents -  
% Ever Incarcerated 
15% - 14% 12% 
Note: The data for “Mexican” in this table includes those respondents who selected “Chicano,” 
“Mexican,” and “Mexican-American” as their primary ethnicity in 1979 due to their relation to 
one another and their similar patterns as it relates to region and incarceration, as well as to form a 
higher N for the group. While disaggregated data for those who selected “Cuban,” “Other 
Hispanic,” and “Other Spanish” is not provided, those individuals’ data is included in the 
aggregate data for “All Hispanic/Latino.” Mexican rates of incarceration in the Northeast and 
Puerto Rican rates of incarceration in the West are not shown due to low Ns. Source: NLSY79 
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Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 41 percent of the incarcerated population had 
not completed high school as compared to just 18 percent of the adult general 
population.33 Economists Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti found that education 
reduces the likelihood of incarceration, and that differences in educational levels between 
black and white men account for 23 percent of the racial disparities in incarceration 
rates.34   
 More recently, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that only 67 percent of Hispanics 
(of any race) ages 25 and older had completed high school, falling well below the rates 
for all other groups, including non-Hispanic white alone (94 percent), black alone (87 
percent), Asian alone (89 percent), and the foreign-born population (72 percent).35 As 
noted previously in the third chapter, the Gastón Institute of the University of 
Massachusetts Boston found that just 61 percent of Puerto Ricans in the state of 
Massachusetts had completed high school.36 Furthermore, the education gap for Latinos 
not only predicts employment and earnings outcomes, but the probability of incarceration 
as well.  
 
 
                                               
33 Caroline Wolf Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations (U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf. 
34 Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, “The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison 
Inmates, Arrests and Self-Reports,” American Economic Review 94, no. 1 (2004): 155-189.  
35 Camile L. Ryan and Kurt Bauman, Educational Attainment in the United States: 2015 
Population Characteristics (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016), available at 
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p20-578.pdf.  
36 Phillip Granberry, Foreign-Born Latinos in Massachusetts (Gastón Institute for Latino 
Community, Development and Public Policy Publications, 2011). 
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*** 
In 1970, Victor entered the U.S. for the first time at age six, moving with his 
parents from Cuba to one of Florida’s major cities.37 His mother had not completed high 
school, and completing high school would prove to be challenging for Victor as well. By 
age 13, he had been stopped by the police for the first time, and by 14, he was sentenced 
to court-ordered counseling, which he refused, opting for probation instead. When he was 
interviewed for the first time in 1979, Victor seemed to have moved past his stages of 
juvenile delinquency; he had a job to occupy his time. That first survey administration, 
the interviewer classified Victor as white. However, by 1980, Victor responded to the 
survey from a jail cell. While, he reported that he had never served time in juvenile 
detention, at 16-years-old, he was stopped by police, arrested, charged, convicted, and 
sentenced to an adult correctional institution. During the 1980 survey, he revealed that he 
had been in several fights at school, skipped school, run away from home, shoplifted, 
stolen property, damaged property, taken a car without permission, drank alcohol, and 
smoked marijuana in the past year. While the crime for which he was charged and 
convicted remains unclear, he stated that he had never used force to obtain the items he 
had taken. Rather, he spent the next seven years behind bars most likely due to a property 
crime, rather than a violent crime. During his time in prison, Victor was classified as 
white in all years but one, in which he was instead classified as “Other.”   
                                               
37 The fictional name “Victor” represents the story of an NLSY79 respondent (survey ID: 7572). 
The only information provided on this respondent’s first conviction is that it was “more than a 
minor traffic offense.” 
 253 
In 1988, he had earned his high school diploma while behind bars and was out of 
prison, working in the inner city, living in poverty, and classified as white. By 1989, he 
was no longer in the labor force, and he was back in jail in the following year, classified 
as “Other” once again. He then continued this in-and-out-of-prison routine—1991 saw 
him out of jail as well as out of the labor force, classified as white; in 1992, he was back 
behind bars, classified as white; in 1993, he was back on the outside, unemployed, in 
poverty, and classified as white; and in 1994, he went back to prison until 1998, being 
classified as both “Other” and white. In 2000, he was out of prison and back in the inner 
city, but not in poverty. In 2002, despite being classified as white by interviewers in most 
years, Victor chose the “Some Other Race” option and identified as Latino. In 2004, he 
was living in poverty again, and inevitably, the location of the next survey he took in 
2008 was jail. Since 2010, however, Victor has not been back to jail, though he has again 
been living in poverty. Looking back to the information that he revealed in 1980, one 
may have expected that Victor’s troubled teenage years would lead him to face more 
severe punishment later in life. However, even as a minor, he was sentenced as an adult 
for a non-violent crime. Victor spent his coming-of-age years behind bars while his peers 
were graduating high school, getting through college, and starting their careers.  
*** 
 Like Victor’s story, other survey responses from the NLSY79 reflect the census 
findings that Latinos, on average, have lower levels of education. When looking at the 
1979 classifications, Hispanic respondents had the lowest average level of education 
compared to other ethno-racial groups, with Mexican respondents ranking the lowest 
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among the Latino subgroups with an average level of education below grade 11. Those 
respondents who refused to classify race except as Hispanic/Latino in 2002 also had an 
lower average grade completed compared to their peers, falling below grade 12 (see 
Table 5.8).38    






1979 White 13.5 11.2 
 Black 12.7 11.5 
 Hispanic/Latino 12.1 10.9 
 Cuban 13.8 11.7 
 Chicano 12.6 10.5 
 Mexican 10.8 10.5 
 Mexican-American 12.3 11.1 
 Puerto Rican 11.9 10.2 
 Other Hispanic 12.9 11.7 
2002 White 13.3 11.0 
 Black or African American 12.6 11.4 
 Some Other Race 12.3 11.5 
 
Respondent Refused to 
Provide Race Other Than 
Hispanic/Latino 11.9 11.0 
 Not Hispanic/Latino 13.2 11.4 
 Hispanic/Latino 12.2 11.1 
Note: Table does not include “Indian-American or Native American” with the other 1979 
categories since that population was marked as “unusually high” The “Asian,” “American Indian 
or Alaska Native,” “Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander,” categories were not included due to 
low Ns. Source: NLSY79 
 
                                               
38 I use 1992 data as this snapshot allowed for youngest members of the 1979 cohort, age 14, to 
complete the highest grade level of education coded in the study—eight years of college in a 
consecutive timeline following high school, which is a rare occurrence at that, with less than one 
percent of the sample completing that many years of education. This year also marked a time 
when the “poor white” sample which skewed data for the white population had been dropped, but 
before the rest of the NLSY79 population began to drop out of the survey for other reasons. Thus, 
the 1992 survey provides the most complete data for education level.  
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 For all ethno-racial groups, the education level consistently drops when 
distinguishing those respondents who had ever been incarcerated, with all showing an 
average grade level below high school completion. Of the incarcerated population, 
Latinos again have the lowest education levels, particularly among those who identified 
as Chicano, Mexican, and Puerto Rican. Even among the never-incarcerated population, 
Latinos show the highest rates of members who had not completed high school as of 
1992 (see Table 5.9).  Furthermore, the role that education—that is, the lack of a high 
school diploma—plays in the likelihood of incarceration is particularly pronounced for 
Puerto Ricans and Chicanos. It should be noted that Lochner and Morretti’s findings from 
their review of NLSY79 data suggested that “the estimated impacts of graduation on 
arrests and incarceration are not simply the result of differential treatment by police and 
judges;” rather, they found a correlation between higher levels of education and lower 
levels of self-reported crime. To be sure, increased schooling is also associated with 
higher wages, which studies have also shown to be correlated with reduced crime and 
incarceration.39  
Another sociologist using the NLSY79 for assessing the state and growth of mass 
incarceration, Bruce Western, suggests that “the collapse of urban labor markets for less-
skilled men in the 1960s and 1970s swelled the ranks of the ghetto poor,” and for that 
                                               
39 See Christopher J. Lyons and Becky Pettit, “Compounded Disadvantage: Race, Incarceration, 
and Wage Growth,” Social Problems 58, no. 2 (May 2011): 257-280; Bruce Western and Becky 
Pettit, “Black-White Wage Inequality, Employment Rates, and Incarceration,” American Journal 
of Sociology 111, no. 2 (September 2005): 553-578. 
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reason, it was low-educated, low-skilled, young men of color who “bore the brunt of 










1979 White 9% 39% 
 Black 14% 31% 
 Hispanic/Latino 25% 49% 
 Cuban 18% 33% 
 Chicano 13% 50% 
 Mexican 40% 50% 
 Mexican-American 22% 51% 
 Puerto Rican 26% 65% 
 Other Hispanic 18% 11% 
2002 White 11% 42% 
 Black or African American 14% 32% 
 Some Other Race 26% 40% 
 
Respondent Refused to 
Provide Race Other Than 
Latino 26% 57% 
 Not Hispanic/Latino 11% 34% 
 Hispanic/Latino 23% 47% 
Note: Table does not include “Indian-American or Native American” with the other 1979 
categories since that population was marked as “unusually high” The “Asian,” “American Indian 
or Alaska Native,” “Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander,” categories were not included due to 
low Ns. Source: NLSY79 
 
incarcerations.”40 In other words, poverty and education work as intertwined forces 
impacting a person’s chances of being incarcerated. People who grow up in poverty lack 
access to high-quality education, which affects their ability to find and keep work and in 
                                               
40 Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2006), 129-130.  
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turn, leaves them poor.41 The data in Table 5.10 show that Latinos had higher rates of 
poverty in 1979 than the white sample. However, disaggregating the data demonstrates 
that Puerto Ricans not only had the highest rates of poverty when compared to other 
groups, but also the likelihood of incarceration was particularly higher for the Puerto 
Ricans who were living in poverty than for those who were not. 





% of Not in 
Poverty 1979 - 
Ever Incarcerated 
% of in  
Poverty 1979 -  
Ever 
Incarcerated 
1979 White 14% 4% 10% 
 Black 37% 17% 26% 
 Hispanic/Latino 32% 11% 17% 
 Mexican 32% 12% 14% 
 Puerto Rican 43% 8% 22% 
2002 White 12% 4% 13% 
 
Black or African 
American 38% 20% 27% 
 Some Other Race 34% 14% 12% 
 
Respondent Refused to 
Provide Race Other 
Than Latino 33% 12% 19% 
 Not Hispanic/Latino 20% 8% 23% 
 Hispanic/Latino 32% 12% 15% 
Note: In addition to groups not listed in Tables 5.10 and 5.9, this table does disaggregate data 
only for the collapsed Mexican category (those identifying as Chicano, Mexican, and Mexican-
American in 1979) and the Puerto Rican category due to low Ns among the other Latino groups 
and the Mexican groups when separated. Source: NLSY79 
 
 The role of poverty in the criminalization of Puerto Ricans is further evidenced by 
considering the effect of persistent poverty on the lives of members of each group. The 
calculations in Table 5.11 provide the average percent of time (survey years) that a 
person reported being in poverty between 1979 and 2014, including cases for which there 
                                               
41 See Williamson; Arum and LaFree. 
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are years with missing data, but excluding the years of missing data from the calculation. 
So, if a respondent only has poverty data for five of the 20 survey years, and in two of 
those years, the respondent is marked as “in poverty,” and in three of those years, he is 
marked as “not in poverty,” he is considered to have been in poverty 40 percent of the 
time—that is, survey years for which there are data. Comparing the never-incarcerated 
population to the ever-incarcerated population, there is a clear correlation between 
persistent poverty and incarceration, with persistent poverty being much higher among 
those who have been incarcerated compared to those who have not. While the average 
persistence of poverty for Latinos is slightly lower than that of black respondents—
whether looking at 1979 ethnicity or 2002 Latino affiliation—disaggregating the data for 
Latino groups reveals the even greater prevalence of poverty in the lives of Puerto 
Ricans, especially those who are incarcerated. 
Table 5.11: Persistent Poverty Among Male Respondents 






1979 White 7% 32% 
 Black 21% 50% 
 Hispanic/Latino 17% 48% 
 Mexican 17% 43% 
 Puerto Rican 23% 64% 
 Cuban 9% 34% 
 Other Hispanic/Spanish 13% 52% 
2002 White 7% 36% 
 Black or African American 21% 49% 
 Some Other Race 16% 40% 
 
Respondent Refused to Provide 
Race Other Than Latino 17% 49% 
 Not Hispanic/Latino 11% 44% 
 Hispanic/Latino 15% 48% 
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Note: Data excluded for ethno-racial categories with low Ns, as in previous tables. The ever-
incarcerated Cuban calculation has a low N (6), but is included in order to show the range in 
persistent poverty between Latino groups, even among the never-incarcerated population. This 
table also excludes the poor white supplemental sample that was dropped from the study after 
1990 in order to avoid skewing data for the white population. Source: NLSY79 
 
Latino Racial Identities as Result of Time Spent in Jail 
 The NLSY79 study provides several ways to consider how incarceration has 
impacted the racial classifications of Latinos. To begin, my analysis models what 
Saperstein and Penner did in their “Race of a Criminal Record” analysis and what 
Hannon and DeFina replicated for people initially classified as white or as black, 
including: (1) assessing how the circumstances of administering the survey in jail can 
impact how an interviewer classifies a person’s race differently than in the previous year, 
(2) investigating how the knowledge of a respondent ever having been incarcerated 
affects how an interviewer classifies the respondent’s race compared to how the 
respondent has been classified in years past, and (3) considering how racial self-identity 
may be impacted as a result of ever having been incarcerated. However, given the serious 
critiques that I and other scholars have of Saperstein and Penner’s framing and 
assessment of the data, I propose additional methods of analysis and ways of organizing 
the data. 
 First, the analysis that follows looks at the respondents who initially self-
identified as both non-white and non-black and those who were classified by interviewers 
as “other” as opposed to white or black. As stated previously, it was these racial others 
who constitute the majority of racial changes across time and Latinos who constitute the 
majority of these racial others. Instead of interrogating the racial changes among the 
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“Other” population, Saperstein and Penner merely acknowledged the “Other” category as 
a middle ground between white and black. Consequently, not only did their research 
design rely on the flawed system of racial cataloging that the NLSY79 used from 1979 to 
1998, which restricted interviewers to the categories of white, black, and other, 
Saperstein and Penner also interpret the “Other” category in a way that happens to suit 
their argument. Interviewers may have understood the “Other” category to mean not 
black and not white, but Saperstein and Penner instead interpreted the “Other” category 
as between black and white. Therefore, while some scholars have attempted to dismantle 
the black-white racial dichotomy because racial others with heritage from Asia, the 
Americas, or the Pacific Islands have struggled to fit within it, Saperstein and Penner 
narrow their ongoing argument in support of racial fluidity by reinforcing the black-white 
racial dichotomy in suggesting that a person is seen either “one way or the other.”42 
Therefore, the work presented in “The Race of a Criminal Record” showcases their 
limited definition of racial fluidity as the back and forth between black and white, not as 
amorphous formations that defy traditional racial boundaries. In reality, looking at the 
NLSY79 data for racial changes through the lens of the racial “Other” experience—the 
majority of which is also a Latino experience—paints a different picture of the 
relationship between incarceration and racial identity and classification.  
 Saperstein and Penner’s analysis, as Hannon and DeFina have noted, also 
mistakenly removed a large number of relevant cases in an attempt to exclude 
                                               
42 Saperstein and Penner, “Race of a Criminal Record,” 106; Aliya Saperstein and Andrew M. 
Penner, “Racial Fluidity and Inequality in the United States,” American Journal of Sociology 118, 
no. 3 (November 2012): 676-727.  
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comparisons with missing resident data. In other words, when Saperstein and Penner 
compared the racial composition of the incarcerated population to that of the non-
incarcerated population, they counted people whose residence was listed as “Jail” in the 
currently incarcerated population and those whose residences was listed as something 
other than “Jail” as not incarcerated, but excluded those who were marked with a missing 
data code for residence in the given year.43 Yet, the dataset provides multiple codes for 
missing data, one of which marked individuals known to live with their parents in earlier 
survey years. By correcting this error as Hannon and DeFina suggested and including 
those respondents known to have been living with their parents and not in jail, the 
number of cases that can be analyzed increases by 18 percent for white respondents and 
22 percent for black respondents.44  
In another respect, however, Saperstein and Penner’s study also over-included 
data by framing their year-to-year change analysis deceptively. They attributed a year-to-
year racial change to a difference in incarceration status, but not a difference in 
incarceration status for an individual. Instead, they compare the currently incarcerated 
population to the not-incarcerated population, equating the difference in racial 
composition between the two groups to a change in carceral status acting as causation for 
                                               
43 The “Not Incarcerated” population in Saperstein and Penner’s analysis included individuals 
residing aboard a ship/barracks, in bachelor/officer quarters, in a dorm/fraternity/sorority, in a 
hospital, in other temporary quarters, in their own dwelling, on base in military family housing, 
off base in military family housing, in an orphanage, at a religious institution, in other individual 
quarters, and in a parental household/under parental care.   
44 Saperstein and Penner’s analysis relied on an N of 91,775 person-years for white respondents 
and an N of 35,418 person-years for black respondents (combined number of years of data 
available for each respondent). Including the respondents who were known to have been living 
with their parents increases the N to 108,303 person-years for white respondents and 43,298 
person-years for black respondents.  
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a change in racial classification at the individual level. However, this analysis does not 
consider if the individual did in fact undergo a change in incarceration status; that is, 
Saperstein and Penner’s “Race Last Year” measure does not account for whether the 
person was also in jail during the previous interview. And while they suggest that racial 
changes are most likely to occur upon incarceration, Saperstein and Penner present data 
for changes in racial classification that may be occurring mid-incarceration or pre- or 
post-incarceration for the non-incarcerated population in the analysis.  
Additionally, Hannon and DeFina argue that Saperstein and Penner had no basis 
to explore the “lasting impact” of incarceration on racial perceptions since the latter pair 
found no initial effect between a year of non-incarceration and a subsequent year of 
incarceration. However, both are flawed conclusions given that the racial processes 
which incarceration sets in motion may not take place immediately or as a result of a 
short stint in prison as opposed to a long stay behind bars. Therefore, the analysis herein 
takes into account that the effects may be long-lasting and may not be immediately 
apparent. Hannon and DeFina do still offer suggestions for organizing data in order to 
assess the lasting impacts of incarceration. They argue that continuously valid residence 
data for 1979 to 1998 must be used in order to avoid relying on one year of provided data 
to determine that an individual was never incarcerated—a rule that Saperstein and Penner 
did not follow. However, Hannon and DeFina suggested strategy eliminates people who 
have data to show that they have been incarcerated and erases the stories of people who 
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have been incarcerated and passed away.45 If data exist for a 1980 interview showing that 
it took place in a jail, but there is no data recorded for residence in 1981, the record still 
definitively demonstrates that the individual had been incarcerated at some point in their 
life, and yet Hannon and DeFina suggest excluding this case, even if residence data exist 
for every other year. Being inclusive of these cases is especially important when focusing 
on the Latino population, for which there is limited data due to a smaller population than 
the “white,” “black,” and “other” categories.  
Furthermore, by default of residence data being recorded for the one day of each 
year that an interview took place, there is bound to be missing residence data for all 
respondents, including people who may have spent anywhere from a matter of days to 
eleven months in jail, never being behind bars at the time of an interview. As Saperstein 
and Penner note, the effects of incarceration persist beyond time spent in jail, perhaps 
even being evident to an interviewer when subjects such as employment over the course 
of the past year arose during the interview. Therefore, there is no way to truly rule out 
cases with “missing data.” Instead, keeping all respondents in the sample provides more 
complete data for an ever-incarcerated measure, given that Hannon and DeFina’s 
suggestion to limit the measure to only those respondents with valid residence data from 
1979 to 1998 (to match the years that interviewers recorded observed race) would reduce 
the sample from 620 individuals who were interviewed in jail between those years to just 
                                               
45 Evelyn J. Patterson describes the detrimental effects of incarceration on inmate’s mortality 
rates, particularly for women and white populations. See “Incarcerating Death: Mortality in U.S. 
State Correctional Facilities, 1985-1998,” Demography 47, no. 3 (August 2010): 587-607. 
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15 of those respondents who also had valid data in each of those survey years, dropping 
97 percent of the sample and all but one Latino respondent.  
To diverge even further from the parameters that Saperstein and Penner set in 
their study, the following analysis also expands on the measure of incarceration, going 
beyond the “Type of Residence” variable that marked respondents interviewed in jail and 
also including the information collected in 1980 that tracked other kinds of criminal 
justice system interactions such as police stops, arrests, charges, juvenile and adult 
convictions and detention, and probation. All of these experiences can help determine 
how individuals have been treated along each stage of the criminal justice system, the 
prevalence of the criminal justice system in the lives of certain communities, and the 
correlation between early interactions with the criminal justice system and later 
incarceration. 
Lastly, the analysis herein also goes past the significance tests that Saperstein and 
Penner used to make their argument that incarceration has an effect on racial self-identity 
and racial classification. Influential statisticians Gene V. Glass and Jacob Cohen have 
made the case for focusing on effect sizes instead of just statistical significance. Glass 
argued that “statistical significance is the least interesting thing about the results. You 
should describe the results in terms of measures of magnitude—not just, does a treatment 
affect people, but how much does it affect them.”46 In the case of this analysis, 
                                               
46 Rex B. Cline, Beyond Statistical Testing: Reforming Data Analysis Methods in Behavioral 
Research (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2004), 95. Also see Jacob 
Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed. (Hillsdale: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1988); Jacob Cohen, “The earth is round (p<.05),” American Psychologist 49, no. 12 
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incarceration acts as the “treatment,” or the action that is being assessed for its effect on 
the population. More broadly, the argument by Glass, Cohen, and other statisticians and 
social scientists to frame results in terms of effect sizes more broadly calls for researchers 
to contextualize their results and provide meaning to them. Emphasizing significance 
tests, as Saperstein and Penner do, falsely equates statistical significance with practical 
significance—that is, an observable impact on lived experiences. However, the sample 
that the NLSY79 provides, with tens of thousands of cases to analyze when taking into 
account each year-to-year difference for over 12,000 individuals over the course of 
almost 20 years, becomes “too big to fail,” in terms of not showing statistical 
significance—the larger the sample, the more likely it is for p-values to approach zero, 
conveying statistical significance.47 However, higher statistical significance does not 
necessarily translate to higher practical significance. Yet, Saperstein and Penner 
articulated the extremely low p-values they found to suggest that incarceration has a high 
impact on racial formations at the individual level, even though the statistical significance 
tests they conducted said nothing about magnitude of the effect, and they did not focus on 
change at the individual level but on differences for a sample of over 90,000 cases. 
Furthermore, because effect sizes can be calculated for small samples, using effect size 
becomes particularly crucial for an examination of Latino data, for which there is a 
limited number of cases that can be analyzed.  
                                               
(1994): 997-1003; Gene V. Glass, B. McGaw, and M.L. Smith, Meta-Analysis in Social Research 
(Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1981). 
 
47 See Mingfeng Lin, Henry Lucas, and Galit Schmueli, “Too Big to Fail: Large Samples and the 
p-Value Problem,” Information Systems Research 24, no. 4 (2013): 906-917. 
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 The discrepancy in the arguments presented by Saperstein and Penner versus 
Hannon and DeFina rests on what each pair believed to be the driving force behind the 
connection between racial change and incarceration. Saperstein and Penner framed the 
linkage between racial change and incarceration by pointing out that the incarcerated 
population had a higher rate of people who had undergone changes in racial classification 
than the non-incarcerated population had. Therefore, they argued that incarceration may 
play a role in increased racial classification changes. Hannon and DeFina, on the other 
hand, noted that the population that underwent changes in racial classification had a 
higher rate of incarceration; and therefore, racially ambiguous individuals—or those who 
observers may struggle to catalog in a white-black-other categorization scheme—are at 
higher risk of having interactions with the criminal justice system than those who are 
racially unambiguous or, at least, unambiguously white. In fact, 25 percent of the ever-
incarcerated population had undergone a change in racial classification, as opposed to 
only 20 percent of the never-incarcerated population. And thinking of it the other way, 
the population who never experienced a change in racial classification had an ever-
incarcerated rate of 5 percent, while the change-in-racial-classification population had an 
ever-incarcerated rate of 7 percent. While it may be difficult to prove causation in either 
direction, simply disaggregating the data can help distinguish the groups to which each 
narrative applies. 
Considering the likelihood of incarceration for racially ambiguous people versus 
racially unambiguous people, Table 5.12 presents incarceration rates for people who self- 
identified as ethnically European, black, or Hispanic/Latino in 1979, disaggregated by  
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Table 5.12: Incarceration Rate by Self-Identified Race and Racial Classifications 
Self-Identified  
Race/Ethnicity 1979 Racial Classifications 1979-1998 Ever Incarcerated 
All Respondents White Only 2.7% 
 Black Only 11.5% 
 Other Only 9.7% 
 White and Black 6.3% 
 White and Other 6.6% 
 Black and Other 6.0% 
 White, Black, & Other 11.5% 
European* White Only 2.4% 
 Black Only 9.4% 
 Other Only 0.0% 
 White and Black 2.3% 
 White and Other 3.8% 
 Black and Other 10.0% 
 White, Black, & Other 5.9% 
Black White Only 0.0% 
 Black Only 11.5% 
 Other Only 0.0% 
 White and Black 7.7% 
 White and Other 0.0% 
 Black and Other 6.8% 
 White, Black, & Other 4.2% 
Hispanic/Latino White Only 2.4% 
 Black Only 0.0% 
 Other Only 7.1% 
 White and Black 0.0% 
 White and Other 6.8% 
 Black and Other 0.0% 
 White, Black, & Other 12.9% 
Note: *The calculations for respondents who self-identified as a European ethnicity as their 
primary ethnic affiliation in 1979 exclude those respondents who also indicated that they were 
black since this analysis means to assess the incarceration rates for those who self-identified as 
white, as opposed to black individuals with European nationality backgrounds, individuals who 
might see themselves as biracial, or individuals who partial blackness has historically been 




how interviewers classified them in each survey year from 1979 to 1998 in which race 
was recorded. Those survey participants who self-identified as European and who 
interviewers consistently classified as white, as well as the individuals who self-identified 
as black and who interviewers consistently classified as black, are considered racially 
unambiguous for the purposes of this analysis. Latinos consistently classified as white, 
black, or as “Other” also potentially demonstrate racial non-ambiguity from the 
perspective of the interviewer, with the latter group then being unequivocally not white 
and not black. Those who were unambiguously white had particularly low rates of 
incarceration while those who were unambiguously black had particularly high rates of 
incarceration. Latinos who were unambiguously “Other”—not white and not black—also 
had a high rate of incarceration. However, the most racially ambiguous Latinos—those 
who had been classified as white, black, and “Other”—had the highest ever-incarcerated 
rate with nearly 13 percent of the population ever having been incarcerated. Therefore, 
Hannon and DeFina’s argument about the high likelihood of incarceration for racially 
ambiguous individuals does not hold for all groups. Hannon and DeFina’s argument 
might be better justified if they considered people consistently classified as “Other” as 
racially ambiguous as opposed to definitively not black and not white. Still, the white-
black-other racially ambiguous group does stand out as an outlier with a high 
incarceration rate among all survey respondents, as well as among Latino respondents. 
Meanwhile, Saperstein and Penner’s suggestion that people are significantly less 
likely to be classified as white and more likely to be classified as black following 
incarceration ignores the fact that among the ever-incarcerated people who underwent 
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changes in racial classification, 70 percent experienced changes between white and other 
(never black), and of the white-other, ever-incarcerated individuals, 83 percent identified 
as a Latino ethnicity in 1979. In fact, white-other classified Latinos account for the 
majority—58 percent—of ever-incarcerated individuals who have undergone a change in 
racial classification.  









White* White Only 94.9% 90.1% -4.8% 
 Black Only 0.9% 3.8% 2.9% 
 Other Only 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 White and Black 1.7% 1.5% -0.2% 
 White and Other 2.0% 3.1% 1.1% 
 Black and Other 0.2% 0.8% 0.6% 
 
White, Black, & 
Other 0.3% 0.8% 0.5% 
Black White Only 0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 
 Black Only 87.0% 91.6% 4.6% 
 Other Only 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 White and Black 10.5% 7.2% -3.3% 
 White and Other 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Black and Other 1.5% 0.9% -0.6% 
 
White, Black, & 
Other 0.8% 0.3% -0.5% 
Hispanic/Latino White Only 9.7% 3.3% -6.4% 
 Black Only 0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 
 Other Only 0.8% 0.8% 0.0% 
 White and Black 0.2% 0.0% -0.2% 
 White and Other 82.9% 83.7% 0.8% 
 Black and Other 0.5% 0.0% -0.5% 
 
White, Black, & 
Other 5.9% 12.2% 6.3% 
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Turning to the amended year-to-year racial classification analysis, Table 5.14 
presents mostly similar results to what Saperstein and Penner presented in their article 
despite including respondents whose residence was coded as missing but known to be 
with their parents—allowing for a larger sample—and excluding the cases in which the 
respondent was incarcerated in the previous year in order to better focus on a change in 
incarceration status as a factor in racial classification differences. Still, the statistical  
Table 5.14: Racial Classification in Previous and Current Year by Incarceration 






Incarcerated Incarcerated Difference 
 
Effect Size 
White White 95.9% 90.5% -5.4%** -0.27* 
 Black 0.5% 0.7% 0.1% 0.02 
 Other 3.6% 8.9% 5.2%** 0.28* 
Black White 1.3% 1.1% -0.2% -0.02 
 Black 98.2% 98.6% 0.4%*** 0.03 
 Other 0.5% 0.2% -0.2% -0.04 
Other White 45.1% 55.7% 10.6% 0.21* 
 Black 2.2% 0.0% -2.2%*** -0.15 
 Other 52.7% 44.3% -8.4% -0.17 
Note: In the “Difference” column, *<0.05 **<0.01, ***<0.001. In the “Effect Size” column, * = 
small effect size, using Hedge’s g with the correction for small sample size bias. Some 
interpretations of effect size identify 0.1 or greater as small effect size of note.  
 
analysis presented in Table 5.14 shows statistical significance for the same comparisons 
for which Saperstein and Penner identified statistically significant results: (1) a smaller 
percentage of people who interviewers classified as white in year one being classified as 
white in year two if they were incarcerated compared to those who were not incarcerated, 
(2) a higher percentage of people who interviewers classified as white in year one being 
classified as “Other” in year two if incarcerated compared to those not incarcerated, and 
(3) a higher percentage of people classified as black by interviewers in year one being 
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classified as black again in year two if incarcerated compared to those not incarcerated. 
However, adding effect sizes to the analysis reframes the results by considering the 
magnitude of the difference between the incarcerated and non-incarcerated populations. 
Most of the effect sizes are trivial to the point of being insignificant, including the 
difference between incarcerated and non-incarcerated black respondents classified as 
black in year one and year two. The only notable effect sizes are for white respondents in 
year one classified as white or other in year two. Even then, the effect size is small—an 
effect only observable through very careful study.48 
Furthermore, among respondents classified as “Other” in the previous year, there 
are no significant differences between the incarcerated and not-incarcerated populations. 
In fact, including the results for respondents who interviewers classified as “Other” in the 
“last year” contradicts the argument that incarcerated individuals are less likely to be 
classified as white and more likely to be seen as black. Instead, among respondents 
classified as “Other” in year one, those who were incarcerated were more likely to be 
labeled as white and less likely to identified as black or as “other.” Yet, the “Other” 
population merits a closer analysis given that most of the racial changes involve people 
classified as “Other” either in “Race Last Year” or “Race This Year,” the majority of 
                                               
48 The threshold for the interpretation of effect sizes can be arbitrary, but the analysis herein relies 
on the conventional standard of interpretations. Some interpretations of effect size levels use 0.1 
as a threshold for a small effect size of note. Jacob Cohen has explained that effect sizes are best 
understood in relation to other relevant measures of interventions. Still, he proposed that a small 
effect size could be thought of as an effect that does indeed make an impact on the subject but 
which can only be observed through very careful study; whereas a large effect (0.8 or greater) 
would be an effect that could be observed with the “naked eye.” See Paul D. Ellis, “Thresholds 
for Interpreting Effect Sizes,” available at 
http://www.polyu.edu.hk/mm/effectsizefaqs/thresholds_for_interpreting_effect_sizes2.html. 
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people classified as “Other” are Latino, and the majority of people experiencing changes 
in racial classification identified as Latino in 1979.49  
 
Table 5.15: Racial Classification Changes, Percent Latino 
Race Last Year Race This Year 
Not 
Incarcerated Incarcerated 
White Black 13% 0% 
 Other 86% 96% 
Black White 12% 20% 
 Other 44% 100% 
Other White 85% 82% 
 Black 42% 0% 
 
In total, Latino person-years make up 75 percent of the cases analyzed for a year-
to-year comparison of racial composition changes of the incarcerated versus the not 
incarcerated populations, excluding instances in which the person was incarcerated in the 
previous year (See Table 5.15). While Latinos make up the majority of individuals whose 
race interviewers classified differently from one year to the next, whether or not 
incarcerated, they do not make up the majority of those whose race changed from white 
to black, black to white, or other to black. No Latinos who were classified as white or 
“Other” in the first year while not incarcerated were classified as black when they were 
incarcerated in the following year. This finding calls into question whether prisons act to 
distinguish between Latinos, regardless of color or phenotype, and non-Latino blacks. 
Indeed, prisons historically have segregated Latinos from both non-Hispanic white and 
non-Hispanic black inmates. 
                                               
49 As noted earlier in the chapter, over 60 percent of respondents who underwent a change in 
racial classification between 1979 and 1998 identified as one of the Latino ethnicities in 1979.  
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Table 5.16: Racial Classification in Previous and Current Year by Incarceration 






Incarcerated Incarcerated Difference 
Effect 
Size 
White White 79.9% 69.8% -10.2%* -0.25* 
 Black 0.4% 0.0% -0.4% -0.07 
 Other 19.6% 30.2% 10.6%* 0.27* 
Black White 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 0.57** 
 Black 43.0% 0.0% -43.0%*** -0.87*** 
 Other 32.0% 50.0% 18.0% 0.38* 
Other White 48.0% 56.0% 8.0% 0.16 
 Black 1.2% 0.0% -1.2% -0.11 
 Other 50.9% 44.0% -6.9% -0.14 
Note: In the “Difference” column, *<0.05 **<0.01, ***<0.001. In the “Effect Size” column, * = 
small effect size, using Hedge’s g.  
 
Filtering the year-to-year comparison for only Latinos, as seen in Table 5.16, the 
retreat from classifying Latinos as black if incarcerated becomes more evident in that 
even those Latinos who were classified as black in the first year were not classified as 
black in the following year when incarcerated. The comparisons for Latinos classified as 
white in the first year show statistical significance in the same ways seen in the overall 
sample. The differences in the comparisons for Latinos classified as black in the first year 
show a pattern opposite of the overall sample. Although the black-to-white and black-to-
other comparisons did not result in statistically significant differences, the effect sizes 
suggest that further study and a larger sample size could produce statistically significant 
differences between the incarcerated and non-incarcerated populations. Again, however, 
the figures for the populations classified as “Other” in the first year demonstrate no 
significant differences between the incarcerated and non-incarcerated populations when 
comparing how they were classified in the following year. 
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 While the analysis with all respondents suggests that blackness is far more fixed 
than whiteness or otherness, the Latino analysis demonstrates that Latino blackness is far 
more fluid for the not incarcerated population. Meanwhile, incarcerated respondents 
classified as black in the first year were never classified as black in the following year, 
suggesting that incarceration acts as a force to exclude Latinos from blackness. This 
practice reinforces the processes which distinguish the non-Latino black population and 
the Latino black population as mutually exclusive groups once they are behind bars. 
However, the approach to limit the data analysis to initial years in which respondents 
were not incarcerated in order to more precisely account for the effect of a change in 
carceral status eliminates the possibility to see change in racial classifications across 
years in which an individual remains in prison.  
*** 
Gabriel was born and raised in a Northeastern city, in a Spanish-speaking home 
by a single, Puerto Rican mother.50 He grew up not knowing anything about his father, 
while his mother, who had only a seventh-grade education struggled to get him through 
school. In 1979, the first survey year, Gabriel was 16-years-old and still in the eighth 
grade; he only ever completed ninth grade. In 1980 when the survey interviewer asked 
about his experiences with the criminal justice system, he reported that he had been 
ordered by a judge to attend counseling. He had, after all, run away from home, taken a 
car without permission, skipped school, and been in a fight at school in the past year. 
Gabriel and his mother had also struggled economically over the past few years; they 
                                               
50 The fictional name “Gabriel” represents the story of an NLSY79 respondent (survey ID: 8958). 
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were living in poverty during the 1978 screening and were out of poverty at the point of 
the first survey, but by 1980, were back in poverty. Gabriel would spend the rest of his 
twenties living in poverty as well. Gabriel also remained unemployed throughout most 
years of the study. To be sure, Gabriel spent many of those years in and out of jail. 
Interviewers met with Gabriel while he was behind bars in 1987, 1989, during a longer 
stay from 1993 to 1998, and again from 2012 to 2014. 
In 1978, the screening interviewer classified Gabriel as Hispanic. Gabriel had the 
same interviewer in 1979 and 1980—someone who classified him as black in the first 
year and “Other” in the second year. Gabriel then took the survey with a different 
interviewer in 1981 and 1982; this interviewer classified him as white the first year and 
black the second year. From 1984 to 1990, Gabriel took the survey again with the 
original person with whom he had interviewed, who consistently classified him as 
racially “Other” in that time period. Another set of interviewers in 1996 and 1998 
classified Gabriel as black and “Other.” Three separate interviewers had identified 
Gabriel as black, but only in one of the eight years in which Gabriel was incarcerated did 
an interviewer classify him as black. Otherwise, interviewers classified Gabriel as 
“Other,” including the interviewer who originally classified him as black in the initial 
survey year. In terms of ethno-racial self-identification, Gabriel identified only as Puerto 
Rican in 1979, and in 2002, he refused to classify his race except as Hispanic/Latino. 
Long-Term Effects of Incarceration on Racial Self-Identity 
 Because the NLSY79 only asked respondents to identify their ethnic/racial 
affiliations in two survey years, the analysis for self-identity necessarily relies on the 
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assumption that incarceration may have long-term effects on how individuals see 
themselves racially following incarceration. Indeed, Racial Identity Development (RID) 
theories posit that racial formations occur over the course of many stages, each of which 
may take several years to transcend.51 Many of these theories acknowledge that 
interactions at school from elementary to college level, as well as at the workplace, will 
likely have an impact on one’s understandings of self-identity as well as group affiliation. 
Jails and prisons also serve as institutions that force unique types of interactions among 
their residents. Consequently, incarceration creates a transformative experience akin 
those of schools and workplaces which cause individuals to reflect, question, and define 
themselves along various intersections of their identity, including race.   
 The following tables show the percent of each 1979-identified ethno-racial group 
that indicated in 2002 that they identified as white, black, “Some Other Race,” or Latino 
and refused to identify their race otherwise, with a comparison between those who had 
never been incarcerated as of 2002 and those who had been incarcerated as of 2002. In 
general, a smaller proportion of 1979 self-identified Latinos indicated that they were 
white if they had ever been incarcerated compared to those who had never been 
incarcerated. However, when the data for Latinos are disaggregated by ethnic group, the 
                                               
51 See Beverly Daniel Tatum, “Talking about Race, Learning about Racism: The Application of 
Racial Identity Development Theory in the Classroom,” Harvard Educational Review 62, no. 1 
(1992): 1-24; D.R. Atkinson, G. Morten, and D. W. Sue, eds., Counseling American Minorities: 
A Cross Cultural Perspective (New York: McGraw Hill Company, 1998); W.E. Cross Jr. and P. 
Fhagen-Smith, “Nigrescence and Ego Identity Development: Accounting for differential Black 
Identity Patterns” in Counseling Across Cultures, 4th ed., eds. P.B. Pedersen, J.G. Draguns, W.J. 
Lomer, and J.E. Trimble (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), 108-123; B.M. Ferdman and P.I. 
Gallegos, “Racial Identity Development and Latinos in the United States,” in New Perspectives 
on Racial Identity Development: A Theoretical and Practical Anthology, eds. C.L. Wijeyesinghe 
and B.W. Jackson, III (New York: New York University Press, 2001) 32-66. 
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comparisons show a divergent pattern for Chicanos, whose ever-incarcerated population 
actually identified as white in 2002 at a higher rate than those who had never been 
incarcerated. 
 







Incarcerated Difference Effect Size 
White 96.9% 89.2% -7.7%*** -0.43* 
Black 1.3% 0.8% -0.5% -0.05 
Hispanic/Latino 44.7% 34.9% -9.8% -0.20* 
Cuban 67.1% 60.0% -7.1% -0.15* 
Chicano 23.7% 40.0% 16.3% 0.37** 
Mexican 42.4% 33.3% -9.1% -0.18 
Mexican-American 48.1% 38.9% -9.2% -0.18 
Puerto Rican 32.5% 21.1% -11.5% -0.25* 
Note: The never- and ever-incarcerated measures rely on data from 1979 to 2002 to exclude those 
respondents who have only been incarcerated after 2002, so that future incarceration does not 
weigh into an analysis on racial change. The “Other Hispanic” and “Other Spanish” categories, 
along with other racial categories, are excluded due to low Ns. Source: NSLY79 
 







Incarcerated Difference Effect Size 
White 1.7% 3.1% 1.3% 0.10* 
Black 98.7% 98.8% 0.1% 0.01 
Hispanic/Latino 1.1% 1.2% 0.1% 0.01 
Cuban 2.6% 0.0% -2.6% -0.17* 
Chicano - - - - 
Mexican - - - - 
Mexican-American 0.6% 0.0% -0.6% -0.08 
Puerto Rican 2.9% 5.3% 2.4% 0.14* 
Note: The never- and ever-incarcerated measures rely on data from 1979 to 2002 to exclude those 
respondents who have only been incarcerated after 2002, so that future incarceration does not 
weigh into an analysis on racial change. The “Other Hispanic” and “Other Spanish” categories, 
along with other racial categories, are excluded due to low Ns. Source: NSLY79 
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 Similarly, the ever-incarcerated Latino population showed a lower rate of black 
identification in 2002 as compared to the never-incarcerated Latino population. This 
trend does, however, vary by ethnic group as seen in Table 5.18. No Chicanos or 
Mexicans, incarcerated or not, identified as black in 2002; a smaller proportion of Cubans 
and Mexican Americans who had ever been incarcerated identified as black in 2002 
compared to their never-incarcerated counterparts; and a greater share of the incarcerated 
population identified as black compared to the never-incarcerated population among 
Puerto Ricans. Still, the proportions of Latinos who identified as black across all groups 
is relatively low, with much greater shares of the Latino population identifying as white, 
“Some Other Race,” or refusing to classify race other than indicating that they were 
Latino/Hispanic. Cubans, Mexican Americans, and Puerto Ricans who had ever been 
incarcerated selected the “Some Other Race” category in 2002 at higher rates than the 
never-incarcerated members of their groups. Chicanos and Mexicans, on the other hand, 
showed the opposite trend.   







Incarcerated Difference Effect Size 
White 0.9% 3.1% 2.2% 0.22* 
Black 0.6% 0.4% -0.2% -0.02 
Hispanic/Latino 20.4% 22.9% 2.5% 0.06 
Cuban 17.1% 40.0% 22.9% 0.59*** 
Chicano 29.0% 20.0% -9.0% -0.20* 
Mexican 16.8% 6.7% -10.1% -0.27* 
Mexican-American 14.8% 16.7% 1.8% 0.05 
Puerto Rican 37.3% 42.1% 4.8% 0.10* 
Note: The never- and ever-incarcerated measures rely on data from 1979 to 2002 to exclude those 
respondents who have only been incarcerated after 2002, so that future incarceration does not 
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weigh into an analysis on racial change. The “Other Hispanic” and “Other Spanish” categories, 
along with other racial categories, are excluded due to low Ns. Source: NSLY79 
 
 Those Latinos who refused to provide race—that is, select one of the provided 
response options for classifying race—also showed notable differences between the ever-
incarcerated and the never-incarcerated populations as presented in Table 5.20. Among 
Cuban and Chicano respondents, the never-incarcerated population refused to provide 
race other than Latino at higher rates than the ever-incarcerated population. The opposite 
was true for the Mexican, Mexican American, and Puerto Rican populations. Of course, 
with the forced segregation between white, black, and Hispanic populations in many 
prisons, the carceral experience had the ability to reinforce the othering of Latinos as a 
unique racial identity, mutually exclusive from non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic 
black populations.   
 








Incarcerated Difference Effect Size 
White 0.5% 1.5% 1.0% 0.13* 
Black 0.2% 0.0% -0.2% -0.04 
Hispanic/Latino 34.8% 38.6% 3.7% 0.08 
Cuban 14.5% 0.0% -14.5% -0.42** 
Chicano 47.4% 20.0% -27.4% -0.55*** 
Mexican 40.8% 60.0% 19.2% 0.39* 
Mexican-American 37.9% 41.7% 3.8% 0.08 
Puerto Rican 28.7% 31.6% 2.9% 0.06 
Note: The never- and ever-incarcerated measures rely on data from 1979 to 2002 to exclude those 
respondents who have only been incarcerated after 2002, so that future incarceration does not 
weigh into an analysis on racial change. The “Other Hispanic” and “Other Spanish” categories, 
along with other racial categories, are excluded due to low Ns. Source: NSLY79 
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 Since respondents had the ability to indicate whether they identified as 
Latino/Hispanic in addition to selecting their racial affiliation, the vast majority of the 
respondents who identified with a Latino ethnic origin in 1979 affirmed their Latino 
identity without having to choose between checking that or one of the racial categories as 
mutually exclusive options. In all cases, except for Puerto Ricans, the ever-incarcerated 
respondents who identified with a Latino/Hispanic background in 1979 affirmed Latino 
identity in 2002 at even higher rates than their never-incarcerated peers. In fact, 100 
percent of ever-incarcerated Cubans, Chicanos, and Mexicans asserted their Latino 
identities, which again demonstrates the potential impact of prisons and jails to 
underscore the distinctive character of Latinos, particularly in comparison to white and 
black individuals without Latino affiliations.  
 







Incarcerated Difference Effect Size 
White 2.6% 7.7% 5.1%* 0.31** 
Black 0.7% 0.8% 0.1% 0.01 
Hispanic/Latino 95.9% 97.6% 1.7% 0.09 
Cuban 93.4% 100.0% 6.6% 0.27* 
Chicano 97.4% 100.0% 2.6% 0.17* 
Mexican 96.8% 100.0% 3.2% 0.19* 
Mexican-American 96.7% 97.2% 0.5% 0.03 
Puerto Rican 95.7% 94.7% -0.9% -0.05 
Note: The never- and ever-incarcerated measures rely on data from 1979 to 2002 to exclude those 
respondents who have only been incarcerated after 2002, so that future incarceration does not 
weigh into an analysis on racial change. The “Other Hispanic” and “Other Spanish” categories, 






At age 17 for the first survey year, Oscar identified as Chicano.52 The term fit his 
background, having been born and raised in a Western, rural town to a Mexican-
American mother born in the United States and a father who had been born in and 
immigrated from Mexico. The label “Chicano” called attention to Oscar’s circumstances 
of being at least a third generation American on his mother’s side, but also having an 
immigrant father and speaking Spanish at home. It meant identifying with people in the 
Southwest who shared his Mexican heritage and who had spent the past couple of 
decades advocating for their rights as agricultural laborers and as communities with 
historical roots in the region. Oscar seemed to maintain this stance of racial otherness 
throughout his life; he refused to classify his race other than as Hispanic/Latino in 2002. 
Most of the interviewers, however, classified Oscar as white. The interviewer who met 
with Oscar in 1980 and 1982 classified him as white during both survey administrations, 
as did the interviewer who met with him in 1989 and 1990 and the one who interviewed 
him from 1991 to 1996. In contrast, another survey administrator classified Oscar as 
racially “Other” in both years, 1983 and 1984, that she interviewed him. The repeat 
interviewers never wavered in their assessment of Oscar’s racial classification, but they 
did contradict one another and Oscar as well.  
As for his interactions with the criminal justice system, Oscar had dropped out of 
school by the time he participated in the first survey year, and by the time he was 18 
years old, he had experienced run-ins with the law. After dropping out of school 
                                               
52 The fictional name “Oscar” represents the story of an NLSY79 respondent (survey ID: 8400). 
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following the ninth grade, Oscar started working, but smoked marijuana frequently and 
became involved in a physical altercation at work for which he was charged with 
seriously threatening the other person. Oscar was also arrested and charged for vandalism 
twice. He eventually received an eight-month probation sentence as well as jail time for 
these actions. This trouble led to him losing his job and being unemployed and living in 
poverty with his parents for the next couple of years. He spent the rest of the 1980s in and 
out of jail, living back with his parents when he was out, only sometimes employed. 
However, by the end of the decade, and probably because he had time while behind bars, 
Oscar finally earned his high school diploma at age 27. He stayed out of prison for the 
next several years. Then, in 1994, Oscar received a longer sentence, and ended up serving 
five years in prison. He was living with parents again for the 2000 survey, and even 
though he had moved out on his own by 2002, he was still living in poverty. Perhaps as a 
result of these tough times, Oscar found himself in a prison cell once again in 2006 until 
his death in 2008. Even though Oscar had claimed a sort of racial otherness in both 1979 
and 2002, interviewers classified him as white in every survey year that he was in prison. 
Oscar’s story demonstrates the discrepancy between how Latinos’ race may be recorded 
on paper by an outside observer and how they persistently see themselves.  
Criminal Justice Interaction  
In 1980, respondents answered several questions regarding their interactions with 
police and the law—if they had ever been stopped by police, booked, charged with illegal 
activity, convicted of illegal activity, on probation, or sentenced to youth or adult 
correctional institutions. Although survey administrators only recorded this information 
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for one year, taking it into account helps formulate a more holistic measure of interaction 
with the criminal justice system. Furthermore, the survey framed these questions to 
determine whether respondents had ever had these experiences. Despite the bias of this 
being only the second year in the longitudinal study with one third of the respondents 
being under age 18, the data reveal that nearly one in four respondents (23 percent) had 
had interactions with the criminal justice system by 1980, and one in three (34 percent) of 
all male respondents had interacted with the criminal justice system by that time. These 
statistics are relatively similar among white, black, and Latino-identified respondents, 
with black women showing a lower rate of criminal justice interaction than white and 
Latina women.53  
Table 5.22: Percent of Group with Criminal Justice Interaction as of 1980 
Self-Identity 1979 Total Male Female 
White 23.2% 65.6% 11.7% 
Black 20.8% 65.8% 7.0% 
Hispanic/Latino 22.0% 66.9% 11.0% 
Cuban 14.7% 75.0% 1.9% 
Chicano 32.2% 56.7% 20.7% 
Mexican 18.3% 68.4% 4.7% 
Mexican-American 24.4% 66.5% 15.7% 
Puerto Rican 23.2% 63.3% 9.3% 
Other Hispanic 18.6% 68.8% 3.7% 
Other Spanish 20.8% 71.4% 16.4% 




                                               
53 Of ten male Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander respondents, 60 percent had past interactions 
with the criminal justice system as of 1980; American Indian/Alaska Native male respondents 
also had a particularly high rate of criminal justice interaction at 40 percent (N=285); Chicano 




Table 5.23: Criminal Justice Interaction vs. Ever Incarcerated  
Self-Identity 
1979 
% with Criminal 
Justice Interaction 
as of 1980 
% Ever 
Incarcerated 




% of Ever 
Incarcerated 
Population 
White 23% 3% 43% 19% 
Black 21% 11% 22% 49% 
Hispanic/Latino 22% 7% 14% 18% 
Source: NLSY79  
When considering incarceration in later years, however, the data tells an 
interesting story when it comes to race: white respondents make up a greater share of the 
population who had come into contact with the criminal justice system as of 1980 than 
the population who had ever been in jail as of 2014. This finding suggests, as previous 
research has indicated, that along each step of the criminal justice process and over the 
course of one’s life, people of color are likely to be more severely punished—
incarcerated and for longer sentences—than their white counterparts (see Table 5.23). 
Although a correlation exists between criminal justice interactions in 1980 and future  
Table 5.24: Correlation Between Criminal Justice Interaction as of 1980 and Future 
Incarceration 
Self-Identity 1979 Correlation  





Puerto Rican 0.202** 
Cuban 0.343** 
Other Hispanic/Spanish 0.202** 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed). Source: NLSY79 
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incarceration between 1981 and 2014, the correlation is even stronger for black and  
Latino respondents. That is, experiences with the criminal justice system at earlier ages 
are less likely to predict future run-ins with the law that lead to incarceration for white 
respondents than they are for black and Latino respondents. While the highest correlation 
between prior criminal justice interaction and future incarceration can be found among 
black respondents—those with the highest incarceration rate—Puerto Rican respondents, 
who have the highest ever-incarcerated rates among Latinos actually show the lowest 
correlations between criminal justice interaction as of 1980 and later incarceration. 
Cubans, on the other hand, who had lower incarceration rates, demonstrated a particularly 
high correlation between early criminal justice interactions and future incarceration, 
which once again demonstrates the distinctions between Latino ethnic groups and how 
their relationships with the criminal justice system are defined. 
Conclusion 
 The information that can be drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979 demonstrates that Latinos have unique experiences with the criminal justice 
system, not only in comparison to their non-Hispanic black and white counterparts, but 
among the various ethnic groups that the label “Latino” encompasses, as well as across 
geographies. Many of the figures presented in this chapter show that Puerto Rican 
respondents have particularly dire circumstances which makes incarceration almost 
inevitable between poverty, low education levels, and inner city residency. While 
aggregate numbers for Latinos fall below the incarceration levels of African Americans, 
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Puerto Rican rates of incarceration, according to the data herein, seem to rival those of 
black Americans.  
 Furthermore, as the story of Oscar demonstrates, when criminal justice statistics 
put forth incarceration numbers, they typically do not capture the full scope of those 
people whose lives have been touched and destroyed by mass incarceration. Most figures 
account for people who are either currently incarcerated or who have ever been 
incarcerated, but exclude those who are deceased. However, the communities that 
encounter the criminal justice system with more frequency—such as Mexican 
communities on the outskirts of metropolitan areas in the West and Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods in Northeastern inner cities—stand to lose significant numbers of their 
neighbors when they serve out sentences and die behind bars.  
 While Saperstein and Penner’s findings prove problematic when reframing the 
data to consider the Latino experience, the new set of results underscore the need for 
further investigation into the racial formations instigated by incarceration for Latinos. 
Certainly, the data on incarcerated Latinos shows that their racial “Otherness” is not 
necessarily a middle ground between perceived whiteness pre-incarceration and 
perceived blackness during and post-incarceration. Rather, incarcerated Latinos were 
typically not classified as black. While 96 percent of the 123 Latinos who had ever been 
incarcerated had also been classified as different races by the interviewer, only 12 percent 
of those respondents were ever classified as black. Instead the changes in racial 
classification for the incarcerated Latino population tended to reflect an inconsistent 
decision between classifying the individual as either white or “Other,” but in the context 
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of a new prison sentence, those respondents were not more likely to be seen as black. 
And in terms of self-identity, incarcerated Latinos, more than their never-incarcerated 
peers in some cases, tended to resist prescribed racial categories and instead retreated to 
an idea of race that was not articulated by the survey response options—theirs was some 



















Conclusion – Another Generation 
 Each new cycle of the U.S. Census has introduced a change in the way the federal 
government formally categorizes people. In turn, these counts help policymakers address 
issues and concerns related to different demographics, and quite notably, reapportion 
congressional seats and Electoral College votes. Questions related to race have been a 
staple of the census since its inauguration in 1790. The terms and mechanisms eventually 
used to count people of Latin American ancestry, however, have usually been 
accompanied by controversy.  
In 1930, Mexican activist groups feared that the new “Mexican” category 
excluded them from being racially white, relegating them to second-class citizenship. In 
1970, the new question about Latino descent only went to five percent of Americans and 
was not translated into Spanish, while the wording of the question prompted people from 
the central and southern regions of the United States to identify as Central and South 
American. In 1980 and 1990, the question on “Spanish/Hispanic origin or descent” 
appeared on the short form which went to all households, but was asked as a separate 
question following the item on race, leading many Hispanic respondents to select “Other” 
for race and write in a response, such as “Mexican.” In 2000, the 
“Spanish/Hispanic/Latino” question preceded the race question and included instructions 
to answer both items in the hopes that Latinos would not select “Other” for race, an effort 
which largely failed. And in 2010, the form added another line of explanation: “For this 
census, Hispanic origins are not races,” seemingly conceding the point that, in practice, 
Hispanic/Latino did function as a racial identity in the minds of those who associated 
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with that designation.54 Nevertheless, the rise of “Some Other Race” persisted as a 
selection popularized by those identifying as Hispanic/Latino, and it ranked as the third 
largest race category selected after “White” and “Black.” 
Now, in anticipation of the 2020 U.S. Census, a new controversy surrounds a 
change that would threaten adequate representation for Latino communities. In March 
2018, Commerce Secretary Wilbur L. Ross Jr. announced the addition of a citizenship 
question to the form, despite consistent concern since 1980 that such a question would 
cause non-citizens, especially undocumented immigrants, to refrain from participating in 
the census. Given that many non-citizens, undocumented immigrants especially, identify 
as Latino and that members of Latino households may be of mixed citizenship statuses, 
Latinos as a whole may be undercounted, reducing the power of politicians and advocacy 
groups to petition for federal funding to support this growing demographic.55  
Almost ironically, as the last-minute decision to incorporate a citizenship question 
could dampen participation by Latinos, the bureau had spent years since the 2010 Census 
investigating ways to secure Latino inclusion in the census process, along with 
affirmative answers on race. As part of that research, the bureau experimented with the 
addition of the Hispanic/Latino category among the response options for the race 
                                               
54 G. Cristina Mora, Making Hispanics: How Activists, Bureaucrats, and Media Constructed a 
New American (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014); D’vera Cohn, Census History: 
Counting Hispanics (Pew Research Center, 2010); United States Census Bureau, “History: 
Questionnaires,” available at 
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/questionnaires/2010_overview.html. 
55 Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population Growth and Change 




question in an effort to more accurately reflect the way individuals self-identify racially, 
without subscribing to fixed notions of race as biological or genetic facts. In trials, this 
led to Latinos being far less likely to select “Some Other Race” by default.56 However, 
the initiative for the U.S. Census to finally acknowledge over a century of Latino lived 
experiences could potentially be counteracted by the effect of the citizenship question.  
At the root of the problem is the reluctance of immigrants to “out” themselves as 
non-citizens, given the consequences they face with law enforcement agencies. While the 
efforts to deport have been relentless in the twenty-first century, the Trump 
administration has been particularly explicit in its criminalization of Latino immigrants. 
This antagonism between Latino communities and the state results in distrust between 
Latinos, regardless of their nativity, and officers of the law. Consequently, these 
experiences of criminalization further distance Latinos from whiteness as evidenced by 
the growing trend of Latinos to identify as “Some Other Race” instead of claiming to be 
white based on European ancestry. Even more telling, the retreat from associating with 
whiteness correlates with low economic status, while impoverished communities are 
most vulnerable to the wrath of the criminal justice system, as “social and economic 
disadvantage [crystallize] in penal confinement.”57  
                                               
56 Sowmiya Ashok, “The Rise of the American ‘Others,’” The Atlantic, August 27, 2016. 
57 Bruce Western and Becky Pettit, “Incarceration & Social Inequality,” Daedalus 139, no. 3 
(2010): 8-19. This retreat refers to efforts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for 
Latino advocacy groups to claim whiteness as a means to assert civil rights. Advocacy groups no 
longer employ this strategy, and the proportions of Latinos choosing “Some Other Race” have 
increased over time. On the correlation between class and racial identity, see Nicholas Vargas, 
“Latino/o Whitening?: Which Latina/os Self-Classify as White and Report Being Perceived as 
White by Other Americans?” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 12, no. 1 (Spring 
2015): 119-136. Vargas also explains that even among those Latino/as who self-identify as white, 
only a small fraction indicate that that they are perceived to be white by others. 
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Indeed, many of the social ills that continue to plague Latinos will have further 
implications for incarceration as the population continues to grow, outpacing other ethno-
racial groups in the country.58 For instance, poverty serves as a major predictor of 
incarcerability, and 2010 Census data showed that the median income for Hispanic 
households was $40,000 compared to a median of $49,800 for all U.S. households. 
Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, the most populous Latino groups, had even lower 
household incomes at $38,700 and $36,000, respectively. Meanwhile, the United States 
had a poverty rate of 15 percent, but the rate for Hispanics was 25 percent, and Mexicans 
and Puerto Ricans had higher rates of poverty at 27 percent. Furthermore, the greatest 
share of children living in poverty is Latino (37.3 percent), compared to white (30.5 
percent) or black (26.6 percent).59 Additionally, the stability of homeownership is only an 
experience enjoyed by 47 percent of Hispanic households, compared to nearly two-thirds 
(65 percent) of all U.S. households.60 This type of economic insecurity coupled with the 
rising number of Latinos foreshadows growing proportions of Latinos entering the 
criminal justice system. 
                                               
58 The Latino population boom took off in the 1990s and has only leveled off since the 2008 
recession. Since then, the Asian population has grown at a high rate. Still, those born during the 
Latino population boom are now entering the ages in which they are most likely to make contact 
with the criminal justice system. See Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Hispanic population growth has 
leveled off (Pew Research Center,  2017). 
59 Mark Hugo Lopez and Gabriel Velasco, Childhood Poverty Among Hispanics Sets Record, 
Leads Nation (Pew Research Center, 2011).  
60 Analysis by Reveal from the Center for Investigative Reporting found that “African Americans 
and Latinos continue to be routinely denied conventional mortgage loans at rates far higher than 
their white counterparts.” See Aaron Glantz and Emmanuel Martinez, “For people of color, banks 




Federal data also show that Hispanics have maintained higher high school dropout 
rates (9.2 percent) than their black (6.5 percent) and white (4.6 percent) peers. Even 
though the gap between Hispanic and non-Hispanic dropout rates has been reduced since 
the 1970s when the rates sat at 34.3 percent for Hispanic students, 21.3 for black 
students, and 12.3 percent for white students, Latinos still fall far behind in the share that 
have a bachelor’s degree or more at 13 percent, compared to 28 percent of the U.S. 
population as a whole.61 These educational disparities carry the consequence of increased 
likelihood for Latinos to enter the criminal justice system. In 2003, 18 percent of the 
general population compared to 41 percent of the incarcerated population had a high 
school diploma or less. While academic and behavior problems, as well as a general loss 
of interest in school, drove the incarcerated population out of school and placed them on 
a path toward prison, a deficit in educational attainment may also be compounded by 
shortcomings in English language acquisition.62     
As of 2010, 91 percent of the U.S. population was proficient in the English 
language, but only 65 percent of Latinos were. In regards to incarceration, language 
barriers translate into obstacles in navigating the criminal justice system. The limited-
English-proficient accused have no explicit right to an interpreter. Instead, they depend 
on judges and legal representation to recognize that their Sixth Amendment rights would 
                                               
61 J. McFarland et al., The Condition of Education 2017 (National Center for Education Statistics, 
2017), available at https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/; Seth Motel and Eileen Patten, The 10 
Largest Hispanic Origin Groups: Characteristics, Rankings, and Top Counties (Pew Research 
Center, 2012). 
62 Caroline Wolf Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations (U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf. 
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be violated without an interpreter and that being in the courtroom without an interpreter 
would consist of “meaningless experiences, incomprehensible rituals, guaranteed 
confusion, and, among other things, ‘a babble of voices.’”63 Furthermore, limited-
English-proficient incarcerated Latinos also lack access to programming meant to help 
the prison population through their sentence with rehabilitation and plans to avoid 
recidivism when those programs are not available in Spanish.  
Recent census data also provide other distinguishing information about Latino 
populations across the United States that inform the connection between Latinos and the 
criminal justice system. For instance, the median age for Hispanics is much lower at 27 
years compared to the median for the total population, which is 37 years. Age represents 
an important factor when predicting incarcerability, given that the people most likely to 
commit crimes—and therefore, be suspected of committing crimes—tend to be on the 
younger side of the age spectrum.  
Also, attacks on immigrants significantly impact Latino communities as over a 
third of Latinos in the U.S. are foreign born, while just 13 percent of the overall U.S. 
population is foreign born. The proportions of the foreign born are even higher among 
certain Caribbean, Central, and South American countries, from 57 percent of 
Dominicans to 67 percent of Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Peruvians.64 And while only 
                                               
63 Lupe S. Salinas, “The Rights of the Limited-English-Proficient Accused in the Criminal 
Courts,” in U.S. Latinos and Criminal Injustice (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
2015), 172.  
64 The percentages of foreign born for other Latino groups include: 65 percent of Ecuadorians and 
Colombians, 62 percent of Salvadorans, 59 percent of Cubans, and 36 percent of Mexicans. Motel 
and Patten, “The 10 Largest Hispanic Origin Groups.” 
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7 percent of the total population are not U.S. citizens, 35 percent of Hispanics do not 
have U.S. citizenship, subjecting a much greater share of Latinos to immigration 
enforcement laws compared to the share of the general population.  
While immigrants remain a significant portion of the Latino population, the 
group’s growth has been mostly attributable to U.S. births since the 2000s. Most notably, 
growth in real numbers continues to be highest in the Southwest where Latinos have 
typically concentrated, but counties in the Northeast have had the largest shares of Latino 
population growth and the fastest-growing Latino populations have been in the South and 
Midwest, areas where Latinos have not had a strong presence historically. That being 
said, black residents have maintained their place as the majority minority in many of 
these states.65 In those areas with much larger black populations, despite the growth of 
the Latino population, black Americans still represent the target of a dominant white 
society’s criminal justice system of control. But without a large black population serving 
as a foil, a rapidly growing Latino population may seem like the most imminent threat. 
According to Hubert Blalock’s power-threat theory, this census information suggests that 
the states experiencing large and fast Latino population growth may increase their use of 
incarceration as a tool to control the new growing minority population in order to protect 
the status quo of the dominant society.66 
Even with the information from the census considered, gaps in the data persist 
                                               
65 “Mapping America: Every City, Every Block,” New York Times, 2010, available at 
http://projects.nytimes.com/census/2010/map. 
66 See Hubert Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations (New York: John Wiley, 
1967); and Power and Conflict: Toward a General Theory (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989).  
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when it comes to understanding the Latino experience with the criminal justice system 
and mass incarceration in recent decades. But a comprehensive review of the various 
databases available can help fill those gaps. For instance, further examination of the 
robust National Longitudinal Survey of Youth database would shed light on the ways that 
understandings of Latinos’ race have changed over time, differing by generation, while 
the reach of the criminal justice system has mostly expanded and only slightly contracted 
in recent years. In 1997, the Bureau of Labor began an additional longitudinal study with 
a new cohort of young respondents—the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 
(NLSY97). The NLSY97 assesses the longitudinal outcomes for a nationally 
representative sample of 9,000 youths, ages 12 to 17 who were initially interviewed in 
1997. While the 1997 sample is roughly two-thirds the size of the NLSY79, the study has 
collected far more measures on race, ethnicity, and criminal justice interaction.  
The NLSY97 has asked about Hispanic/Latino identity as ethnicity separate from 
questions on race, but has made a point to consistently ask about both race and 
ethnicity.67 As for experiences with the criminal justice system, the NLSY97 database 
also provides a month-by-month account of incarceration status, backdating the measure 
to account for experiences from 1992 to 2014. The study also collected data from 
respondents on gang and criminal activity, drug use, arrests, probation and parole details, 
types of charges, convictions, sentences served, and experiences upon reentry in various 
                                               
67 The study collected race and ethnicity data from the respondent in 1997 and 2002, interviewers 
recorded race for the respondent from 1997 to 2001 (with choices of black, white, and other from 
1997 to 2000, and check-all-that-apply options akin to the NLSY79 2002 categories), and the 
race/ethnicity for the respondents’ household members, friends, dating/sexual partners, and work 
supervisors was also reported. 
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survey years. The wealth of data that the NLSY97 offers on the intersections between 
race and incarceration allows for a multitude of approaches to exploring the findings as a 
way of understanding Latino experiences with the criminal justice system and the 
potential impact of the system on Latino identity.  
While the NLSY79 included 1,834 respondents who identified primarily with a 
Latino/Hispanic ethnic origin in the first survey year, accounting for 15 percent of the 
overall sample, the NLSY97 includes 1,901 respondents who identified as Hispanic in the 
inaugural survey year, which accounted for 21 percent of the entire survey population. In 
2002, both cohorts were asked to classify their race, being presented with aligned 
response options. While both cohorts identified as white, black, and “Some Other Race” 
at similar rates, the younger cohort “refused to classify race other than Latino/Hispanic” 
at a much higher rate, 52 percent compared to just 35 percent among the NLSY79 cohort.  
The NLSY97, like the NLSY79, also allows for insightful disaggregation of the 
data given that interviewers recorded ethnicities for respondents in 1999, including 
Cuban/Cubano, Chicano, Mexican/Mexicano, Mexican-American, Puerto 
Rican/Puertoriqueño/Borincano, Other Latino/Hispano/Latin-American Descent, and 
Other Spanish Descent. Furthermore, during the 2008, 2009, and 2010 surveys, 
interviewers used a color card to record the respondent’s skin color.  
Overall, participants who identified as non-Hispanic white in 1997 had a 
perceived skin color average of 1.8 on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lightest and 10 
being the darkest, while interviewers reported that Hispanic white respondents had a 2.5 
skin color level on average. Non-Hispanic black respondents had an average perceived 
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skin color level of 6.2, while black Hispanics averaged 4.5 according to interviewers. 
Those Latinos who identified as “Something Else” when asked to classify their race in 
1997, reportedly had an average skin color level of 2.9. These data demonstrate the role 
that skin color plays in the racial identities of Latinos. To be sure, the perceived skin 
color of respondents differed by incarceration status for all ethno-racial groups as well—
the ever-incarcerated group had a darker perceived skin color on average compared to 
their never-incarcerated counterparts (see Table 6.1).  






Race/Ethnicity 1997 Mean N Mean N 
Not Hispanic 3.3 4659 3.9 425 
   White 1.7 2830 1.9 233 
   Black 6.2 1617 6.5 179 
   “Something Else” 3.0 78 3.3 6 
Hispanic 2.7 1254 3.0 119 
   White 2.5 551 2.6 54 
   Black 4.4 35 4.9 7 
   “Something Else” 2.8 617 3.1 54 
 
Together, the ethnic backgrounds and the perceived skin color of the NLSY97 
respondents help piece together the racial formations of individuals who identified as 
Latino in 1997 and/or 2002. Moreover, the collection of skin color data for survey 
respondents can provide important information about colorism when considering the 
correlation between skin color and life outcomes for Latinos. This, of course, speaks to 
some of the arguments addressed in this project. That is, skin color impacts racial 
formations, while colorism plays a role in the criminalization of Latinos.  
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Different types of data, however, are needed to consider how feelings of exclusion 
and dispossession relate to Latino affiliations with foreignness or Indianism. Qualitative 
data can better illuminate the meaning that Latinos make of the symbols they choose to 
represent their racial identities, whether that imagery appears on walls in their 
neighborhoods, consumer products such as clothing, or on their own bodies in the form of 
tattoos. And, while I have argued throughout this dissertation that processes of 
criminalization have informed the three racial paradigms that I have described herein, 
further investigation is needed to determine the extent to which these paradigms have 
affected particular Latino communities—or even Latino individuals—simultaneously, 
complementing or contradicting one another. Indeed, Latino racial formations—whether 
self-constructed or shaped by observers—are complex, just as racial boundaries in the 
United States have always been contentious.  
Without interrogating the significance of the “Hispanic/Latino” label, researchers 
can lose sight of both the quantitative and qualitative significance of Latino incarceration 
rates. While that label is meant to encompass people with ancestry from Spanish-
speaking and/or Latin American countries, the varying citizenship statuses and English-
proficiency levels among offenders who identify as Hispanic or Latino can have serious 
implications for the way they experience the U.S. criminal justice system and the 
resources they most need. In his essay, “Race, Identity, and ‘Box-Checking,’” legal 
scholar and Latino Critical theorist Luis Angel Toro suggests that the classification of 
“Hispanic” is a legal fiction with dire consequences for overcoming structural 
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disadvantages.68 As Toro implies, the fiction of “Hispanic” breeds a failure to understand 
what is actually at stake for those Latinos being imprisoned. Non-citizen Latinos face 
deportation, and their numbers are on the rise. A significant number of Latinos encounter 
language barriers, which can affect their ability to be hired or do well in school, and 
therefore, can negatively impact their chances for recidivism. Furthermore, low education 
levels and high unemployment rates may cause higher risks for entering prisons, but there 
are also consequences associated with education and unemployment post-incarceration. 
That is, those who have been incarcerated can expect lower job prospects overall, but 
especially so for Latinos with their particularly low education levels.69 For that reason, 
certain Latinos may face unique collateral consequences with incarceration compared to 
other groups, given their previously established disadvantages. Without deconstructing 
the specific demographics of the Latino prison and jail population, state authorities can 
catalog an entire racial group without knowing how to better serve them.  
But there are both negative and positive implications for using the singular 
classification of “Hispanic” for all Hispanics/Latinos making contact with the U.S. 
criminal justice system. Angel Oquendo suggests that Latinos can find commonalities in 
their histories to form a cohesive unit, a “spiritual” rather than material concept of race, 
in his essay, “Re-imagining the Latino/a Race.”70 That is, if “Hispanic” or “Latino” can 
                                               
68 Luis Angel Toro, “Race, Identity, and ‘Box-Checking,’” in The Latino/a Condition: A Critical 
Reader, eds. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 
52-59. 
69 Western, Punishment and Inequality in America, 91-96. 
70 Angel Oquendo, “Re-imagining the Latino/a Race,” in The Latino/a Condition: A Critical 
Reader, eds. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 
60-71. 
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be an empowering term, one which breeds solidarity rather than ignorance, it can be a 
tool to challenge disproportionate rates of incarceration, incarceration’s collateral 
consequences, and the criminalization of all Latinos as presumed immigrants. 
Additionally, a united Latino front can demand services in Spanish if need be. State 
authorities can be held accountable to offer more educational opportunities before, 
during, and after incarceration to prevent further crime. Solutions may be created to help 
the greater number of dependent family members that lose parents to prisons, given that 
incarcerated Latinos are likely to have more children than other inmates.  
To be sure, these concerns need to be addressed even as the state and federal 
prison populations have finally started to decline after over three decades of exponential 
growth.71 During the Obama administration, changes in drug crime sentencing—along 
with two decades of lower crime rates and an overall attitude change away from throw-
away-the-key mindsets—helped drop the federal prison population by one-sixth over the 
past four years. And over the past decade, many states have adopted policies to reduce 
overcrowding in their prisons, with initiatives ranging from more data collection and 
assessment to sentencing reforms and the expanded use of parole and community 
corrections.72 The idea to reduce mass incarceration by releasing geriatric prisoners, 
using prison alternatives to handle low-level offenders, and focusing on rehabilitation and 
treatment for offenders with drug addictions all receive popular support. Of course, 
                                               
71 State prison population began declining in 2010; federal prison populations followed suit in 
2014. E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2014 (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
2015); State, Federal Prison Populations Decline Simultaneously for First Time in 36 Years (Pew 
Research Center, 2015). 
72 State, Federal Prison Populations Decline Simultaneously for First Time in 36 Years. 
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growing awareness of pervasive injustices also draws support for those who have been 
racially profiled, wrongly accused, or disproportionately sentenced. While Americans 
have more easily reached a consensus of support for those ideas, prison abolition is more 
difficult to contemplate, let alone embrace, in the American imagination. The United 
States has been so invested in prisons that incarceration seems inseparable from the 
concept of justice.  
Ultimately, the intersections of race, incarceration, and education demand that the 
United States government more effectively address the significance of the growing 
Latino population, the education achievement gaps between Latino students and their 
peers, and the funds invested in incarceration as opposed to education. As a country, the 
United States spends over a trillion dollars on its high levels of incarceration when 
accounting for the financial burden placed on the families with incarcerated loved ones 
and the communities missing contributing members of society.73 On the other hand, 
Latino students have increasingly enrolled in college, recently matching the levels of 
their white peers, but they still fall behind in four-year degree completion, demonstrating 
a need for greater support systems and resources for Latinos pursuing higher education.74 
Widely-disseminated research, popular discourses, and grassroots activism must push the 
conversation further for a paradigmatic shift to occur and for incarceration to be replaced 
as the principal determinant in the lives of poor communities of color. Without 
                                               
73 M. McLaughlin et al., The Economic Burden of Incarceration in the U.S. (St. Louis, MO: 
Institute for Advancing Justice Research and Innovation, 2017). 
74 John Gramlich, Hispanic dropout rate hits new low, college enrollment at new high (Pew 
Research Center, 2017). 
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investment in improving education for Latinos, prisons are poised to be the dominant 
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